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Abstract
Background and importance: Rising drug prices are putting pressure on health care
budgets. Policymakers are assessing how they can save money through generic drugs.
Objective: The aim of this Ph.D. was to explore issues relating to the prices and usage of
generic medicines in high- and middle-income countries in five articles. This was done
using quantitative and qualitative methods, including price and Herfindahl-Hirschman
indexes, difference-in-differences regression analyses, semi-structured stakeholder in-
terviews, and literature reviews. As a Ph.D. “thesis by papers”, each of the five articles
should be read as a stand-alone piece. However, the thesis presents an overarching
narrative, outlined at the end of Chapter 1.
Novelty and empirical contribution: My original contributions to knowledge are:
(i) updated analyses of generic drug policies, prices, and usage rates in high-income
countries, based on a large, representative sample of generic medicines from 2013
(Chapters 2 and 3); (ii) evidence on the impact of a pharmaceutical tendering system
on medicines prices, demand, and competition over a 15-year period (Chapter 4); (iii)
quantitative data on the impact of therapeutic tendering on drug spending and prices
(Chapter 5); and (iv) qualitative data on how a country can move from a fragmented
health-care system to a single-payer one, using tendering as the basis for a comprehens-
ive drug-benefit plan (Chapter 6).
Key findings: The prices and market shares of generics varied widely across Europe.
For example, prices charged by manufacturers in Switzerland were, on average, more
than 2.5 times those in Germany and more than 6 times those in the United Kingdom,
based on the results of a commonly used price index. However, the results varied
depending on the choice of index, base country, unit of volume, method of currency
conversion, and therapeutic category. The results also differed depending on whether
one looked at the prices charged by manufacturers or those charged by pharmacists.
The proportion of prescriptions filled with generics ranged from 17% in Switzerland
to 83% in the United Kingdom. The results of the first two studies indicated that the
countries which used tender or tender-like systems to set generic drug prices in retail
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pharmacies (ie, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden) had among the
lowest prices among the countries included in the studies.
Tendering can be an effective policy to procure essential medicines at low prices,
based on analysis of data from South Africa and Cyprus. For instance, the average
prices of antiretroviral therapies, anti-infective medicines, small-volume parenterals,
drops and inhalers, solid-dose medicines, and family-planning agents dropped by
roughly 40% or more between 2003 and 2016 in South Africa. Many tender contracts
in South Africa remained competitive over time, based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman
results, with some notable exceptions. However, the number of different firms winning
contracts decreased over time in most tender categories. Also, there were large dis-
crepancies between the drug quantities the health ministry estimated it would need to
meet patient demand and the quantities the ministry went on to procure during tender
periods. In South Africa, the introduction of therapeutic tendering was associated with
an estimated 33% to 44% reduction in the prices of solid-dose drugs in 2014. National
governments in countries aiming to introduce national health systems (eg, Cyprus and
South Africa) will need to adapt their tendering systems and other pharmaceutical
policies during transition periods.
Future research directions: More research is needed to better understand the drivers
of differences in generic drug prices between countries. It is also important to examine
why there are large differences in the prices of drugs in various therapeutic areas, both
within and between countries. Also, data from more countries, especially low- and
middle-income ones, are needed to determine which features of tendering systems are
associated with lower prices. Future studies should re-examine the South African thera-
peutic tendering system once data from more post-intervention periods are available,
possibly using other research designs like interrupted time-series models (ie, segmented
regression analysis).
Policy implications: Price indexes are useful statistical approaches for comparing
drug prices across countries, but policymakers should interpret price indexes with
caution given their limitations. This thesis offers useful data for policymakers using, or
planning to introduce, tendering systems, especially in countries aiming for universal
health coverage, like Cyprus (Chapter 6) and South Africa (Chapters 4 and 5).
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Introduction
“Begin at the beginning,” the King said, gravely, “and go on till you come to an end;
then stop.”
– Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
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MEDICINES are integral to modern health care. In the past half-century, thediscovery of transformative new drugs revolutionized medicine. [1] Theapproval of the blood-pressure-reducing drug captopril and the cholesterol-
lowering medicine lovastatin in the 1980s by US regulators ushered in a new era in
cardiovascular care. The antidepressant fluoxetine, first marketed in the US in 1986,
helped reshape psychiatric treatment. The chemotherapy imatinib, approved by the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the early 2000s, radically improved the
treatment of leukemia and other types of cancer. The discovery of protease inhibitors,
a class of antiretroviral drugs, turned human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) into a
manageable chronic illness. And the recent advent of immunotherapy promises to
transform cancer therapy. Yet despite these advances, many patients worldwide lack
access to medicines, with drugs often unaffordable or unavailable. [2–21]
I Access to medicines
The World Health Organization (WHO) views “equitable access to safe and afford-
able medicines as vital to the attainment of the highest possible standard of health by
all”. [23] This public health imperative falls under the umbrella term “access to medi-
cines”, which encompasses the accessibility (eg, physical location of pharmacies), avail-
ability, affordability, and acceptability (eg, quality) of medicines. [23] Access to essential
medicines, as part of a broader right to health, was enshrined in international law by
the WHO in its constitution (1946) and by the United Nations General Assembly in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). [2, 7, 22, 24–29]
Right-to-health principles are written into many national constitutions. [25, 26]
Access to affordable, high-quality, essential medicines is a matter of global concern.
In 2015, the United Nations set up a high-level panel on access to medicines to “review
and assess proposals and recommend solutions for remedying the policy incoherence
between the justifiable rights of inventors, international human rights law, trade rules
and public health in the context of health technologies”. [30] In 2017, a commission
convened by the medical journal The Lancet published a report on access to essential
medicines for universal health coverage. [2] Organisations like the Access Campaign of
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) and Drugs for Neglected Diseases
initiative (DNDi) have for decades been promoting drug innovation and development
in neglected disease areas and better access to health technologies for all. [31]
The availability of low-cost generic medicines is a key part of any national or
international strategy to guarantee access to essential medicines for patients. [2] Generic
medicines are bioequivalent replicas of brand name drugs, containing the same active
ingredients and with identical quality, safety, and efficacy profiles. Generics can be sold
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for much less than their brand name counterparts as they are relatively inexpensive
to bring to market. Greater use of generic medicines instead of more expensive brand
name ones can improve health-care efficiency and generate savings without stifling
drug innovation. [9] In countries where patients lack insurance against prescription
drug costs, the availability of generic drugs can promote equitable access to medicines.
The next section describes the life cycle of a new medicine, from its initial marketing
after successful clinical trials in humans to the availability of generic versions of the
medicine.
II Life cycle of a pharmaceutical product
Manufacturers of on-patent drugs, referred to as brand name or originator firms
throughout this thesis, hold monopoly positions due to patents and other market
exclusivities awarded during research and development. To the extent possible un-
der the law, these firms charge the highest price the market will bear to maximize
profits. [32] This is represented by stages 1 and 2 in Figure 1, which shows the life-cycle
stages and typical price trend for a new pharmaceutical product.
If drugs with different active ingredients target the same condition and offer com-
parable therapeutic benefits, the situation could, in theory, resemble an oligopolistic
market (stage 3 in Figure 1). In reality, there is often little price competition between
therapeutic substitutes—also called “me-too” drugs or drug analogues [34]—as shown
in previous studies, many of which looked at the US drug market. [35–45] For instance,
the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found, based on data for medicines in
five therapeutic classes, that the prices of the breakthrough drugs—ie, the first active
ingredients in each class to use a therapeutic mechanism—often continued to rise in
the US at a rate faster than inflation after me-too competitors entered the market. [37]
Similarly, Hostenkamp found no evidence of price competition between therapeutic
substitutes sold in Danish hospital pharmacies. [36] Lu and Comanor reported that the
average price of brand name drugs in their sample rose faster than inflation in the US
after the introduction of therapeutic substitutes, although they found that the rate of in-
crease was lower in therapeutic classes with more competitors, all else equal. [38] They
also found that the prices of some me-too drugs which offered little or no therapeutic
benefit over the first-in-class product were typically sold at a lower initial price than
the first-in-class product—presumably in an attempt to gain market share—but that
the prices were sharply raised for many of the products once they become more widely
used. [38]
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Figure 1: Pharmaceutical life-cycle stages and generalized price development for a specific
disease area or condition.
Source: Reproduced from WHO (2016, p. 5), with permission. [33]
It is difficult to draw causal, and universally applicable, conclusions about the
nature and extent of price competition between me-too products. Results are likely to
differ from country to country, since price regulations and incentives for consumers
to choose the least expensive me-too drugs vary widely across settings. For example,
some countries, like France and Sweden, require regulatory approval for a drug to
be reimbursed by the state and generally prohibit price changes once a product has
been brought to market. Other countries, like the US, generally allow free pricing of
products. [46] Such differences influence the pricing strategies of drug manufactur-
ers. Drug substitution and internal reference pricing policies also differ across and
within countries, as outlined in Chapter 2, and both types of policies can impact price
competition between therapeutic substitutes. [46]
Still, several factors may explain the observed lack of price competition in many of
these studies. Importantly, first-in-class medicines have the advantage that physicians
become accustomed to prescribing those medicines and may be hesitant to switch
patients to me-too drugs later on if there is no clear clinical rationale for doing so, espe-
cially since physicians often lack data on the comparative costs of treatments. [37, 47]
The prescribing habits of clinicians may also be shaped by the promotional activit-
ies of drug firms and their sales representatives, who often try to differentiate their
products from those of competitors. [47, 48] These firms sometimes engage in aggress-
ive “switch” campaigns, in which doctors are encouraged to switch their patients to a
me-too product. [49] As Kessler and colleagues describe, companies “rely on the widely
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held notion—not always true—that what is newer is better and is therefore worth more.
Aggressive advertising campaigns and lack of information among prescribing physi-
cians about comparative costs can facilitate the higher pricing of ’me-too’ drugs”. [47]
In the past, pharmaceutical companies have regularly made “false and misleading
claims” about the superiority of their products over others in promotional materials
and activities. [47] There are also rampant conflicts of interest in the medical-industrial
complex, [47, 50] with many physicians receiving payments or research grants from
drug firms, which may influence prescribing patterns. [51–53]
Moreover, for there to be strong price competition between therapeutic substitutes,
consumers would need to be sensitive to differences in quality and price between
such products. [35] (Here consumer refers, in most cases, to physicians or pharmacists
who select treatment regimens for their patients. [54]) Yet there are usually major
imperfections in consumer behavior in health care markets. [35, 55] Many clinicians are
unaware about the comparative costs of treatments, and many prescribe based on habit
rather than up-to-date clinical evidence. [56] Imperfections in consumer behavior may
limit or even prohibit price competition between therapeutic substitutes.
Once the market exclusivity of a drug expires—at which time the brand name
company is expected to have recouped its sunk research and development (R&D)
costs1—any firm can legally sell a generic copy of the drug (stages 4 through 6 in
Figure 1), subject to bioequivalence standards and good manufacturing practices. [62]2
Generic medicines are bioequivalent replicas of on-patent drugs: they contain the same
active ingredients and have identical quality, safety, and efficacy profiles. [64, 65] Only
the non-active ingredients, known as excipients, can differ between originator and
generic drugs. For example, generics may contain different colouring, flavouring, and
stabilising agents. [64] (Throughout this thesis, I use the term brand name or originator
drugs to refer to patent-protected medicines and generic drugs to refer to bioequivalent
replicas of originator products.3)
Generic drugs are important for two reasons. First, as generic firms generally incur
1Some health policy experts argue that the high prices charged by brand name firms are not commen-
surate with the industry’s R&D outlays. [57–59] By one estimate, US taxpayers, patients, and private
industry alone pay roughly “1.7 times the global R&D expenses of major pharmaceutical corporations
as a result of paying more than these corporations charge European countries for the same products —
an excess amounting to US$ 40 billion in 2015, about 10 percent of total spending the US on pharmaceut-
icals”. [60, 61] Topics around the pricing and patenting of new medicines are outside the scope of thesis.
Instead, I assume that when an originator firm loses its market exclusivity for a brand name product,
the firm has recovered its R&D costs. Regulators, payers, policymakers, and other stakeholders should
then strive to make high-quality generic drugs available sustainably as soon as possible at affordable
prices—all while encouraging patients to switch to generic drugs from their brand name counterparts.
2These standards are not always met in low- and middle-income countries, often due to inadequate
regulatory capacity, leading to variable quality. [63] The WHO operates a pre-qualification scheme for
suppliers to try to guarantee the quality, efficacy, and safety of generic medicines in these countries. [62]
3There are branded generic products, but the distinction between branded and unbranded generics is
not essential for this thesis.
25
fewer research, development, and advertising costs, generics can be priced considerably
lower than on-patent drugs. [8, 48] In this way, generic drugs can generate sizable
savings for payers. Here payer refers to “any groups, other than patients, that are
responsible for funding or reimbursing the cost of health care. ... Depending on the
country, the term ‘payer’ might refer to private or public insurers, employers, or other
third-party payers”. [66] In countries where patients bear most or all of the cost of drugs,
lower generic prices can improve the affordability of treatment. Second, the availability
of generic drugs could stimulate innovation, as it should encourage originator firms to
invest in research and development to regain their monopoly positions. Payers can also
use the savings from generics to buy on-patent drugs, which may promote innovation.
However, it is important that savings from generics are used to pay for new medicines
which have been shown, preferably in high-quality, head-to-head randomized clinical
trials, to be better than older, cheaper alternatives. [67] Otherwise, the savings from
generic medicine may contribute to the proliferation of me-too drugs, ie, drugs which
provide little or no added therapeutic benefit over existing treatment options. [67]
Payers thus aim to minimize generic drug prices and to maximize the volume
market shares of generic drugs. The latter has increased steadily over the last two
decades in most high- and middle-income countries. In 2014, around 9 out of 10
prescriptions were filled generically in the US, representing roughly one-third of drug
spending. [68] The US Association for Accessible Medicines, a trade association for
generic drug manufacturers and distributors, estimated that the use of low-cost generic
medicines saved the US health care system roughly US$ 1.7 trillion between 2006 and
2016, including US$ 115 billion in savings for Medicare and Medicaid in 2016 alone. [69]
In Europe, generics account for about half of drug consumption, but only 18% of
spending. [70]
Yet a recent US study estimated that the underuse of cheaper generics leads to nearly
US$ 6 billion in unrealised savings per year. [71] An earlier study approximated that
US drug expenditure would decrease by about 11% if generics were substituted for all
originator drugs that are dispensed despite generics being available. [72] Another study
estimated that the cost of treating hypertensive patients would drop by 25% in the US
if physicians followed clinical guidelines more closely and prescribed generics when
appropriate. [73] Studies from Canada, China, EU member states, Japan, Latin American
countries, and the US have also highlighted significant shortcomings in generic drug
markets in each of these countries or regions. [8, 10, 14–21] There is growing concern
that, over time, as prices drop, generic markets may experience a steep decline in
competition and drug shortages (stages 5 and 6 of Figure 1), as witnessed in the US
and other countries in recent years. [74–77] This is discussed further in Chapter 2.
Many blockbuster drugs—drugs with over US$ 1 billion in annual sales—will lose
their patents in the coming years. It is therefore timely to study drug market function
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to improve generic drug policies (incl. competition between therapeutic substitutes),
ie, stages 3-6 in Figure 1. This is especially critical in periods of economic recession
when available resources are further constrained. Access to cheap, effective, safe, high-
quality generic medicines is critical if health systems worldwide are to address the
rising costs of health and pharmaceutical care. [78–81] The aim of this Ph.D. was to
explore issues relating to the prices and usage of generic medicines in selected high-
and middle-income countries in five related articles, as described further in the next
chapter.
In this thesis, I only analysed generic drug markets (ie, bioequivalent new molecular
entities), not markets for biosimilar products. As described earlier, generic drugs
are bioequivalent, chemically-derived copies of brand-name pharmaceutical products.
Biological, biopharmaceutical, and biosimilar products, which are derived from human
or animal materials, follow different approval and regulatory pathways. [82–91]
III Thesis requirements
This thesis adheres to the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
guidelines for a “thesis by publishable papers”, which should (i) “consist of at least
three papers, an introduction, conclusion, and any other linking chapters that might be
appropriate” and (ii) “have a minimum of 50,000 words and a maximum of 100,000
words including figures and tables in the overall count”.
The LSE Department of Social Policy guidelines further state: “The papers should
... have been published in high-quality refereed journals, be submitted for publication
to such a journal, or be of a quality to be published in such a journal. The large
majority of the work for the papers concerned should have begun after the student’s
initial registration for M.Phil./Ph.D. At least one paper should be single authored,
and any other papers should be primarily authored by the student. If there are any
co-authored papers, the thesis should be accompanied by specific detailed statements
on the contribution of the co-authors”.
The full requirements for LSE doctoral theses can be found in the university’s
“Regulations for Research Degrees”, available at https://www.lse.ac.uk/.
IV Structure of the thesis
Chapter 1 reviews literature relevant to this thesis, including data on the supply- and
demand-side policies used in generic drug markets, as well as the pricing and usage of
generic medicines in high- and middle-income countries. Chapter 1 also outlines gaps
in the literature and the research questions posed in each thesis paper.
27
Chapters 2 through 6 present the empirical results of each study. As a Ph.D. thesis
by papers, each of the five articles should be read as a stand-alone piece. However, the
thesis presents an overarching narrative, outlined at the end of Chapter 1.
Chapter 7 summarises the main contributions of this thesis, offers ideas for future
research, discusses possible policy implications of my findings, and outlines limitations
of this research.
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1Literature review
“There is no such thing as truth. People who really know what happened aren’t talking.
And the people who don’t have a clue, you can’t shut them up.”
– Tom Waits, Interview in Pitchfork magazine (Nov. 2006)
Key messages
• There are gaps in our understanding of off-patent drug markets.
• There are few published comparisons of generic drug prices and usage rates in
high-income countries using large, representative samples of medicines.
• There is little evidence on the impact of pharmaceutical tenders on competition
and drug prices over time.
• Little is known about the impact of tendering for medicines by therapeutic class
on prices and spending.
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THE World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) outlines minimum standards of intellectualproperty rights. All WTO member states must incorporate these standards into
national legislation, although the TRIPS agreement contains “provisions that allow a
degree of flexibility and sufficient room for countries to accommodate their own patent
and intellectual property systems and developmental needs”. [92]1
In accordance with the TRIPS agreement, new pharmaceutical products or manu-
facturing processes are patented for a minimum of 20 years in WTO member states
to reward innovation and incentivise research and development.2 In some countries,
including European Union (EU) member states and the United States (US), patent terms
can be prolonged to ensure returns on investment for firms; [10, 93] other forms of
market exclusivity may also apply. [93]
While patent protection is meant to stimulate innovation, it is important to protect
payers from excessive drug costs. Between 2000 and 2015, drug spending per person
(adjusted for inflation) increased dramatically in many member states of the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Figure 1.1). [94] In 2015,
drug spending as a proportion of GDP among these countries ranged from 0.5% in
Luxembourg to 2.2% in Greece (median: 1.4%), while drug spending as a proportion
of total health spending ranged from 6.8% in Denmark to 29.2% in Hungary (median:
15.1%). Drug spending per capita (median among OECD countries in 2015: US$ 511.6)
is likely to continue to rise, in real terms, due to ageing populations, growing income
levels, and increasing costs of new drugs, among other factors. [78–81]
In off-patent markets, the key entry barriers, namely intellectual property protection
and high research and development costs, are removed. Once the market exclusiv-
ity of a brand name drug expires, generic drug firms with marketing approval can
start selling copycat versions of the originator drug. In theory, an infinite number of
generic substitutes could become available shortly after the loss of market exclusiv-
ity.3 Although this should lead to a competitive environment, market imperfections
will likely remain. Importantly, the market for medicines is characterized by a tiered
demand system, in which physicians and pharmacists make treatment decisions for
1For instance, the Doha Declaration affirmed the right of developing countries to issue compulsory
licenses, enable pharmaceutical parallel trade, and take other steps to “ensure access to medicines in
the interests of public health”. Critics argue, however, that governments in low- and middle-income
countries have not taken adequate advantage of these provisions to guarantee access to essential
medicines for patients. [92]
2A patent is usually enforced from when the application is filed, which, for medicines, is typically around
the time of discovery. [92] Thus, the ’effective’ patent length following clinical trials and marketing
approval is shorter than the 20-year ’nominal’ length. [93] Products can also enjoy a period of data
exclusivity (for safety, quality, and efficacy data produced during clinical trials) to “protect undisclosed
test data, submitted to drug regulatory authorities for the purposes of obtaining marketing approval,
against unfair commercial use”. [92] The period of data exclusivity may extend beyond the date of
patent expiry. [10]
3Some patients may experience side-effects to the inactive ingredients of generics.
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patients, who are often price insensitive if covered by comprehensive insurance. [62]
Physicians and pharmacists, in turn, may not be aware of all generic medicines or still
prefer originator products. [95] Patients may also exhibit brand loyalty to originator
drugs. [96] In fact, a number of recent studies and systematic reviews have found that
many physicians, pharmacists, and patients hold unfavorable views of generic drugs
which are not evidence based. [51, 95–104]
Even if a perfectly competitive off-patent market is unattainable, generic drug
policies may help decrease prices and encourage patients to switch from originator
to generic drugs. To expedite generic entry, most high-income countries streamline
the approval process. [105–108] In the US, for instance, Roche-Bolar provisions4 allow
generic firms to submit “abbreviated new drug applications” prior to patent expiry. In
these applications, generic firms can refer to the data generated by originator firms and
do not have to re-conduct all the clinical tests. [105,107,109] Similar exemptions exist in
the EU and other countries. [106]5
To understand the functioning of generic drug markets, it is important to examine
the supply- and demand-side factors influencing the availability, prices, and market
shares of generic drugs. To this end, I conducted two separate literature reviews to
identify literature gaps and research questions which I addressed in each of the five
thesis articles.
In the rest of this chapter, I discuss: (i) the methods followed for both literature
reviews, (ii) the key supply- and demand-side policies used in generic drug markets
in high- and middle-income countries to encourage price competition among generic
drug companies and promote generic drug use, (iii) the available evidence on which
factors influence the availability, prices, and market shares of generic drugs in high-
and middle-income countries, (iv) the gaps in the literature on generic drug markets
addressed in this thesis, and (v) the research questions posed in each thesis paper.
4The name comes from a 1984 patent dispute in a US court case between Roche Products, Inc., an
originator firm, and Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., a generic firm.
5The US also provides six-month marketing exclusivity to generic drug companies that successfully
challenge brand-name patents. This is usually called a “Paragraph IV challenge” after the relevant
clause in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act. [109] However, this clause is controversial since it results in a duopoly between
the off-patent originator drug and first generic entrant. [109] The first generic entrant is then able to
price its product just below the price of the off-patent originator, since it cannot legally face any further
competition. [110] This limits the potential savings for payers, which may explain why such clauses are
rarely adopted in other countries. [108]
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Figure 1.1: Total pharmaceutical expenditure (US$ per capita) in 23 OECD countries (2000-2015).
Note: 2000 data were unavailable for Belgium, Hungary, and Poland; 2015 data were unavailable for Australia, Canada, and Japan.
Source: Reproduced from OECD data. [94]
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1.1 Methods
1.1.1 Scoping literature review: Generic drug policies
I reviewed the generic drug policies in the ten largest generic drug markets in Europe
in 2013, which—listed in order—were: Germany, France, the UK, Spain, Italy, Poland,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium.6 These countries were selected
since they are also covered in Chapters 2 and 3.
I focused on high-income countries due to availability of information and data.
A recent literature review [111] summarized pharmaceutical pricing and purchasing
policies used in low- and middle-income countries. The generic drug policies identified
in that review mirrored those used in the ten countries above, with the exception of
cost-plus pricing (Table 1.1). At the end of each section, I give examples of low- and
middle-income countries which use each policy. [111]
To categorize pharmaceutical policies, I followed the conceptual framework outlined
by Kanavos (2014), [8] which distinguishes between supply- and demand-side policies.
Supply-side measures target prices and reimbursement rates, while demand-side meas-
ures target quantities (Table 1.1). Supply-side measures include policies aimed at
controlling distribution chain costs, such as regulation of mark-ups and discounts. I
did not examine measures used to speed up generic market entry, like allowing generic
drug firms to file so-called abbreviated new drug applications prior to patent expiry.
Supply- and demand-side policies play complementary roles in fostering strong generic
drug markets.
To identify the generic drug policies applied in each country in 2013 for reimbursed
medicines, I followed a four-step approach. First, I used previously-compiled lists of
policies in each country (2000-2010) as a baseline; [8, 108] these lists included all the
study countries except Belgium and Switzerland. For Switzerland I used a 2007 country
report published by the OECD as the baseline, [112] while for Belgium I relied on a
published article from 2005 on the country’s generic drug policies. [113]
Second, I searched MEDLINE for peer-reviewed literature published between 1 Janu-
ary 2011 and 11 August 2015 (search date) with up-to-date information for each country;
Appendix A provides a summary of the search strategy, search dates, and results. The
references were handled in EndNote X7 (Thomson Reuters, Toronto, Canada). I also
searched the websites of the respective health ministries—if these pages were available
in English or French—for information about generic drug policies. When there were
discrepancies between sources, I relied on the most recently-published information.
Figure 1.2 and Box 1.1 summarise the search strategy and results, respectively.
6The sizes of the European generic drug markets were determined based on IMS Health data on sales in
euros in 2013; all foreign currencies were converted to euros based on yearly average exchange rates.
The dataset is described in greater detail in Chapter 2.
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Third, I compared our findings with internal IMS Health guides on the pharmaceut-
ical sectors in the study countries in 2013. These documents outlined the generic drug
policies in each country. When there were discrepancies between the data identified in
the first two steps and the IMS Health guides, I relied on the information in the guides.
Finally, I contacted at least one pharmaceutical policy researcher or health ministry
official from each country to verify the identified policies (Appendix A). The policy
summaries are meant to provide an overview of the approaches used in each country
to regulate generic drug markets, but exceptions may apply to some products. Also, to
contextualize the policy summaries below and provide evidence on their effectiveness,
I added references to relevant studies where appropriate.
Figure 1.2: Preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA) flow
chart.
Note: The PRISMA flow chart was developed by [114].
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Box 1.1: Search strategy and selection criteria.
The aim of the literature review was to identify which generic drug policies
were used in 2013 in the retail drug markets in Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK.
I searched the MEDLINE database (PubMed portal, title/abstract) for
English- and French-language peer-reviewed studies published between
1 January 2011 and 11 August 2015 (search date). I excluded conference
abstracts and used the following keywords:
1. (generic or off-patent)
2. (drug* or medicine* or pharmaceutical*)
3. (Belgium or England or France or Germany or Italy or Netherlands
or Northern Ireland or Poland or Portugal or Scotland or Spain or
Switzerland or UK or U.K. or United Kingdom or Wales)
An asterisk truncated the search word (eg, drug* = drug, drugs, etc.). I
carried out the search for each country separately, so line 3 only included
one country at a time. For the UK search, I also included the terms England,
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.
I included an article if it contained at least one section describing the
supply-side or demand-side generic drug policies in the study country.
This could include a comprehensive overview of such policies in the
background/introduction section of an article, as determined by the author.
The reference lists of identified articles were screened and relevant articles
were included. These citation checks sometimes revealed articles which
were relevant for other study countries.
1.1.2 Narrative literature review: Generic drug markets
Next, I surveyed peer-reviewed studies, grey literature, and books published since 2000
to identify factors associated with: (i) generic market entry, (ii) originator drug prices
and market shares (following loss of market exclusivity), and (iii) generic drug prices
and market shares. I also included highly referenced older publications. I summarised
the qualitative data as a narrative review. Much of the evidence on competition and
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market structures in generic drug sectors comes from Europe and the United States.
These studies were identified through unstructured searches of EconLit, Embase,
MEDLINE (PubMed), Scopus, ISI Web of Science, and Google Scholar over the course of
my Ph.D. studies. The searches included terms like “generic medicine”, “generic drug”,
”market entry”, “market share”, “originator drug”, “originator medicine”, “policy”,
“price”, “pricing”, “reimbursement”, and common synonyms; I used asterisks (*) where
appropriate to truncate search terms. I searched “article title, abstract, and keywords”
(or the closest equivalent in each database), as well as MEDLINE and Embase subject
headings (MeSH and Emtree, respectively). The reference lists of identified articles were
screened; relevant articles suggested by experts were also included. The references were
handled in EndNote X7 (Thomson Reuters, Toronto, Canada) or Mendeley (Elsevier,
Amsterdam, Netherlands).
1.2 Supply-side generic drug policies
Supply-side policies can be broadly categorised into two groups: market mechanisms
and procurement strategies. [108] Market mechanisms are regulations which affect the
prices and reimbursement rates of medicines. Three of the most common ones are price
capping, free pricing, and internal reference pricing. Procurement strategies, which are
non-market mechanisms, refer to the centralised purchasing of a particular quantity of
generics at an agreed-upon price. Tendering is the only procurement strategy used for
generic drugs. Supply-side measures also included policies aimed at controlling the
distribution chain.
These policies were applicable for reimbursed prescription medicines, and the
policies were usually set and enforced by government officials in the national health
ministry or medicines agency, depending on the country. In some countries, like Spain,
individual payers can set different reimbursement rules. Some pricing authorities (eg,
Italy) also reserve the right to enact across-the-board price cuts at their discretion, while
others (eg, Belgium and Portugal) require manufacturers to repay part of their turnover
on reimbursed drugs each year if total public spending exceeds a predetermined level.
1.2.1 Free pricing
Belgium, Germany, and the UK are the only countries among the ten to generally
allow generic drug firms to set their own prices, presumably in the hopes that this
will encourage generic entry and price competition. [115, 116] In Germany, however,
manufacturers bringing new generic products to market must offer a rebate (10%) to
sickness funds unless the products are priced at least 30% below the reference price
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(see section below on internal reference pricing); additional rebates apply to products
that are not subject to internal reference pricing.
Free pricing can be coupled with internal reference pricing and demand-side policies,
which are discussed in subsequent sections. Some studies suggest that prices are lower
over time, on average, in countries which allow free pricing than in those which enforce
price caps (see next sub-section). [10, 43, 46, 108, 116, 117] However, it is difficult to
disentangle the effects of multiple drug policies operating concurrently.
1.2.2 Price capping
The national governments of the other seven countries cap the ex-manufacturer prices
of generic drugs (ie, impose maximum allowable prices). The caps specify the minimum
amount by which generic drug manufacturers must drop their prices in relation to
those of the originator drugs. [111, 116, 118–120]
These reductions are fixed in France (60%), Poland (25%), Portugal (50%), and Spain
(40%); Portugal is the only country where the cap applies to wholesale prices. In Italy
(30-75%) and Switzerland (10-60%), the caps are calculated on a sliding scale based
on the average annual turnover of the originator product in the years preceding loss
of market exclusivity. The caps are larger for generic versions of drugs with higher
turnovers during the periods of patent protection. In the Netherlands, the cap for a
given medicine is calculated based on the ex-manufacturer prices of the same drug in
selected EU countries.
Price-cap regulation is prevalent in Europe, where it is seen as easy to implement
and is politically popular. It is unclear, though, whether price caps contain drug costs
effectively, as they limit the first-mover advantage for generic firms. [116, 121] In the
absence of a price cap, the first generic entrant might only offer a limited price reduction
to maximise profits. This could encourage other generic firms to enter the market
and stimulate price competition. [115] Medicines for Europe, a trade organization
for generic drug firms which was previously called the European Generic Medicines
Association, argues that price-cap regulation partly removes this incentive and may
lessen savings. [122]
Policymakers in some low- and middle-income countries set maximum retail prices
(eg, China, India, Philippines, South Africa [private sector], and Sri Lanka), maximum
wholesale prices (eg, Sri Lanka), and maximum ex-manufacturer prices (eg, Bulgaria,
Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Vietnam) for generic medicines. [111]
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1.2.3 Internal reference pricing
Internal reference pricing sets a maximum reimbursement rate for generic drugs. [13,
123, 124] There are two main types of internal reference pricing: molecular and thera-
peutic. Molecular reference pricing—also called chemical or generic reference pri-
cing [116, 123]—sets a reference price for drugs with the same active ingredient (ie, the
off-patent originator drug and any available generic versions of that drug). Therapeutic
reference pricing sets a reference price for all drugs considered therapeutic equivalents
(ie, the off-patent originator drug, any available generic versions of that drug, and other
brand name or generic drugs that treat the same condition). A key aim of the latter is to
curb spending on “me-too drugs” which offer limited therapeutic benefit over existing
ones. [125–128]
If a product is priced above the reference price, the patient usually has to pay the
difference out-of-pocket. For example, if three generics of a drug are priced at e10, e15,
and e20 per 30-day supply, a payer may be willing to reimburse up to the average price
(e15) and force patients to pay a e5 surcharge if they select the most expensive option.
Eight of the countries set maximum reimbursement rates for generic medicines
through internal reference pricing. In most of the countries, medicines are grouped
by active ingredient—that is, a basket consists of the originator drug and the available
generic versions of this drug—and then a reimbursement cap is set for each of these
baskets. Often, the reference price is the lowest retail price among the medicines in a
basket. In Germany and Poland, the groups can also include medicines considered to be
therapeutically equivalent, which may be on- or off-patent drugs with different active
ingredients. If the price of a generic medicine exceeds the molecular or therapeutic
reference price, the patient must pay the difference in all of the countries except Spain,
where products priced above the reference price are not reimbursed at all.
Internal reference pricing is meant to spur competition between drug firms by
making patients more price sensitive. [125] The evidence suggests the prices of more
expensive drugs tend to drop to the reference level, while the prices of cheaper products
often increase to the reference level. In other words, internal reference pricing seems
to incite one-off reductions in spending, but may not encourage further price competi-
tion. [116, 123, 125, 126, 128] Reference pricing systems may operate more efficiently if
the reference prices are revised periodically, as this could prevent the reference price
from acting as a price floor. [115] However, there are few date on the long-term impact
of reference pricing on generic drug prices and spending. [123]
Internal reference pricing is also used in low- and middle-income countries, includ-
ing Bulgaria, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. [111]
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1.2.4 Tendering
In a tender, a drug purchaser puts out a request for a quantity of a medicine and asks
for bids from domestic or international manufacturers with the right to sell the product
in the country. Usually, the purchaser then asks the manufacturer which offered the
lowest price to supply the market for the duration of the contract.
Tendering schemes, also called reverse auctions, can differ across jurisdictions in
several ways. Importantly, schemes vary with regard to the price criteria (eg, lowest
price or any price within 5% of lowest), the number of winners, and the length of the
tender period. [129] Tenders can be issued by public or private payers. [129] Often,
payers award the contract based on several criteria, including price, firm’s country of
origin (ie, local vs. foreign), quality, delivery date, and after-sales service (eg, respond
to drug-related queries). [129]
Of the ten countries included in this review, only Germany, the Netherlands, and
Spain tender for generic drugs.7 In all three countries, a purchaser—a sickness fund in
Germany, a private health insurer in the Netherlands, or the Andalusian Health Service
in Spain—can only tender for drugs with the same active ingredients. In Germany,
some sickness funds split contracts between as many as four firms if the price bids are
similar.
Tendering is used in many low- and middle-income countries in Africa (eg, Angola,
Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa), the Western Pacific (eg, China, Fiji, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, and Vietnam), and Latin America. [111] In
China, for instance, where tenders are issued at provincial level, the national govern-
ment supports a tendering system consisting of two stages: in the first round, suppliers
are asked to submit documentation showing that they satisfy quality and performance
standards, after which government official evaluate the commercial bids of applicants
who passed the first round. [130]
1.2.5 Distribution regulation
In all the countries except Germany and Poland, the governments enforce regressive
margins for wholesalers and pharmacies: the percentage mark-ups decrease on a sliding
scale as drug prices increase. Even if a mark-up is regressive, however, pharmacists
might earn more in absolute term by prescribing more expensive, branded medicines.
Some of the countries also allow pharmacists to charge a dispensing fee. Pharmacists
in Belgium, for example, receive an extra fee (e1.26) for dispensing a medicine included
in the reference price system. These fees can differ based on the length of a prescription
7Only the Spanish autonomous community of Andalusia issues tenders for drugs sold in retail pharma-
cies.
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and the amount of subsidies given to pharmacies in less-populous areas. In Poland, the
wholesaler mark-ups are fixed at 6%, although the pharmacy mark-ups are regressive.
In Germany, the distribution-chain mark-ups are fixed percentages. In the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and the UK, the margins are unregulated, probably with the aim of
encouraging price competition. With the exception of Germany, all of the countries
have eliminated or reduced the value-added taxes on prescription medicines.
Manufacturers and wholesalers can offer confidential discounts in all countries
except Italy and Poland. This is done to incentivise pharmacies to dispense their drugs
by offering discounts; the level and scope of the discounts are usually confidential. [116,
131, 132] Generic manufacturers often give discounts to wholesalers on bulk orders
to incentivize wholesalers to buy medicines from them instead of their competitors,
while wholesalers often give discounts to pharmacies for the same reason. Some
countries cap the permissible level of discounts. In France, for example, the maximum
permitted discounts offered by wholesalers to pharmacists for generic products is
17%, while in Spain it is 10%. All the countries that allow discounts, except Portugal,
require wholesalers and pharmacies to repay a defined amount of their profits from
such discounts; this is known as a “clawback”. Italy, which forbids discounting for
reimbursed medicines, still requires pharmacies to repay some of their profits each year
based on annual turnover rates.
Margin levels and discounting practices are regulated in many low- and middle-
income countries, including Bangladesh, Bulgaria, China, India, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Turkey, and Vietnam. [111]
1.2.6 Supply-side lessons
There are differences in the features and mix of supply-side policies employed in high-
and middle-income countries, despite often shared health and industrial policy goals.
As shown in Table 1.2, regulators and payers sometimes follow markedly different
strategies to decrease prices. For example, while some countries, like France, force
generic drug firms to decrease prices through price caps, others, like the UK, allow
free pricing. This may be due to a weak understanding of which measures are most
effective. In particular, there is disagreement over whether market forces or centralised
procurement are most appropriate to support a strong generic market. It is important
to disentangle the effects of these policies on generic prices to promote evidence-based
practices.
The available evidence on the impact of different generic drug policies on prices is
of variable quality. Several studies have found that generic drug prices tend to be lower
over time in countries with less regulation of generic drug prices, after controlling for
relevant factors like population size (ie, a proxy for market size), demand-side policies
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(eg, compulsory generic substitution), and time since market entry. [10, 46, 108, 116, 117,
133] Meanwhile, systematic reviews have consistently found that internal reference
pricing can lead to immediate savings through reductions in drug prices, although the
long-term effects of the policy are unclear. [116, 123, 125]
There is growing interest in the use of tenders to obtain price reductions on generic
drugs. Tendering has been commonly used for inpatient drugs and other medical
technologies, such as vaccines, [134–139] but tendering for outpatient medicines is still
in its infancy. Studies have documented early experiences with tendering in Germany,
the Netherlands, and other European countries. [129, 140–143] The limited available
evidence suggests that generic prices can decrease by more than 90% following a
tender. [129,144] There is little published data on whether price reductions are sustained
over time.8
Overall, the supply side of generic markets is complex and poorly understood.
There is a need for more evidence on the comparative effectiveness of supply-side
policies, especially tendering for which there is currently little published data.
1.3 Demand-side generic drug policies
The revenue of generic firms is largely volume-driven, as they incur few research and
development costs and can accept low prices. [122] Payers apply demand-side policies
to influence patient choices, physician prescribing, and pharmacist dispensing.
1.3.1 Physicians
Generic prescribing is the prescription of drugs by international non-proprietary name,
rather than brand name (eg, atorvastatin instead of Lipitor). It can be mandatory (eg,
Portugal), voluntary (eg, the UK), or forbidden.9 The recent introduction of mandatory
generic prescribing in Spain is expected to save the country e 2 billion per year. [149]
Some health ministries and health insurers use electronic prescribing systems to
monitor and influence prescribing habits (eg, encourage or enforce generic prescribing).
For example, electronic prescribing is compulsory in the UK, and the electronic sys-
tem automatically changes brand names to generic names in prescriptions, although
clinicians can manually reverse this change.
8The European Parliament, [145] Management Sciences for Health (MSH), [146] OECD, [147] and
WHO [148] have published legal principles or recommendations on good procurement practices.
Appendix B summarizes the recommendations of MSH and WHO.
9In 2013, generic prescribing was not forbidden in any of the ten countries included in this literature
review. However, it was forbidden in other European countries, like Austria and Greece.
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Table 1.1: Key supply- and demand-side policies in off-patent drug markets.
Supply-side policies
Pricing Free pricing Generic drug firms are allowed to set their own prices.
Cost-plus pricing The price is set as function of the basic production costs, R&D expenditure, and a negotiated premium, usually based on supplier-submitted data.
Price capping Payers set maximum generic drug prices, which are usually linked to the originator price (eg, mandated 30% reduction).
Tendering Payers purchase generic drugs from the firm that offers the best bid based on the tender specifications.
Reimbursement Internal reference pricing Payers establish a reimbursement cap for a drug based on the prices of comparator products.
Supply chain Discounts Wholesalers or manufacturers incentivise pharmacies to dispense their drugs by offering discounts, which are usually confidential.
Margin controls Regulation of the margins charged by distributors (wholesalers and importers) and retailers (pharmacies, online sellers, supermarkets, and dispensing doctors).
Demand-side policies
Prescribers Clinical guidelines Guidelines outline the appropriate care for a condition; they often express a preference for generic drugs.
Financial incentives Explicit (eg, physician remuneration or pay-for-performance) or implicit (eg, budget control).
Formularies Specify which drugs can be prescribed (or reimbursed) and often express a preference for generic drugs.
Generic prescribing Drugs are prescribed by international non-proprietary name instead of brand name (eg, atorvastatin instead of Lipitor).
Prescription monitoring Payers use information technology systems to review prescription patterns, also known as e-prescribing.
Pharmacists Generic substitution Payers encourage or require pharmacists to dispense the generic version of a drug, even if the off-patent originator is prescribed by the physician.
Patients Cost sharing Out-of-pocket expenses to increase price sensitivity and to encourage cost-effective purchasing.
Education campaigns Disseminate information to patients to encourage health literacy (eg, information on generic drugs) and promote active patient involvement in health care.
Source: Author’s compilation from [111, 116, 121, 123, 140, 150–153].
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Table 1.2: Pricing and reimbursement policies for generic medicines sold in the retail sector in the study countries (2013).
Price capping Free pricing Reference pricing Tendering Dist. mark-ups Discounting Clawbacks No or reduced VATa
Molecular Therapeutic R Fx U C U F
Belgium Xb Xc X X X X
France Xd Xe X X X X
Germany X X X X X X
Italy X X X X X
Netherlands X X X X X X X
Poland X X X X X
Portugal X f X X X X
Spain X X Xg X X X X
Switzerland X X X X X
United Kingdom X X X X X
Dist. = distribution; R/Fx/U = regressive, fixed, or unregulated; C/U/F = capped, unregulated, or forbidden
aFor all prescription medicine, including generic ones.
bMandatory price cuts apply for generic medicines with active ingredients that have been reimbursed for 12 years or longer.
cReference prices are set at between 15.5% and 41% below the price of the off-patent originator, depending on the product, and these percentages are increased
over time.
dIn some cases, the required price reduction can be reduced if a generic manufacturer able to justify it, although the reduction can never be less than 10%; once a
generic medicine is marketed, the price of the originator brand is automatically reduced by 20%.
eInternal reference pricing is only used when uptake of a particular generic medicines does not reach the desired level (ie, <60% 12 months after loss of market
exclusivity; <65% after 18 months; <70% after 24 months; and <80% after 36 months).
f The cap is higher (75%) for generic versions of originator products priced below e10.
gCurrently, only the autonomous community of Andalusia issues tenders in Spain.
Source: Author’s compilation from various sources (see Appendix A)
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Payers or national governments in some countries also apply financial incentives,
such as target rates of generic prescribing, to encourage physicians to prescribe cost-
effectively. In France, for instance, the national pay-for-performance scheme includes
financial rewards for clinicians who meet generic prescribing targets, while clinicians
in Belgium who fail to meet similar targets can face financial penalties.10
1.3.2 Pharmacists
If a clinician writes a prescription for a brand name drug when a generic version is
available, pharmacists are sometimes allowed to dispense the generic; in most countries,
patients and clinicians can block generic substitution. This policy, known as generic
substitution, can be mandatory (eg, Sweden), voluntary (eg, France), or forbidden (eg,
Belgium and the UK). In the UK, one of the two countries where it is forbidden, if a
physician prescribes a brand-name drug, it usually reflects an explicit decision by the
prescriber to forgo the generic option in the electronic prescription system; rates of
generic prescribing by physicians are very high in the UK. In Poland, patients need to
approve any prescription changes that are made by pharmacists.
Payers increasingly intervene at the pharmacy level to diminish the importance
of prescribing decisions. [155, 156] In an older study, Simeons and De Coster [115]
estimated that for the 10 best-selling off-patent drugs in Europe, generic substitution
would reduce public spending on these drugs by between 21% (Poland) and 48% (Den-
mark). The European Commission [10] has found that mandatory generic substitution
is associated with quicker generic entry and lower prices.
Generic substitution is used in low- and middle-income countries, including China,
Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Vietnam. [111]
1.3.3 Patients
Governments, payers, and generic firms sometimes launch public education campaigns
to promote the cost-saving potential of generics, as well as the bioequivalence of generic
and originator drugs. [150]
Cost sharing also affects patient drug consumption: patients are more likely to
demand generic medicines if they are asked to pay more for brand-name ones. [108]
Most countries apply cost sharing strategies to encourage patients to consume cheaper
generic medicines, usually with limits on how much patients can be asked to pay for
medicines annually. In Switzerland, for example, patients typically have to pay higher
co-pays for originator branded medicines if cheaper generic drugs are available. As
previously explained, in all the countries that use internal reference pricing, patients
10Roughly half of existing schemes in the US reward generic prescribing. [154]
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pay more for products priced above the reference prices. In the UK, meanwhile, patients
pay a flat fee of £7.85 per prescription item (e9.25), irrespective of the drug price. Some
patients are exempted from this fee, and currently around 90% of prescription items
are dispensed free of charge in the UK. In some countries, government agencies and
health insurers launch public campaigns to educate patients—as well as clinicians and
pharmacists—about the equivalent quality, safety, and efficacy profiles of generic and
originator brand drugs.
Differential co-payments are used in Bulgaria, China, Malaysia, and Turkey. [111]
1.3.4 Demand-side lessons
In general, there is greater consensus about which demand-side policies are appro-
priate. [150, 157] As demand-side policies directly affect the behaviour of physicians,
pharmacists, and patients, it is also easier to monitor policy performance and to correct
issues than it is with supply-side policies.
On the demand-side, many countries encourage or require physicians to prescribe
medicines by their generic names and pharmacists to substitute generic drugs for
originator brand medicines (Table 1.3). Mandatory generic substitution can generate
substantial savings for payers and is associated with quicker market entry of generic
drugs. [10, 155, 156]
Overall, it is important to remember that there are different ways of achieving
similar results, and that improvements in generic drug markets are not the only options
for controlling pharmaceutical spending. Box 1.2 highlights additional strategies to
those discussed.
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Table 1.3: Demand-side policies for generic medicines sold in the retail sector in the study
countries (2013).
Physicians Pharmacists Patients
Generic
prescribing
Prescribing
guidelinesa
Financial
incentives
Generic
substitution
Cost
sharing
Education
campaignsb
M V M V F
Belgium X X X Xc X
France Xd X X Xe X f X
Germany X X X X X
Italy X X X X X X
Netherlands X X X X X
Poland X Xg X
Portugal X X Xg X X
Spain X X X X X X
Switzerland X X X X
United Kingdom X X X X
M/V/F = mandatory, voluntary, or forbidden
aIn most countries, guidelines are only available for selected illnesses with a high budget impact; the
guidelines are usually not binding, but guideline adherence is increasingly monitored electronically or
through claims data.
bI considered whether government agencies, payers, or generic drug firms periodically conducted educa-
tion campaigns; such campaigns might not have occurred in 2013 specifically.
cPharmacists must dispense one of the three cheapest options for prescriptions written with international
non-proprietary names, as well as prescriptions for antibiotic and antifungal agents; if a patient refuses
to be dispensed one of these options they must pay the full price of more expensive medicines.
dClinicians can still write the brand name next to the international non-proprietary name, and they can
prohibit generic substitution on the prescription.
eUnless otherwise specified by the physician. Also, not all medicines are included on the national generic
substitution list; however, many of the omitted medicines are included in the generic prescribing targets
of the national pay-for-performance scheme.
f A patient that refuses to be dispensed a generic drug has to pay upfront for the brand-name drug
and be refunded later, whereas a patient that agrees to be dispensed the generic drug pays nothing
at the point of service. Also, if insurance covers a fixed % of the drug price, then patients might pay
more out-of-pocket for brand-name medicines due to their higher prices. However, most patients have
supplementary private health insurance to cover such costs.
gPharmacists are legally required to notify patients about the availability of cheaper generic options;
patients can choose a generic version of a medicine if the prescribing physician has not forbidden
substitution on the prescription.
Source: Author’s compilation from various sources (see Appendix A)
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Box 1.2: Complementary strategies to improve the quality and efficiency of
prescribing.
1. Governments should improve health technology assessment methods
to ensure payers and health care systems obtain good value for
money. [158] Otherwise, increasing the use of generic drugs does not
guarantee more efficient spending. For example, the savings from
generic drugs might be used to pay for costly new medicines for
which there is no evidence of superiority over older, less-expensive
treatments. [67]
2. Physicians and pharmacists should encourage rational drug use to
curb spending and optimise value for money. This means managing
both over- and under-utilization of medicines, [159–161] taking
into account the fact that prescription drugs may not always the
best medical option. For instance, a recent study suggested that
exercise might be as effective as, or even more effective than, statins at
preventing type 2 diabetes mellitus, repeat heart attacks, and repeat
strokes. [162] Clinicians should help shape patient expectations about
the benefits of medicines.
3. Regulators should try to reduce or eliminate the use of obsolete
drugs. [163] In mid-2009, for example, the European Medicines Agency
recommended the gradual withdrawal of dextropropoxyphene-
containing medicines across the EU, after concluding that “their risks,
particularly the risk of potentially fatal overdose, are greater than their
benefits”. [164] Yet in 2014, there were more than 105,000 prescriptions
filled in England for co-proxamol (paracetamol/dextropropoxyphene),
accounting for over £3 million (US$ 4.4 million) in spending. [165]
It is important to note that although weaning patients off obsolete
treatments might be good value for money, it is not always cost
saving. [163] Patients might be started on newer, more expensive
drugs, which could increase drug spending.
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1.4 Evidence on prices and market shares in generic drug
markets
To date, much of the research on off-patent markets has focused on the determinants of:
(i) generic market entry, (ii) originator drug prices and market shares (following loss
of market exclusivity), and (iii) generic drug prices and market shares. The following
sections summarise key studies in these three areas.
1.4.1 Generic market entry
The timing of generic entry is important, as delays reduce savings. The data suggest that
the time from the loss of market exclusivity for the brand name drug to the availability
of the first generic is influenced by the market size (ie, perceived profitability, which
depends on population size and burden of disease), product characteristics, supply- and
demand-side policies, therapeutic class, and country-specific factors. [9,21,107,166–174]
These variables influence a firm’s decision to launch a drug onto the market, which is
presumably based on expected revenue.
In 2009, the European Commission concluded an 18-month inquiry into the pharma-
ceutical sector, with a focus on competition between generic and originator firms. [10]
The 219 active ingredients included in the study sample accounted for roughly 70%
of total drug spending in the European Union—based on sales in the year preceding
loss of market exclusivity. The inquiry found that about half of originator drugs faced
generic competition within a year of loss of market exclusivity. Generic market entry
occurred, on average, seven months following loss of exclusivity. For the highest-selling
originator drugs, the delay was, on average, only four months. The findings varied
markedly across EU member states. The report conservatively estimated e 3 billion in
savings forgone annually in the EU from delayed entry. It also outlined strategies that
originator firms employ to hinder generic entry, such as strategic patenting (eg, patent
clusters), paying generic firms not to enter the market, and launching frivolous patent
infringement lawsuits. [10]
1.4.2 Originator drug prices and market shares
Several studies have analysed the impact of loss of market exclusivity on the prices of
originator drugs. These studies have drawn opposing conclusions: some studies found
that generic entry led to a decline in the prices of originator products, [45,175,176] while
others observed that the originator drug prices remained constant or increased after
the introduction of the first generic product. [166, 177–181] The latter price response,
sometimes referred to as the “generic competition paradox", may represent an attempt
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by originator firms to capitalise on the brand-loyal patients who are unlikely to consume
generic drugs. [182] Policies such as tendering and internal reference pricing, however,
limit the ability of originator firms to freely set prices.
The effect of generic entry on the market shares of originator drugs is more intuitive.
Studies have consistently found that originator volume shares decrease sharply after
loss of market exclusivity. [108, 166, 175, 183] However, originator firms sometimes
launch second-generation drugs prior to patent expiry and encourage physicians to
switch their patients to these treatments to maintain profit levels. [10, 49]
1.4.3 Generic drug prices and market shares
The evidence indicates that generic prices are influenced by many of the same factors
that influence generic entry, including supply- and demand-side policies, number of
generic competitors, country size, product characteristics (eg, pack size), and time since
loss of market exclusivity. [10, 21, 62, 108, 116, 133, 166, 172, 180, 184–186] Some studies
suggest that competition is weaker in highly-regulated off-patent markets compared to
unregulated or weakly-regulated ones. [10, 46, 116, 117]
Studies have found that the generic drug prices drop significantly as competitors
enter the market. [37, 175, 187, 188, 188] This trend seems to continue until a threshold is
reached and the market becomes saturated. For example, Wiggins and Mannes [45]
studied price competition in the market for anti-infective medicines. They found
that the average prices of generic drugs dropped by 83% when the number of firms
increased from 1 to between 6 and 15. The prices dropped even further when over 40
sellers were present.
Compared to the originator prices at the time of loss of market exclusivity, the
European Commission inquiry [10] found that, on average, generic prices decreased
by 25% and 40% after one and two years, respectively. The average generic volume
market shares were 30% and 45% after one and two years, respectively. Even a marginal
increase in the market share or decrease in the prices would generate sizable savings.
A widely cited 2009 study found, for a basket of 15 widely-used off-patent medicines
in low and middle-income countries, that the average availability of these medicines in
public pharmacies ranged from 30% in Africa to 54% in the Americas. [4] The median
government procurement prices of the cheapest generics were 3 times higher than
international reference prices in the Americas, and 12 times higher in western Pacific
countries. In all geographic regions, generic medicines were more often available
in private pharmacies than in public ones, but usually at a much higher cost. The
median prices of generic medicines in private pharmacies were 9 times higher than
international reference prices in Europe, and 25 times higher in the Americas. [4] The
average wholesale margins ranged from 2% to 380% in those countries for which cost
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breakdowns were available; in these countries, the average retail margins ranged from
10% to 552%, while value-added taxes ranged from 4% to 15%. [4]
1.5 Literature gaps and research questions
There are knowledge gaps in the literature on generic drug markets, which are briefly
summarised below. The introduction section of each article summarizes the relevant
literature and knowledge gaps to motivate each study aim.11 Box 1.3 summarises the
Ph.D. research topics.
Article 1
Although it is often claimed that generic prices vary across high-income countries,
there are few peer-reviewed studies which compare generic drug prices. The existing
comparisons are likely outdated, given how often pricing and reimbursement policies
change. Moreover, the impact of distribution margins and taxes on generic drug prices
has been underexplored, even though studies indicate that those costs can account
for most of the retail price of a generic drug, ie, the price charged by pharmacists to
patients or third-party payers. Nearly all studies have looked at ex-manufacturer prices,
ie, those charged by manufacturers to wholesalers, which do not account for distri-
bution costs. To address this gap, the first article (published in The Milbank Quarterly)
provides an updated analysis of generic drug prices, utilization rates, and policies in 13
high-income countries to understand the nature and extent of any differences.
Article 2
Previous studies which have compared medicine prices across countries have often
relied on different methods, making it difficult to compare findings. Most analyses have
also had small sample sizes, which may have biased the results. In the second study
(published in BMC Health Services Research), I compare the ex-manufacturer and retail
prices of a large sample of generic drugs in seven European countries in 2013, using
the same dataset as in Article 1; the data were provided freely by IMS Health under an
academic license. I calculated all commonly used price indexes to outline the method-
ological challenges to comparing generic drug prices. It is critical that policymakers
are aware of the advantages and limitations of these types of analyses, given that the
results of price comparisons might be used to justify changes to pharmaceutical policies.
11Small parts of the text here, such as description of study objectives, reappear in the introduction
sections of the respective chapters.
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Articles 3, 4, and 5
The results of the first two studies indicate that countries which use tender or tender-
like systems to set generic drug prices in retail pharmacies (ie, Denmark, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Sweden) have among the lowest prices among the countries included
in the studies. Pharmaceutical tendering refers to the bulk purchase of medicines from
suppliers at agreed-upon prices over contracted periods. It is increasingly promoted as
an effective measure to drive down the prices of generic medicines.
The short-term cost savings from tendering must be weighed against the potential
adverse long-term effects on competition in generic drug markets. Proponents of ten-
dering claim it will result in prices which more accurately reflect costs of production.
Previous studies have documented early experiences with tendering in Germany, the
Netherlands, and other European countries. These analyses generally found that the
introduction of tenders was associated with large price decreases for generic medicines.
In the Netherlands, for example, the prices of some generic drugs dropped by as much
as 90% overnight in retail pharmacies when insurers first started issuing tenders, sug-
gesting that tenders can scoop significant one-off savings from price competition. [129]
However, such results cannot necessarily be generalized across therapeutic groups
or medicine forms (tablets versus creams, for instance), and it is not clear whether
subsequent tenders would sustain such low prices—or if prices would instead creep
back up as manufacturers drop out of the market. Critics argue it will create product
shortages, drive generic firms out of business, and lead to higher prices in the long-run,
as manufacturers drop out of the market. Yet there is little empirical evidence on the
effects of tendering on prices, competition, and supply security in the pharmaceutical
sector.
The final three Ph.D. papers present evidence of the impact of tendering in South
Africa and Cyprus. These countries were chosen as case studies for two reasons. First,
the countries operate some of the longest-running tendering systems in the world, so
they represent two of the few settings where the long-term effects of tendering can
be analysed. The tendering systems in other European countries, like Germany and
the Netherlands, were introduced more recently. Second, the health care systems in
both countries are organized similarly. Both health care systems consist of a public and
private sector. Most individuals are eligible for public-sector coverage, but only around
four-fifths of the population in each country seeks care in the sector. The remaining
20% of individuals—most of them high earners—obtain care in the respective private
sectors. Pharmaceutical tenders are only issued in the public sectors. Both national
governments have announced plans to introduce national health insurance schemes,
which will provide need-based universal access to high-quality care, free at the point of
use, with funding from general tax revenues and employee contributions. Thus, there
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were opportunities to draw shared policy lessons from the two case studies.
The third paper (published in Social Science & Medicine) outlines a conceptual frame-
work for analysing the South African tendering system and presents evidence on the
impact of the system on prices and competition over the past 15 years. In this paper, I
calculated price and Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes to measure trends in prices and
market concentration for tenders issued between 2003 and 2016, among other statistical
analyses. To conduct this research, I spent roughly 1.5 years in South Africa as a Visit-
ing Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town and the National Department of
Health of South Africa (Essential Medicines Directorate, Pretoria, South Africa). During
my field work, I filed a government data request under the Promotion of Access to
Information Act (2000), received government data on medicine prices and quantities in
the public and private sectors (2003-2016), and cleaned, organised, and analysed these
datasets with input from local health ministry officials and academics.
The fourth paper, which is being prepared for submission to a peer-reviewed journal,
evaluates the impact of therapeutic tendering on the prices of medicines. In 2014, to
enhance price competition, the South African health ministry began tendering by thera-
peutic class for medicines which it considers interchangeable. For instance, the health
ministry views the cholesterol-reducing drugs atorvastatin (10 mg), fluvastatin (40 mg),
lovastatin (20 mg), rosuvastatin (5 mg), and simvastatin (10 mg) as therapeutically
equivalent. Under the new policy, the health ministry started only buying the least
expensive product in this group. It is expected that tendering by therapeutic class
generates larger savings than tendering by individual products. The aim of this study is
to estimate, using a difference-in-differences regression model, the effect of therapeutic
tendering on (i) the prices of medicines subjected to the policy and (ii) the total spending
on these products.
The fifth paper (published in the Bulletin of the World Health Organization) reviews
the pharmaceutical sector in Cyprus in terms of the availability and affordability of
medicines and analyses pharmaceutical policy options for the national health system
finance reform which was expected to be introduced in 2017. The government needed
to decide which drugs to cover in the forthcoming system, which pricing and reimburse-
ment policies to apply, and how much patients would have to pay for medicines. The
Cypriot Ministry of Health sought support from the World Health Organisation (WHO)
Regional Office for Europe to decide on these issues. The WHO, in turn, asked research-
ers from LSE Health to provide technical assistance to the health ministry. Like South
Africa, Cyprus uses tendering to procure medicines in the public health care sector. The
paper explores how the public and private markets could be efficiently merged in the
forthcoming national health system and assesses the key barriers to the implementation
of the new system. To collect primary data, I conducted semi-structured interviews with
seven key national stakeholders from groups that are directly or indirectly involved
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in the tendering process. These interviews were conducted during a four-day study
visit to Nicosia, Cyprus in April 2014. I also examined secondary data provided by the
Cypriot Ministry of Health; these data included the prices and volumes of prescription
medicines in 2013. The results of this study may be useful for policymakers in other
countries aiming to establish a comprehensive drug-benefit plan under universal health
coverage, like South Africa.
Box 1.3: Ph.D. research question and subsidiary topics.
Research question:
What are features of an efficient generic drug market?
Subsidiary topics:
1. How do generic drug prices, policies, and utilization rates compare
across selected high-income countries? (Article 1)
2. What are the methodological challenges to comparing generic drug
prices across countries? (Article 2)
3. What is the effect of pharmaceutical tendering on prices and com-
petition over a 15-year period? Evidence from South Africa. (Article
3)
4. What is the price impact of tendering for medicines by therapeutic
class? A difference-in-differences estimation based on data from South
Africa. (Article 4)
5. What are features of a sustainable tendering system for generic drugs
under universal health coverage? Evidence from Cyprus. (Article 5)
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Appendix A: Search strategy for the generic drug policies
employed in each country in 2013
Step 1: Literature search
Description
In 2013, which generic drug policies were used in the retail drug markets in Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the
UK?
Box A: Exclusion/inclusion criteria.
Publication Years: January 1, 2011 - August 11, 2015 (search date)
Languages: English or French
Publication Types: Excluded “Conference Abstracts”
I included an article if it contained at least one section describing the supply-side
or demand-side generic drug policies in the study country. This could include a
comprehensive overview of such policies in the background/introduction section of an
article, as determined by the author.
The reference lists of identified articles were screened and relevant articles were
included. These citation checks sometimes revealed articles which were relevant for
other study countries.
Search words
I conducted an advanced search in PubMed (MEDLINE) of “title/abstract”; an asterisk
truncated the search word (eg, drug* = drug, drugs, etc.).
• (generic or off-patent)
• (drug* or medicine* or pharmaceutical*)
• (Belgium or France or Germany or Italy or Netherlands or Poland or Portugal or
Spain or Switzerland or UK or U.K. or United Kingdom)
• 1 and 2 and 3
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I carried out the search for each country separately, so line 3 only included one
country at a time. For the UK search, I also included the terms England, Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
Search results (references are listed in alphabetical order)
Belgium
Box B: Belgium search results.
Initial search results: 24
Excluded from title/abstract review: 18
Excluded from full article review: 1
Included results (initial): 5
Articles from citation review: 3
Included Results (total): 8
References identified through the search:
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2014). “Does increased use of generic medicine by
elders in Belgium help to contain escalating health care budgets?” Journal of Aging
& Social Policy, 26:266-280.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2012). “How can pharmacist remuneration systems in
Europe contribute to generic medicine dispensing?” Pharmacy Practice, 10(1):3-8.
• Fraeyman J, Van Hal G, Godman B, Beutels P (2013). “The potential influence of
various initiatives to improve rational prescribing for proton pump inhibitors and
statins in Belgium.” Expert Reviews of Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research,
13(1):141-151.
• Fraeyman J, Van Hal G, De Loof H, Remmen R, De Meyer GRY, Beutel P (2012).
“Potential impact of policy regulation and generic competition on sales of choles-
terol lowering medication, antidepressants and acid blocking agents in Belgium.”
Acta Clinica Belgica, 67(3):160-171.
• Fraeyman J, Verbelen M, Hens N, Van Hal G, De Loof H, Beutels P (2013). “Evolu-
tions in both co-payment and generic market share for common medication in
the Belgian Reference Pricing System.” Applied Health Economics and Health Policy,
11(5):543-52.
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References identified through citation review:
• Carone G, Schwierz C, Xavier A (2012). “Cost-containment policies in public phar-
maceutical spending in the EU.” Economic Papers 461, European Commission.
European Union: Brussels. 67 p.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2013). “Demand-side policies to encourage the
use of generic medicines: an overview.” Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res,
13(1):59-72.
• Vogler S (2012). “The impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement
policies on generics uptake: implementation of policy options on generics in
29 European countries—an overview.” Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal,
1(2):93-100.
France
Box C: France search results.
Initial search results: 35
Excluded from title/abstract review: 28
Excluded from full article review: 2
Included results (initial): 5
Articles from citation review: 3
Included Results (total): 8
References identified through the search:
• Anonymous (2013). “Generics: keep a balanced view.” Rev Prescrire, 33(361):854-
861.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2012). “How can pharmacist remuneration systems in
Europe contribute to generic medicine dispensing?” Pharmacy Practice, 10(1):3-8.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2014). “Analysis of French generic medicines retail
market: why the use of generic medicines is limited.” Expert Rev Pharmacoecon
Outcomes Res, 14(6):795-803.
• Pichetti S, Sermet C, Godman B, Campbell SM, Gustafsson LL (2013). “Multilevel
analysis of the influence of patients’ and practitioners’ characteristics on patented
versus multiple-source statin prescribing in France.” Applied Health Econ Health
Policy, 11:205-218.
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• von der Schulenburg F, Vandoros S, Kanavos P (2011). “The effects of drug market
regulation on pharmaceutical prices in Europe: overview and evidence from the
market of ACE inhibitors.” Health Economics Review, 1:18.
References identified through citation review:
• Carone G, Schwierz C, Xavier A (2012). “Cost-containment policies in public phar-
maceutical spending in the EU.” Economic Papers 461, European Commission.
European Union: Brussels. 67 p.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2013). “Demand-side policies to encourage the
use of generic medicines: an overview.” Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res,
13(1):59-72.
• Vogler S (2012). “The impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement
policies on generics uptake: implementation of policy options on generics in
29 European countries—an overview.” Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal,
1(2):93-100.
Germany
Box D: Germany search results.
Initial search results: 32
Excluded from title/abstract review: 28
Excluded from full article review: 2
Included results (initial): 2
Articles from citation review: 5
Included Results (total): 7
References identified through the search:
• Saverno K, Gothe H, Schuessel K, Biskupiak J, Schulz M, Siebet U, Brixner D
(2014). “Consideration of international generic distribution policies on patient
outcomes in the United States and Germany.” Pharmazie, 69:238-240.
• von der Schulenburg F, Vandoros S, Kanavos P (2011). “The effects of drug market
regulation on pharmaceutical prices in Europe: overview and evidence from the
market of ACE inhibitors.” Health Economics Review, 1:18.
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References identified through citation review:
• Busse R, Blümel M (2014). “Germany: Health System Review.” Health Systems in
Transition, 16(2): 1-296.
• Carone G, Schwierz C, Xavier A (2012). “Cost-containment policies in public phar-
maceutical spending in the EU.” Economic Papers 461, European Commission.
European Union: Brussels. 67 p.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2012). “How can pharmacist remuneration systems in
Europe contribute to generic medicine dispensing?” Pharmacy Practice, 10(1):3-8.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2013). “Demand-side policies to encourage the
use of generic medicines: an overview.” Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res,
13(1):59-72.
• Vogler S (2012). “The impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement
policies on generics uptake: implementation of policy options on generics in
29 European countries—an overview.” Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal,
1(2):93-100.
Italy
Box E: Italy search results.
Initial search results: 30
Excluded from title/abstract review: 27
Excluded from full article review: 2
Included results (initial): 1
Articles from citation review: 5
Included Results (total): 6
References identified through the search:
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2014). “Analysis of the Italian generic medicines
retail market: recommendations to enhance long-term sustainability.” Expert Rev
Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res, 15(1):33-42.
References identified through citation review:
58
• Carone G, Schwierz C, Xavier A (2012). “Cost-containment policies in public phar-
maceutical spending in the EU.” Economic Papers 461, European Commission.
European Union: Brussels. 67 p.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2012). “How can pharmacist remuneration systems in
Europe contribute to generic medicine dispensing?” Pharmacy Practice, 10(1):3-8.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2013). “Demand-side policies to encourage the
use of generic medicines: an overview.” Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res,
13(1):59-72.
• Ferré F, de Belvis AG, Valerio L, et al (2014). “Italy: Health System Review.” Health
Systems in Transition, 16(4): 1-168.
• Vogler S (2012). “The impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement
policies on generics uptake: implementation of policy options on generics in
29 European countries—an overview.” Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal,
1(2):93-100.
The Netherlands
Box F: The Netherlands search results.
Initial search results: 25
Excluded from title/abstract review: 20
Excluded from full article review: 3
Included results (initial): 2
Articles from citation review: 3
Included Results (total): 5
References identified through the search:
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2012). “How can pharmacist remuneration systems in
Europe contribute to generic medicine dispensing?” Pharmacy Practice, 10(1):3-8.
• von der Schulenburg F, Vandoros S, Kanavos P (2011). “The effects of drug market
regulation on pharmaceutical prices in Europe: overview and evidence from the
market of ACE inhibitors.” Health Economics Review, 1:18.
References identified through citation review:
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• Carone G, Schwierz C, Xavier A (2012). “Cost-containment policies in public phar-
maceutical spending in the EU.” Economic Papers 461, European Commission.
European Union: Brussels. 67 p.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2013). “Demand-side policies to encourage the
use of generic medicines: an overview.” Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res,
13(1):59-72.
• Vogler S (2012). “The impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement
policies on generics uptake: implementation of policy options on generics in
29 European countries—an overview.” Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal,
1(2):93-100.
Poland
Box G: Poland search results.
Initial search results: 8
Excluded from title/abstract review: 8
Excluded from full article review: 0
Included results (initial): 0
Articles from citation review: 5
Included Results (total): 5
References identified through the search: None.
References identified through citation review:
• Carone G, Schwierz C, Xavier A (2012). “Cost-containment policies in public phar-
maceutical spending in the EU.” Economic Papers 461, European Commission.
European Union: Brussels. 67 p.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2012). “How can pharmacist remuneration systems in
Europe contribute to generic medicine dispensing?” Pharmacy Practice, 10(1):3-8.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2013). “Demand-side policies to encourage the
use of generic medicines: an overview.” Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res,
13(1):59-72.
• Sagan A, Panteli D, Borkowski W, et al (2011). “Poland: Health System Review.”
Health Systems in Transition: 13(8):1-193.
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• Vogler S (2012). “The impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement
policies on generics uptake: implementation of policy options on generics in
29 European countries—an overview." Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal,
1(2):93-100.
Portugal
Box H: Portugal search results.
Initial search results: 5
Excluded from title/abstract review: 1
Excluded from full article review: 3
Included results (initial): 1
Articles from citation review: 5
Included Results (total): 6
References identified through the search:
• Voncˇina L, Strizrep T, Godman B, Bennie M, Bishop I, Campbell S, Vlahovic´-
Palcˇevski V, Gustafsson LL (2011). “Influence of demand-side measures to en-
hance renin-angiotensin prescribing efficiency in Europe: implications for the
future.” Expert Rev Pharmacoeconomics Outcomes Res, 11(4):469-79.
References identified through citation review:
• Barros P, Machado S, Simões J (2011). “Portugal: Health System Review.” Health
Systems in Transition, 13(4): 1-156.
• Carone G, Schwierz C, Xavier A (2012). “Cost-containment policies in public phar-
maceutical spending in the EU.” Economic Papers 461, European Commission.
European Union: Brussels. 67 p.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2012). “How can pharmacist remuneration systems in
Europe contribute to generic medicine dispensing?” Pharmacy Practice, 10(1):3-8.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2013). “Demand-side policies to encourage the
use of generic medicines: an overview.” Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res,
13(1):59-72.
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• Vogler S (2012). “The impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement
policies on generics uptake: implementation of policy options on generics in
29 European countries—an overview.” Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal,
1(2):93-100.
Spain
Box I: Spain search results.
Initial search results: 25
Excluded from title/abstract review: 19
Excluded from full article review: 4
Included results (initial): 2
Articles from citation review: 4
Included Results (total): 6
References identified through the search:
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2014). “Analysis of Spanish generic medicines retail
market: recommendations to enhance long-term sustainability.” Expert Review of
Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes Research, 14(3): 345-53.
• Voncˇina L, Strizrep T, Godman B, Bennie M, Bishop I, Campbell S, Vlahovic´-
Palcˇevski V, Gustafsson LL (2011). “Influence of demand-side measures to en-
hance renin-angiotensin prescribing efficiency in Europe: implications for the
future.” Expert Rev Pharmacoeconomics Outcomes Res, 11(4):469-79.
References identified through citation review:
• Carone G, Schwierz C, Xavier A (2012). “Cost-containment policies in public phar-
maceutical spending in the EU.” Economic Papers 461, European Commission.
European Union: Brussels. 67 p.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2012). “How can pharmacist remuneration systems in
Europe contribute to generic medicine dispensing?” Pharmacy Practice, 10(1):3-8.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2013). “Demand-side policies to encourage the
use of generic medicines: an overview.” Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res,
13(1):59-72.
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• Vogler S (2012). “The impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement
policies on generics uptake: implementation of policy options on generics in
29 European countries—an overview.” Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal,
1(2):93-100.
Switzerland
Box J: Switzerland search results.
Initial search results: 14
Excluded from title/abstract review: 12
Excluded from full article review: 1
Included results (initial): 1
Articles from citation review: 0
Included Results (total): 1
References identified through the search:
• Decollogny A, Eggli Y, Halfon P, Lufkin TM (2011). “Determinants of generic
drug substitution in Switzerland.” BMC Health Services Research, 11:17.
References identified through citation review: None.
United Kingdom
Box K: United Kingdom search results.
Initial search results: 75
Excluded from title/abstract review: 61
Excluded from full article review: 7
Included results (initial): 8
Articles from citation review: 3
Included Results (total): 11
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References identified through the search:
• Bennie M, Bishop I, Godman B, Barbui C, Raschi E, Campbell S, Miranda J, et al
(2013). “Are specific initiatives required to enhance prescribing of general atypical
antipsychotics in Scotland?: International implication.” The International Journal of
Clinical Practice, 67(2):170-180.
• Bennie M, Bishop I, Godman B, Campbell S, Miranda J, Finlayson AE, Gustafsson
LL (2013). “Are prescribing initiatives readily transferable across classes: the case
of generic losartan in Scotland?” Quality in Primary Care, 21:7-15.
• Dylst P, Vulto A, Simoens S (2012). “How can pharmacist remuneration systems in
Europe contribute to generic medicine dispensing?” Pharmacy Practice, 10(1):3-8.
• Godman B, Bishop I, Finlayson AE, Campbell S, Kwon H-Y, Bennie M (2013).
“Reforms and initiatives in Scotland in recent years to encourage the prescribing
of generic drugs, their influence and implications for other countries.” Expert Rev
Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res, 13(4):469-482.
• Hassali MA, Alrasheedy AA, McLachlan A, Nguyen TA, AL-Tamimi SK, Ibrahim
MIM, Aljadhey H (2014). “The experiences of implementing generic medicine
policy in eight countries: A review and recommendations for successful promo-
tion of generic medicine use.” Saudi Pharmaceutical Journal, 22:491-503.
• Mansfield SJ (2014). “Generic drug prices and policy in Australia: room for
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search returns for relevant documents or pages.
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autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/ [Last accessed: Oct 20, 2015].
• Imbaud D, Morin A, Picard S, Toujas F (2012). “Evaluation de la politique française
des médicaments génériques.” Inspection générale des affaires sociales, Rapport
N◦RM2012-115P. Available from: http://www.medicamentsgeneriques.info/
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gov.it/ [Last accessed: Oct 19, 2015].
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Step 2: Internal IMS Health guides
Next, I compared our findings with internal IMS Health guides on the pharmaceutical
sectors in the study countries in 2013. These documents outlined the generic drug
policies in each country.
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Step 3: Input from pharmaceutical policymakers and researchers
Finally, I contacted the following researchers and policymakers to verify the identified
generic drug policies in their respective countries. Any errors in the manuscript are my
own.
Belgium
• Dr. Francis Arickx (National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance, Brus-
sels, Belgium)
• Ms. Yoeriska Antonissen (National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance,
Brussels, Belgium)
France
• Ms. Karen Berg Brigham (URC Eco-Ile-de-France, Paris, France)
• Dr. Guillaume Dedet (WHO Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark)
• Dr. Isabelle Durand-Zaleski (URC Eco-Ile-de-France, Paris, France)
Germany
• Dr. Dimitra Panteli (Technical University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany)
Italy
• Dr. Armando Magrelli (National Centre for Rare Diseases, Rome, Italy)
Netherlands
• Dr. Patrick Jeurissen (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, Amsterdam, Nether-
lands)
Poland
• Dr. Paweł Kawalec (Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland)
Portugal
• Dr. Mónica Oliveira (University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal)
• Dr. Carlos Gouveia Pinto (University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal)
• Dr. Luìs Silva Miguel (University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal)
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Switzerland
• Dr. Jörg Indermitte (Federal Office of Public Health, Bern, Switzerland)
• Ms. Mareika Studer (Federal Office of Public Health, Bern, Switzerland)
United Kingdom
• Ms. Helena Bowden (Department of Health, London, England)
• Dr. Cathleen Schulte (Department of Health, London, England)
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Appendix B: Features of good pharmaceutical procurement
Management Sciences for Health, a nonprofit international health organisation, pub-
lished its first report on managing access to medicines and health technologies in 1987;
subsequent editions were published in 1997 and 2012. The most recent edition offered
the following guidance on pharmaceutical procurement.
Box A: Recommendations for good pharmaceutical procurement published
by Management Sciences for Health.
Key principles of good pharmaceutical procurement for health systems:
1. Reliable payment and good financial management
2. Procurement by generic name
3. Clear specification of a recognized pharmaceutical quality standard
4. Limitation of procurement to the essential medicines list
5. Increasing procurement volume by aggregating demand
6. Formal supplier qualification and monitoring
7. Competitive procurement
8. Monopsony commitment
9. Order quantities based on reliable estimate of forecasted actual need
10. Transparency and written procedures
11. Separation of key functions
12. Product quality assurance program
13. Annual audit with published results
14. Regular reporting of procurement performance indicators
Source: Reproduced from Management Sciences for Health (2012, p. 322), with permission. [146]
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Figure A: Procurement cycle for pharmaceutical products.
Source: Reproduced from Management Sciences for Health (2012, p. 18.4), with permission. [146]
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In 1996, the World Health Organization convened an inter-agency pharmaceutical
coordination group on Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy, involving advisers from
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Bank. The work of this
group built on earlier research by Management Sciences for Health on pharmaceutical
procurement.
The group identified four strategic objectives of pharmaceutical procurement and
twelve operational principles for good procurement. These principles relate to “effi-
cient and transparent management” (principles 1-3), “drug selection and quantification”
(4-6), “financing and competition” (7-10), and “supplier selection and quality assurance”
(11-12).
Box B: Recommendations for good pharmaceutical procurement published
by the World Health Organization.
Strategic objectives of pharmaceutical procurement:
1. Procure the most cost-effective drugs in the right quantities
2. Select reliable suppliers of high-quality products
3. Ensure timely delivery
4. Achieve the lowest possible total cost
Operational principles for good pharmaceutical procurement:
1. Different procurement functions and responsibilities (selection, quanti-
fication, product specification, pre-selection of suppliers and adjudica-
tion of tenders) should be divided among different offices, committees
and individuals, each with appropriate expertise and resources for the
specific function.
2. Procurement procedures should be transparent, following formal writ-
ten procedures throughout the process and using explicit criteria to
award contracts.
3. Procurement should be planned properly and procurement perform-
ance should be monitored regularly; monitoring should include an
annual external audit.
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4. Public sector procurement should be limited to an essential drugs list
or national/local formulary list.
5. Procurement and tender documents should list drugs by their interna-
tional nonproprietary name (INN), or generic name.
6. Order quantities should be based on a reliable estimate of actual need.
7. Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure reliable financing for pro-
curement. Good financial management procedures should be followed
to maximize the use of financial resources.
8. Procurement should be effected in the largest possible quantities in
order to achieve economies of scale; this applies to both centralized
and decentralized systems.
9. Procurement in the public health sector should be based on competitive
procurement methods, except for very small or emergency orders.
10. Members of the purchasing groups should purchase all contracted
items from the supplier(s) which hold(s) the contract.
11. Prospective suppliers should be pre-qualified, and selected suppli-
ers should be monitored through a process which considers product
quality, service reliability, delivery time and financial viability.
12. Procurement procedures/systems should include all assurances that
the drugs purchased are of high quality, according to international
standards.
Source: Reproduced from World Health Organization (1999, pp. 13-32), with permission. [148]
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2Comparing generic drug markets in
Europe and the United States: Prices,
volumes, and spending
“I guess the only time most people think about injustice is when it happens to them.”
– Charles Bukowski, Ham on Rye
Key messages
• This study indicates that there are opportunities for cost savings in generic drug
markets in Europe and the United States.
• Regulators should make it easier for generic drugs to reach the market.
• Regulators and payers should apply measures to stimulate price competition
among generic drugmakers and to increase generic drug use.
• To meaningfully evaluate policy options, it is important to analyze historical
context and understand why similar initiatives failed previously.
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Abstract
Context: Rising drug prices are putting pressure on health care budgets. Policymakers
are assessing how they can save money through generic drugs.
Methods: We compared generic drug prices and market shares in 13 European coun-
tries, using data from 2013, to assess the amount of variation that exists between
countries. To place these results in context, we reviewed evidence from recent studies
on the prices and use of generics in Europe and the United States. We also surveyed
peer-reviewed studies, grey literature, and books published since 2000 to: (i) outline
existing generic drug policies in European countries and the United States, (ii) identify
ways to increase generic drug use and to promote price competition among generic
drug companies, and (iii) explore barriers to implementing reform of generic drug
policies, using a historical example from the United States as a case study.
Findings: The prices and market shares of generics vary widely across Europe. For
example, prices charged by manufacturers in Switzerland are, on average, more than
2.5 times those in Germany and more than 6 times those in the United Kingdom, based
on the results of a commonly used price index. The proportion of prescriptions filled
with generics ranges from 17% in Switzerland to 83% in the United Kingdom. By
comparison, the United States has historically had low generic drug prices and high
rates of generic drug use (84% in 2013), but has in recent years experienced sharp price
increases for some off-patent products. There are policy solutions to address issues in
Europe and the United States, such as streamlining the generic drug approval process
and requiring generic prescribing and substitution where such policies are not yet
in place. The history of substitution laws in the United States provides insights into
the economic, political, and cultural issues influencing the adoption of generic drug
policies.
Conclusions: Governments should apply coherent supply- and demand-side policies
in generic drug markets. An immediate priority is to persuade more physicians,
pharmacists, and patients that generic drugs are bioequivalent to branded products.
Special-interest groups continue to obstruct reform in Europe and the United States.
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RISING drug prices are putting pressure on health care budgets. [74, 78]
1 Drugs
account for sizable shares of health care spending in rich countries, with costs
of new treatments for diabetes, [189] multiple sclerosis, [190] rheumatoid
arthritis, [191] various cancers, [32, 58, 59, 192] and dermatological conditions [193]
increasing. There are many reasons, including aggressive pricing strategies by manu-
facturers [32] and adoption of greater numbers of orphan and personalized drugs with
high price tags. [194, 195] Governments are responding by looking at ways to negoti-
ate lower prices for patented drugs [196] and to expand the use of health technology
assessments to ensure medicines are given to those who will benefit most. [158, 197]
Policymakers are also assessing how they can save money through generics.
Generic drugs are bioequivalent replicas of brand name drugs, containing the
same active ingredients and with identical quality, safety, and efficacy profiles. [64, 65,
198–200] Any differences are limited to inactive ingredients, like coloring, flavoring,
and stabilizing agents. Generics can, in theory, be sold for a fraction of the price of
brand name drugs for two reasons. First, it is relatively cheap to bring a bioequivalent
product to market. Second, the market for the drug typically already exists, significantly
reducing marketing expenses. [201]
The cost-saving potential of greater generic drug use makes it an attractive option
for policymakers, especially since many blockbuster drugs went off patent in the last
decade, with more soon to follow. Notably, the cholesterol-lowering drug rosuvastatin
(Crestor)—one of the best-selling medicines of all time—lost market exclusivity in the
United States and many European countries in 2016. [202]
We have four objectives. First, we compare generic drug prices and market shares
in 13 European countries, using data from 2013, to assess the amount of variation that
exists between countries. To place these findings in context, we review recent studies
on prices and use of generic drugs in Europe and the United States. Second, we outline
existing generic drug policies in European countries and the United States. Third, given
issues identified in the earlier parts, we explore possible measures to increase usage of
generics and to stimulate price competition among generic drugmakers. And, fourth,
we analyze obstacles to improving generic drug policies, using a historical example
from the United States as a case study.
1This chapter was published: Wouters OJ, Kanavos PG, McKee M (2017). Comparing generic drug
markets in Europe and the United States: Prices, volumes, and spending. The Milbank Quarterly, 95(3):
554-601.
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2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Data set
We selected 13 European countries with different generic drug policies: Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Greece,
Portugal, Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark (listed in order of pharmaceutical market
size). These countries represent the ten largest generic drug markets in Europe—in
terms of spending—as well as three countries (Denmark, Greece, and Sweden) which
are often included in European comparative policy analyses.
For each country, we obtained IMS Health data on the 2013 sales of 200 off-patent
active ingredients (Appendix A), available in 3,156 strength-form combinations. These
were the most-prescribed off-patent active ingredients in the European Union (EU)
that year, according to IMS Health data. Sales were recorded in terms of volume and
monetary value.
Volumes were measured in number of doses, which IMS Health sometimes refers to
as “standard units”. IMS Health defined the amount in a single dose of each product,
which could be 1 tablet, 5 mL of liquid, 1 vial, and so forth. [203] We excluded 129
products (4.1%, 129/3,156) for which there was no information on dosage.
Monetary values were measured in euros, with foreign currencies converted to euros
at yearly average exchange rates. [204] These figures were obtained by multiplying
the price of a product, excluding value-added taxes, by the number of packs sold
over the year. This was done using ex-manufacturer and retail prices separately. Ex-
manufacturer prices were those charged by manufacturers to wholesalers, while retail
prices were those charged by pharmacists to patients or insurers. Appendix B includes
further details on the calculations.
The data set lacked certain information. First, it excluded biosimilar products,
parallel-traded generic drugs, off-patent brand name drugs, and generics sold in hos-
pital pharmacies. Second, retail data were unavailable for the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. Finally, the sales data did not reflect confidential rebates and dis-
counts.
2.1.2 Price indexes
We calculated Laspeyres indexes to compare drug prices in three steps. [8, 12, 117,
205–208] First, for each active ingredient, we calculated the average price per dose
by dividing the total sales across form-strength combinations by the number of doses
sold. For instance, omeprazole (Prilosec) was sold in France as 10-mg and 20-mg
capsules. The ex-manufacturer sales of these drugs amounted to roughly e 88.5 million
and 450 million doses. Accordingly, the average price per dose of omeprazole was e
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0.197 (88.5/450). We calculated the ex-manufacturer and retail prices of each active
ingredient.
Second, we identified a subset of 80 active ingredients prescribed in all 13 countries.
This common sample accounted for between 46% and 72% of total generic drug sales
in every country but the United Kingdom (25%). Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics
on the generic drug markets.
Third, we calculated Laspeyres indexes using weights from a base country, in this
case Germany, since it is the largest drug market in Europe by revenue. The rationale
behind weighted indexes is that prices of highly consumed active ingredients should
be given greater consideration. The indexes are calculated as:
IL =
∑ni=1 p
c
i q
c
i
∑ni=1 p
b
i q
b
i
· 100
where p is the price of an ingredient (i) in a comparator country (c) or the base country
(b), and q is the corresponding quantity in doses. The base country is assigned a value
of 100.
The Laspeyres results are interpreted as price ratios. For instance, an index value
of 140 for country X means that prices are, on average, 40% higher there than in the
base country (Germany). Conversely, a value of 60 for country X indicates that prices
are, on average, 40% lower in country X. Because we limited our analysis to medicines
available in all 13 countries, the indexes show how prices differ between each country.
In other words, if values of 140 and 80 are observed for countries X and Y, respectively, it
indicates that prices are, on average, 75% higher in country X than in country Y (140/80).
2.1.3 Policy analysis
To place the price-index results in context, we first summarized evidence from recent
studies on the prices and use of generic drugs in Europe and the United States. We then
surveyed peer-reviewed studies, grey literature, and books published since 2000 to:
(i) analyse current generic drug policies in Europe and the United States, (ii) identify
potential solutions to increase generic drug use and to spur competition among generic
manufacturers, and (iii) explore barriers to the introduction of generic drug policies,
using the history of substitution laws and bioequivalence regulation in the United
States as a case study.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics on generic drug markets (2013).
Population
(millions)a
Generic
spending
(billions)b,c
Generic
spending
(per capita)b,c
Generic
volume
(billions of
doses)c
Generic
volume (per
capita)c
Proportion of
generic spend
accounted for
by the sampleb,c
Generic
market
share
(volume)d
Generic
market
share
(value)b,d
Belgium 11.2 e 0.45 e 40.60 4.2 251.6 56% 32% 14%
Denmark 5.6 e 0.17 e 29.60 2.7 481.6 56% 54% 14%
France 66.0 e 4.14 e 62.80 25.6 387.9 52% 30% 16%
Germany 82.1 e 5.20 e 63.40 37.6 458.3 51% 80% 37%
Greece 11.0 e 0.45 e 41.00 2.3 207.4 67% 20% 15%
Italy 60.2 e 2.08 e 34.50 15.3 254.0 47% 19% 11%
Netherlands 16.8 e 0.50 e 29.80 7.5 445.7 47% 70% 16%
Poland 38.0 e 1.55 e 40.90 16.2 425.5 46% 57% 42%
Portugal 10.5 e 0.47 e 45.10 2.8 401.1 49% 39% 23%
Spain 46.6 e 2.12 e 45.60 19.4 416.0 54% 47% 21%
Sweden 9.6 e 0.32 e 33.80 3.8 399.2 72% 44% 15%
Switzerland 8.1 e 0.51 e 63.40 1.8 231.7 71% 17% 16%
United Kingdom 64.1 e 2.87 e 44.80 36.3 566.0 25% 83% 33%
aReproduced from the World Bank. [209]
bAll monetary figures are based on ex-manufacturer prices. The market shares account for reimbursed generics in hospital and retail pharmacies. [210]
cReproduced from IMS Health (2013, Pricing Insights database).
dReproduced from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, [94] with the exception of the Polish and Swedish figures (IMS Health, 2013).
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2.2 Results
2.2.1 Generic drug market shares and prices in Europe and the United
States
Table 2.1 shows the proportion of prescriptions filled with generics in 13 European
countries. The percentages were low (ie, less than 40%) in Switzerland (17%), Italy
(19%), Greece (20%), France (30%), Belgium (32%), and Portugal (39%). They were
moderate (ie, 40% to 60%) in Sweden (44%), Spain (47%), Denmark (54%), and Poland
(57%); and high (ie, greater than 60%) in the Netherlands (70%), Germany (80%), and
the United Kingdom (83%).
2.2.1.1 Price indexes
Figure 2.1 compares ex-manufacturer prices in each country. The figure shows wide
variation in prices. For example, Swiss ex-manufacturer prices were, on average, more
than 2.5 times German ones and more than 6 times British ones.
Figure 2.1: Ex-manufacturer prices of generics (2013).
Source: Derived from authors’ analysis of data from the Pricing Insights database (IMS Health, 2013).
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Figure 2.2 compares retail prices in 11 European countries. The spread between
the Swiss and German retail prices was smaller than the difference between the ex-
manufacturer prices. Retail prices in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium were lower than in
Germany, whereas the opposite was true at the ex-manufacturer level. Retail prices
include distribution costs (ie, transport, processing, and storage) and markups charged
by wholesalers and pharmacies.
Figure 2.2: Retail prices of generics (2013).
Note: Retail prices were unavailable for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Source: Derived from authors’ analysis of data from the Pricing Insights database (IMS Health, 2013).
Table 2.2 shows the ex-manufacturer prices of seven of the most consumed products
in the sample. Atorvastatin (Lipitor) and simvastatin (Zocor) are cholesterol-reducing
drugs; amlodipine (Norvasc) is a calcium channel blocker used to treat high blood
pressure and coronary heart disease; metformin (Glucophage) is a type 2 diabetes
medication; and esomeprazole (Nexium), omeprazole (Prilosec), and pantoprazole
(Protonix) are proton-pump inhibitors used to treat heartburn and related conditions.
Prices of all seven products differ among countries. For instance, the price per dose
of omeprazole was 30 times greater in Switzerland than in the United Kingdom (e
0.811 vs e 0.027). Even after excluding Greece and Switzerland, the two countries that
generally had the highest prices, there were large price discrepancies.
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Table 2.2: Ex-manufacturer prices (e per dose) of seven top-selling active ingredients (2013).
Amlodipine Atorvastatin Esomeprazole Metformin Omeprazole Pantoprazole Simvastatin
Belgium e 0.11 e 0.20 e 0.19 e 0.03 e 0.24 e 0.20 e 0.12
Denmark e 0.01 e 0.12 e 0.27 e 0.01 e 0.04 e 0.03 e 0.02
France e 0.14 e 0.27 e 0.19 e 0.06 e 0.20 e 0.19 e 0.19
Germany e 0.01 e 0.07 e 0.16 e 0.02 e 0.12 e 0.17 e 0.08
Greece e 0.17 e 0.52 e 0.27 e 0.04 e 0.45 e 0.40 e 0.40
Italy e 0.09 e 0.13 e 0.26 e 0.03 e 0.21 e 0.22 e 0.11
Netherlands e 0.02 e 0.09 e 0.11 e 0.02 e 0.03 e 0.04 e 0.02
Poland e 0.06 e 0.12 e 0.15 e 0.04 e 0.17 e 0.09 e 0.10
Portugal e 0.07 e 0.12 e 0.17 e 0.04 e 0.09 e 0.09 e 0.08
Spain e 0.04 e 0.29 e 0.43 e 0.02 e 0.06 e 0.32 e 0.04
Sweden e 0.02 e 0.10 e 0.18 e 0.03 e 0.11 e 0.15 e 0.05
Switzerland e 0.32 e 0.40 e 0.47 e 0.05 e 0.81 e 0.30 e 0.48
United Kingdom e 0.01 e 0.03 e 0.14 e 0.02 e 0.03 e 0.03 e 0.02
% difference
(highest/lowest)
2,723% 1,990% 450% 469% 3,027% 1,492% 2,382%
Source: Derived from authors’ analysis of data from the Pricing Insights database (IMS Health, 2013).
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Small price differences can have a large budget impact for high-volume drugs. For
example, roughly 294 million doses of simvastatin were consumed in France in 2013.
For simvastatin alone, if France had paid the UK price per dose (e 0.020 instead of
e 0.192), spending would have been more than e 50 million less. There are caveats:
volumes might not remain constant if prices change, and there might be differences in
production and supply-chain costs that prevent price equalization across countries.
2.2.1.2 Recent evidence
Recent studies indicate there are opportunities for cost savings in off-patent drug
markets in Europe and the United States.
A high-profile inquiry by the European Commission into generic competition found
that patients in EU countries have to wait an average of about 7 months for generics to
become available, starting from when brand name drugs lost market exclusivity. [10]
The inquiry report, published in 2009, estimated that these delays cost payers in EU
countries e 3 billion (US$ 3.4 billion) per year, based on retail prices. [10] Those findings
were echoed by a 2014 study, which found significant delays in the availability of
generics in many European countries. [9]
The European Commission’s report showed that generics are slow to penetrate
markets: after 2 years on the market, generics account for less than half of sales in
EU member states. [10] The report also found that prices are slow to drop in many
countries. Variation in prices and market shares between European countries has been
attributed to differences in pricing and reimbursement regulations, prescribing policies,
and generic substitution laws, among other factors. [8, 10, 11]
By comparison, the United States has historically had high rates of generic drug use—
84% of prescriptions were filled with generics in 2013 [94]—and low prices. [74] In recent
years, however, it has seen a decrease in competition in the generics sector. Between
2012 and 2013, the total cost of 280 widely used generic medicines only fell by 4% in
the United States, a slower rate of decline than in the previous 7 years. [211] This trend
was due to a combination of issues, including supply-chain disruptions, loopholes in
regulations by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), tough market conditions
driving firms out of business, a flurry of mergers and acquisitions, and backlogs in the
processing of generic drug applications by the FDA. [35, 212–214]
In extreme cases, reduced competition has enabled individual companies to drastic-
ally raise the prices of generic drugs. [68, 215] For example, the price of pyrimethamine
(Daraprim), an off-patent anti-infective medication, went up by about 5,500% overnight
in 2015. [216,217] Such price hikes have affected numerous generic drugs, including the
widely used antibiotic doxycycline (Doryx) and the cholesterol-lowering drug pravast-
atin (Pravachol). The cost of 500 doxycycline capsules rose from US$ 20 in October 2013
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to US$ 1,928 in April 2014, while the cost of a 1-year supply of pravastatin rose from
US$ 27 to US$ 196 during the same period, according to an analysis by the senior citizen
group AARP. [218] The US Government Accountability Office reported that between
2010 and 2015 there were “extraordinary price increases” of 100% or more for 315 out of
the 1,441 generics they studied. [219] Many of the affected medicines have been around
for decades at low cost. [74, 214, 219] (There have also been documented cases of large
price hikes for generic drugs in some European countries, like the U.K. [220])
Moreover, recent studies show that many American and European physicians,
pharmacists, and patients do not perceive brand name and generic drugs to be bioequi-
valent. [51, 95–104] A 2016 study found that 30% of surveyed physicians in the United
States preferred prescribing brand name drugs over their generic counterparts, while
27% believed generics cause more adverse effects than brand name drugs. [99] A 2013
US study reported that 2 in 5 physicians “sometimes” or “often” prescribe brand name
drugs instead of equivalent generics when patients request the former. [221]
In summary, there are shortcomings in generic drug markets in Europe and the
United States, notably delays in the availability of generics, high prices, and low
utilization rates. These issues affect countries to varying degrees. In the next section,
we outline contemporary generic drug policies in Europe and the United States to
identify lessons that might be drawn from different approaches.
2.2.2 Generic drug policies in Europe and the United States
There are vast differences between countries in terms of regulatory structures, lobby-
ing powers of special-interest groups, patent-litigation systems, political economies
of health care systems, and perceptions of generics among patients and health care
professionals. [222] Such differences influence the adoption and effectiveness of policies.
Figure 2.3 shows the patchwork of policies in place in Europe. Generic drug sub-
stitution is mandatory in 13 countries, voluntary in 14, and forbidden in five. The
situation with respect to generic prescribing is similarly diverse. Internal reference
pricing, which limits how much insurers will reimburse for generics, is used in most
countries. [13, 123, 124] In several countries, health insurers buy generic drugs in
bulk from the manufacturers that offer the best prices, a policy referred to as tender-
ing. [140, 223] For example, a health insurer might put out a tender for 1 million packs
of 20-mg simvastatin and ask generic manufacturers to submit confidential bids. The
winning manufacturer is asked to supply the entire market for the duration of the
contract, which typically ranges from 1 to 2 years. [140]
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Figure 2.3: Internal reference pricing (A), generic prescribing (B), generic substitution (C), and
tendering (D) in EU and EFTA countries (2016).
EFTA, European Free Trade Association; EU, European Union; IRP, internal reference pricing.
Note: These maps show the policies used by the 28 EU member states and the four EFTA signatories
(Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) for non-hospital pharmacies. We populated the maps
based on a 2016 report published by the World Health Organization. [224] If information was missing,
we used older sources dating as far back as 2009. The policies in some countries may have changed
since then. In Spain, only the autonomous community of Andalusia issues tenders. Generic prescribing
refers to the prescribing of drugs by their international nonproprietary names. The Danish and Swedish
tendering systems operate differently to the others. In each country, the relevant national government
agency asks generic manufacturers to offer their best prices. Usually, the least expensive generics become
the only ones that pharmacists can dispense; if a patient wants a brand name drug, they are required to
pay the difference out-of-pocket. The bidding process is repeated every 2 weeks in Denmark, and every
4 weeks in Sweden. There are safeguards to reduce the risk of supply disruptions.
Source: Derived from authors’ analysis of the data [118, 121, 140, 151, 152, 223, 224]; the map toolkit is
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
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Figure 2.3 gives a broad overview of policies, but the way these policies are imple-
mented varies considerably. Other supportive measures are often used to influence
generic drug usage, such as charging higher co-payments on branded drugs that have
generic equivalents to encourage patients to choose the latter.
National governments in all but three EU member states (Denmark, Germany,
and the United Kingdom) impose price controls on generics (ie, maximum allowable
prices). [118] Often these controls are linked to the prices of brand name drugs. In
Spain, for instance, the first company to sell a generic version of a drug must price
its product at least 40% below the price of the brand name drug at the time of loss
of market exclusivity; subsequent generic entrants must be priced at or below this
level. Many EU governments also retain the right to block large price increases for
prescription drugs, including generics, if necessary to protect public health or reduce
pressure on the public purse. [224] As nearly all EU countries have universal health
care systems, funded either through government tax revenues or taxes on employers
and employees, a population-based focus has strong political support from consumers
and non-industry stakeholders in these nations. [225]
In the United States, by comparison, generic prescribing is voluntary in all 50
states. Neither internal reference pricing nor tendering is used for generic drugs sold
in non-hospital pharmacies. There are no government price controls on generics, and
substitution laws differ from state to state, as shown in Figure 2.4. [56]
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Figure 2.4: Generic drug substitution laws in the United States (2010).
Note: States with “patient choice” grant patients the right to refuse generic drug substitution, usually at a higher cost.
Source: Derived from authors’ analysis of data [56]; the map toolkit is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
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Pricing, prescribing, and substitution policies can affect the prices and usage of
generics. [10] To illustrate this, Figure 2.5 shows how ex-manufacturer prices and
market shares of ramipril (Altace), a drug widely used to treat high blood pressure,
evolved between 1998 and 2010 in 4 countries. Ramipril lost patent protection in each
country in either November 2002 or March 2003, as indicated by the vertical lines.2
The figure shows that it took over a year for the first generic version of ramipril
to come on the market in the United Kingdom and Spain, compared to 2 years in
Sweden and 3 years in France. The trends in prices and market shares in each country
varied considerably. In the United Kingdom, the generic price fell to about a fifth of the
branded price within 3 months of the first generic being launched. During this time,
the price of the branded version remained unchanged and generic ramipril captured
over 90% of the British market. In Spain, on the other hand, the generic competitor was
introduced at about 60% of the branded price and only slowly gained market share,
reaching around 10% after 1 year of being on the market and only 25% after 3 years.
The branded price then fell to match the generic, which showed no sign of responding
to competition. In Sweden, at launch, the generic price was only 10% of the branded
price, which rapidly fell to a similar level. The generic market share continued to rise
steeply, to almost 100%. In France, although the prices moved in step, the price of
the generic drug remained about two-thirds that of the branded. Again, the generic
gained a high market share within a few years of entering the market. By the end of
2009, generic ramipril cost 7 times more in France (e 0.236 per dose) than in Sweden (e
0.033).
2The vertical lines show the date of patent expiry (November 2002 in France, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom; March 2003 in Spain). The Swedish and British prices were converted to e using official
exchange rates. The data correspond to sales in non-hospital pharmacies (except for Sweden, where
the data include sales in hospital and non-hospital pharmacies). Data on sales of branded ramipril in
France between January 1998 and December 1999 were unavailable. Prices and market shares were
measured on a quarterly basis.
88
Figure 2.5: Ex-manufacturer prices (e per dose) and market shares (%) of brand name and generic ramipril in four countries (1998-2010).
Source: Derived from authors’ analysis of data from the Midas database (IMS Health, 2010).
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2.2.3 Possible policy solutions
2.2.3.1 Facilitate generic market entry
First, national regulators should streamline the generic drug approval process. [93, 226]
In response to recent price hikes in the United States, Kesselheim et al called for
regulators to prioritize applications from manufacturers trying to bring to market a
generic medicine sold by three or fewer firms. [74, 212, 227] This would put downward
pressure on prices and make it harder for individual companies to have much influence
over prices. For off-patent drugs facing limited or no competition, Kesselheim et al
further recommended that the FDA temporarily import generics from countries with
equally high regulatory standards, like Canada and EU member states, to avoid paying
high premiums. [74, 228]
Second, in countries with backlogs of applications for generic drug approval, gov-
ernments could allocate more resources to national regulators to speed up the review
process [74] or could charge generic firms fees to increase resources available for the
drug approval process, as is done by the FDA. [229] In the European Union, levels
of backlogs vary greatly between national regulatory agencies, despite efforts to har-
monize such processes across the union. [10] In the United States, it currently takes
about 15 months, on average, for generic drugmakers to receive an initial response
from the FDA. [230] Over 4,000 generic drugs were awaiting approval from the FDA as
of mid-2016. [231]
Third, regulators should address the anticompetitive tactics used by brand name
firms to delay generic drug launches. Brand name manufacturers frequently file pat-
ent infringement lawsuits against generic drugmakers for launching their drugs too
early, preventing the marketing of generic products while the companies are tied up
in court. [10] Some such lawsuits might reflect calculations by brand name firms that
the extra revenue obtained after patent expiry is likely to exceed the legal fees in-
curred. [232] Brand name firms have employed other strategies to hinder market entry
for generic drugs, like filing patent clusters (ie, complex webs of primary and secondary
patents on pharmaceutical products and manufacturing processes that serve to extend
periods of market exclusivity). [10, 233, 234] Some medicines are protected by as many
as 1,300 patents, [10] making it difficult for generic drugmakers to determine when
they can legally enter the market. The US Congress proposed new legislation in 2015
that could make it easier for generic drug companies to challenge patents without the
need for lengthy and costly litigation. [235] The bill is still under consideration. The
European Commission has called for similar measures. [10]
Fourth, regulators should block pay-for-delay deals, where brand name drugmakers
offer generic manufacturers cash, or something else of value, to delay the introduction
of generic drugs onto the market. [10] Brand name drugmakers continue to enjoy
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monopolies, meaning consumers pay higher prices for longer. These deals happen in
both Europe and the United States. In 2009, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
estimated that eliminating pay-for-delay deals would save consumers and the federal
government over US$ 3.5 billion a year. [236] A 2013 Supreme Court ruling gave the
FTC the authority to block such deals, which it has begun to do. Yet there continue to
be legal disputes over what constitutes a pay-for-delay deal, which hamper the FTC’s
efforts.
Finally, regulators should facilitate access to samples of brand name products
for generic drugmakers. Since 2007, some brand name manufacturers have taken
advantage of a legal loophole in the United States to block access to samples, citing
restrictions imposed by the FDA through risk evaluation and mitigation strategies. [237,
238] This prevents generic drug companies from conducting bioequivalence tests prior
to patent expiry. These test results are needed for companies to receive marketing
authorization at the time of patent expiry. Several countermeasures have been proposed
by Congress and the FDA, but none have been implemented to date. [238]
2.2.3.2 Encourage price competition
Studies on pricing policies indicate that allowing generic drug companies to set their
own prices, while giving physicians and pharmacists incentives to prescribe and dis-
pense the least expensive generics, is more effective at driving down prices over time
than government-mandated price controls. [10, 46, 108, 116, 117, 239] This is the ap-
proach adopted by policymakers in Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, [11] although the Swedish authorities reserve the right to block large
price increases for generics. An analysis of IMS Health data conducted by the FDA
found that drug prices in the United States drop, on average, by around 50% with two
generic competitors on the market, around 70% with five on the market, and around
90% with 15 or more on the market. [188] However, safeguards are needed to prevent
large, unjustified price hikes for drugs available in generic versions. For example,
increases exceeding a percentage threshold could be blocked by national authorities on
economic or public health grounds, with exceptions for causes outside the control of
manufacturers which are verifiable (eg, changes in the prices of ingredients).
Tendering is another way to encourage price competition, especially if market
competition fails to achieve large price reductions for generic medicines. As mentioned
earlier, tendering refers to the purchase of generics in bulk, usually from the suppliers
offering the lowest prices. It has been shown to lower administrative costs, drive
down the prices of generics, and improve price transparency. [129, 140, 141, 223] In the
Netherlands, for example, the introduction of tendering resulted in the retail prices
of some generics—including amlodipine, omeprazole, and simvastatin (Table 2.2)—
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dropping by 80% to 90% overnight in non-hospital pharmacies. [129] The color, shape,
and size of a pill might change after a tender if a new manufacturer is asked to supply
the market, so physicians and pharmacists need to communicate such changes to
patients to promote treatment adherence. [240–242] Also, European payers in charge
of tendering sometimes split contracts between two or more manufacturers, as long
as the bids are close to each other, to minimize the risk of supply disruptions and to
maintain competition. [140] There is no conclusive evidence, though, that disruptions
occur more often in countries that rely on tendering than in others.
2.2.3.3 Promote generic dispensing and prescribing
Countries should require pharmacists to substitute generic drugs for brand name medi-
cines. The Swedish national government, for example, introduced mandatory generic
substitution in 2002, which led to a spike in generic drug use. [155] The European Com-
mission found that generic drugs enter the market sooner, on average, in EU member
states with mandatory substitution. [10] Currently, generic substitution is mandatory
in only 11 EU countries and 14 US states. [56, 224]
Governments should encourage or require physicians to prescribe drugs by their
generic names. [11, 150] A recent study estimated that physicians blocking generic
drug substitution costs the United States over US$ 7.5 billion per year, including
US$ 1.2 billion in out-of-pocket fees for patients. [243] This practice is also costly
in European countries, including France [244] and Switzerland. [245] There may be
legitimate reasons for prescribing brand name drugs instead of generic ones—for
example, a patient might be allergic to an inactive ingredient in a generic medicine. [240]
However, in many cases, those decisions are likely due to habit or misconceptions
about generic medicines among physicians. [56] Academic detailing (ie, having trained
experts with no conflicts of interest provide unbiased information to clinicians about the
effectiveness, safety, and costs of drugs) could help correct suboptimal prescribing. [246]
A meta-analysis conducted for Cochrane found, based on data from 25 randomized
controlled trials, that academic detailing improves compliance with desired prescribing
practices. [246] Financial incentives aimed at improving rates of generic prescribing
were also shown to be effective, although the evidence base is limited. [247, 248]
Moreover, regulators in some countries allow pharmacists to substitute a generic
for a brand name drug with a different active ingredient, as long as both drugs belong
to the same therapeutic class and have the same indication. For example, if a doctor
prescribes a patient rosuvastatin, a cholesterol-lowering drug not yet available in
generic form in some countries, a pharmacist could give the patient generic simvastatin
instead. [249] A recent study estimated that the United States spends an extra US$
73.0 billion per year—about 10% of total drug spending—on brand name drugs with
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available therapeutic substitutes. [250] This estimate included US$ 24.6 billion in out-
of-pocket expenses. [250] Most of the estimated excess spending was on brand name
drugs in five classes: statins, a class of cholesterol-reducing drugs (US$ 10.9 billion);
atypical antipsychotics, a class of drugs used to treat psychiatric conditions (US$ 9.99
billion); proton pump inhibitors, a class of drugs used to treat heartburn and related
conditions (US$ 6.12 billion); selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, a class of drugs
used to treat depression (US$ 6.08 billion); and angiotensin receptor blockers, a class of
drugs used to lower blood pressure (US$ 5.53 billion). [250]
Therapeutic substitutes can vary in terms of side effects and other properties, so
this form of substitution is less straightforward to implement than substitution of
bioequivalent products. For therapeutic substitution to be more widely practiced, the
relevant authorities and clinical organizations should develop appropriate protocols
and strengthen coordination between physicians, pharmacists, and insurers. [55,250,
251] A challenge is to get buy-in from trade groups for physicians, many of which have,
in the past, opposed such restrictions on prescribing and have raised concerns about the
potential adverse health consequences for patients. [250,252] In the United States, some
patient organizations have also been skeptical of therapeutic substitution, worried that
legislators are too focused on cutting costs at the expense of quality of care. [55]
2.2.4 Barriers to reforming generic drug policies: A case study from
the United States
Having reviewed a range of policy options, we now draw on the experience of one
country, the United States, to explore barriers to reform and offer thoughts on how they
might be overcome. While we focus on the history of substitution and bioequivalence
policies in the United States as a case study, similar analyses could be done for any
country.
The history of generic drug substitution in the United States (Box 2.1) shows how
trade groups for brand name drugmakers and clinicians have consistently banded
together to resist generic drug policy reform in the United States. [50, 253, 254] It is a
history marked by political conflicts, vested economic interests, and intense lobbying
by stakeholders. [55] Figure 2.6 highlights key events and milestones.
Regulation of bioequivalence has played a key role in the evolution of substitution
policies in the United States. [55, 201, 255] In the 1950s and ’60s, when US lawmakers
started calling for generic prescribing and substitution, there was little clarity about
how to verify that generic drugs would produce the same therapeutic effects as their
brand name counterparts. A scandal erupted in 1967 when it was found that some
patients who consumed generic versions of chloramphenicol (Chloromycetin), a widely
used antibiotic, had no traces of the active ingredient in their bloodstreams. It was later
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shown that the coating used by some generic manufacturers prevented the drug from
dissolving in the gastrointestinal tract. [255]
In response, between 1967 and 1975, the US FDA commissioned five separate ex-
ternal committees to provide input on how to assess the therapeutic equivalence of
generic and brand name drugs. [55] The proliferation of committees and recommend-
ations slowed down the market entry of generic drugs, hurt the public perception
of generics, hampered the campaign to roll back anti-substitution laws, and delayed
other changes to generic drug policies during this period. [50, 55, 256] The scientific
and regulatory uncertainty around bioequivalence created space for brand name manu-
facturers and their trade groups to nurture brand loyalty and to claim, often without
evidence, that there were meaningful differences between branded and generic medi-
cines. [55, 256] Not until 1984 did the FDA settle on a coherent and widely accepted
set of bioequivalence standards—based on the rate and extent of absorption of the
active ingredient into the bloodstream [199]—as part of the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. [255]
The issues raised by the proponents and critics of generic drug policy reform have
remained similar over the last 50 years in the United States. [50, 257] The evolution
of substitution and bioequivalence regulation provides insights into the economic,
political, cultural, and scientific issues influencing policy changes. Such insights can
help policymakers avoid past pitfalls.
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Box 2.1: History of drug substitution in the United States.
Generic drug substitution
The first instances of generic drug substitution were reported in the late
1940s. In response, the National Pharmaceutical Council (NPC), a trade
organization for the brand name drug industry, began aggressively lobbying
against substitution, saying it would stifle innovation. The group further
claimed that substitution would reduce quality of care, citing the scientific
uncertainty that existed at the time over whether generic drugs were as
effective as brand name drugs. [255]
The NPC forged an alliance with the American Medical Association (AMA)
and the American Pharmacists Association (APhA), two major trade
groups for clinicians and pharmacists. The AMA argued that substitution
diminished the role of physicians, while the APhA said it was a violation of
the ethical and professional standards of the trade. (In an apparent quid pro
quo, the NPC helped pharmacists lobby against supermarkets, which were
beginning to sell prescription and over-the-counter drugs.) The AMA was
further concerned that government intervention on dispensing was a step
toward socialized medicine, which they opposed.
The anti-substitution campaign was largely successful: by 1959, 44 states
had enacted laws blocking generic drug substitution.
During the 1960s and ’70s, when state health care budgets were ballooning,
state and municipal governments started looking at ways to cut health care
spending. Meanwhile, there was growing support for substitution among
pharmacists, who sought a more active role in the care of patients. In 1972,
Kentucky became the first state to abolish its anti-substitution law. By 1984,
all 50 states had legalized generic drug substitution.
However, state policies differed in three ways. First, generic substitution
was compulsory in some states and voluntary in others. Second, patients in
many states could refuse substitution. Finally, some states restricted which
drugs pharmacists could substitute.
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The rollback of anti-substitution laws on a state level resulted in a patchwork
of policies, most of which remain in place today. Physicians in all states can
block substitution, usually by ticking a box on the prescription pad which
reads “dispense as written”. [56] The poorer states have some of the weakest
substitution laws in the country, leading one commentator to recently note
that “the cost savings of generic substitution [in the United States] now
appear to benefit populations in inverse proportion to economic need”. [55]
To date, all attempts by federal legislators to enforce a minimum standard
of substitution have been voted down, and the politics and economics
of substitution have continued to play out at the state level. [258] Still,
substitution laws have helped dramatically increase the rate of generic drug
use in the United States: around 10% of prescriptions were filled generically
in 1958, compared to 88% in 2015.
Therapeutic drug substitution
In the 1980s, state lawmakers and hospital administrators turned their atten-
tion to therapeutic substitution. Proponents argued that many new drugs
offered little or no additional therapeutic benefit over existing ones and
that they should be substituted for older, cheaper medicines—preferably
generics. This would generate savings and incentivize drug companies to
develop innovative products. Trade groups for brand name drugmakers
and clinicians opposed therapeutic substitution, claiming it would harm
patients.
Oregon passed the first therapeutic substitution law in 1981, and hospitals
around the country began implementing a two-tiered approach: automatic
therapeutic substitution in clear-cut cases (eg, cephalosporins, anti-allergy
drugs, and heartburn treatments) and prior authorization in less straight-
forward cases (eg, beta blockers and anti-cancer drugs). Between 1987 and
1993, the proportion of health maintenance organizations that allowed
therapeutic substitution in non-hospital pharmacies doubled to 70%.
Private and public insurers increasingly turned to pharmacy benefit
managers (PBMs), who serve as intermediaries between drug companies
and payers, to help coordinate therapeutic substitution. PBMs negotiate
lower drug prices and rebates on behalf of large patient populations. Most
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PBMs operate formularies specifying the preferred products for different
therapeutic indications. These organizations help dictate the nature and
extent of generic and therapeutic substitution. They often rely on tiered
co-payment systems, whereby patients are required to pay more for brand
name drugs.
The lack of transparency with PBMs, however, meant that insurers were
unsure about how much of the negotiated discounts was passed on to
them, and how much was kept by PBMs. Some PBMs were bought by
pharmaceutical companies, introducing further conflicts of interest.
In 2000, partly in response to the rapid growth and opaqueness of PBMs,
the Oregon state legislature implemented guidelines on which medicines
should be prescribed to Medicaid patients for specific conditions, known
as a preferred drug list. [259, 260] The preferred drug list was the “public,
transparent, evidence-based analogue of the private formulary-shaping
activities of the PBMs”. [55] Idaho and Washington quickly followed suit
and developed their own lists.
These three states joined forces with the Pacific Northwest Evidence-based
Practice Center in 2003 to form the Drug Effectiveness Review Project
(DERP), a collaboration between Medicaid and public pharmacy programs
in member states to promote evidence-based prescribing. By 2008, the
DERP consortium comprised 15 states and two nonprofit organizations, and
33 states operated preferred drug lists, most of which promoted therapeutic
substitution wherever possible.
The recent economic downturn put the project under financial strain.
In 2014, there were only nine paying members in the consortium. Still,
DERP paved the way for future research into comparative effectiveness,
a field fraught with ethical, political, methodological, organizational, and
procedural issues.
Source: Derived from authors’ analysis of data [50, 55, 261]; other references are shown in the text.
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Figure 2.6: Key events and milestones for US drug substitution.
APhA, American Pharmacists Association; HMO, health maintenance organization.
Source: Derived from authors’ analysis of the data. [55, 261]
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2.2.4.1 Current opportunities for reform
Recent developments point to an opportunity for reform of generic drug policies in the
United States.
In the past few years, a series of price scandals shifted public attention from the high
prices of new medicines to the rising costs of generics, raising pressure on companies
and policymakers to contain costs. [262] A 2015 national survey by the Kaiser Family
Foundation found that roughly 3 in 4 Americans believe prescription drug prices are
unreasonably high, and, of those, 76% say pharmaceutical companies are mostly to
blame. [263] These findings may partly reflect the reputational damage to generic
drugmakers caused by recent scandals, as well as the increase in the number of patients
facing higher deductibles for medicines. [264]
A subsequent Kaiser poll, in 2016, found that the vast majority of Americans are
in favor of government action to curb prescription drug prices. [265] According to the
results, more than 8 in 10 Americans (82%) favor allowing Medicare to negotiate prices
with companies, while 66% support the creation of an independent group to oversee
the pricing of prescription drugs and 71% believe patients should be allowed to buy
medicines imported from Canada. [265]
The increasing roles of federal and state governments in health care has further
renewed attention on cost containment. [55, 261, 266] A growing number of govern-
ment officials, including Senators Bernie Sanders (D-VT), Susan Collins (R-ME), Elijah
Cummings (D-MD), and Claire McCaskill (D-MO) are looking at ways to improve
competition in the off-patent drug market to reduce spending, with some arguing that
state and federal governments should be allowed to block unjustified price increases
on generics. [267, 268] Competition authorities are also investigating potential price
collusion between generic companies. [220, 269] Private health insurers, which have a
strong interest in keeping generic prices low, have joined the debate, arguing on the
side of lawmakers on this issue. They were largely absent from discussions in the 1970s,
’80s, and ’90s when the prices of drugs were rising more slowly than those of other
health care goods and services. [55]
The outcome of the 2016 presidential election could provide further momentum
for improving generic drug policies. During the campaign, now-President Donald
Trump supported giving Medicare greater power to negotiate drug prices and allowing
states to import less expensive drugs from Canada and elsewhere. He launched an
attack on the pharmaceutical industry at a press conference a few days prior to his
inauguration. “Pharma has a lot of lobbies, a lot of lobbyists, and a lot of power”,
Trump said at the press conference. “And there’s very little bidding on drugs. We’re
the largest buyer of drugs in the world, and yet we don’t bid properly. And we’re going
to start bidding and we’re going to save billions of dollars”. Since taking office, Trump
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has reiterated his support for Medicare drug price negotiations. He has also stated his
desire to streamline the FDA drug approval process, but without offering specifics on
how he would like to see the process for generic drugs changed.
Scott Gottlieb, Trump’s new FDA commissioner who has close links to the pharma-
ceutical industry and a conservative think tank, also criticized the costs and delays of
generic drug approvals. In his first remarks to FDA staff, Gottlieb urged the agency
to take “meaningful steps to get more low cost alternatives to the market, to increase
competition, and to give consumers more options”. He went on to say that the FDA
should “make sure the generic drug process isn’t being inappropriately gamed to
delay competition and disadvantage consumers”. [270] There are concerns, however,
that changes to FDA procedures may harm the organization’s ability to guarantee
the efficacy, quality, and safety of approved drugs, including generics. [271] While it
remains to be seen how these developments play out in practice, the available evidence
suggests a willingness by the Trump administration to address price hikes and to ensure
the availability of low-cost generics. It is critical, though, that any changes to FDA
procedures do not undermine the agency’s ability to ensure that approved generics,
and new medicines, meet adequate regulatory standards.
Yet, at this writing, American health policy is extremely uncertain, [272–276] and
there are reasons why changes to generic drug policies may prove elusive.
In January 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress approved a budget resolution
that sets the stage for a major overhaul of the health care system, an action supported
by Trump’s health secretary. [274] In May, Republican lawmakers in the House of Rep-
resentatives passed a bill to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act. Among other
things, the bill would eliminate tax penalties for Americans who do not have health
insurance, remove a mandate for larger companies to offer affordable insurance to
employees, increase annual limits on how much individuals and families can contribute
to health savings accounts, cut taxes on high-income individuals and other groups
imposed by the Affordable Care Act, repeal income-based tax credits and subsidies
for out-pocket costs, remove caps on how much health insurers can charge older cus-
tomers in monthly premiums, and cut federal funding for Medicaid, a publicly funded
insurance program for low-income individuals and families. [277]
An analysis conducted by the non-partisan US Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimated that the House bill would save the federal government over US$ 100 billion
in a decade, but would also drastically increase the number of uninsured over the next
10 years and lead to hikes in health care premiums in the coming 3 years. [278] In many
states, health care premiums and out-of-pocket costs would soar for chronically ill
patients, and decline for young and healthy individuals. It is unclear what impact such
changes would have on the generic drug market, with the CBO report silent on this
issue.
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The bill moved to the Senate for a debate and vote, where Republican lawmakers
proposed an amended version of the legislation, which included only modest changes.
However, the Senate bill was defeated in July 2017 following opposition from law-
makers on both sides of the aisle and key stakeholders, including the American Hospital
Association and AARP. At the time of writing, Senate Republicans have indicated that
they will postpone efforts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act, although
Republican lawmakers can table new health care legislation at any point.
Moreover, the American Medical Association and the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, two of the largest and most influential lobbying organiza-
tions in the United States, continue to oppose government intervention in the generic
drug market (Box 2.1), such as stronger substitution laws and measures to block large
price increases. [50] Although both groups supported the Affordable Care Act, they
did so only after having received assurances that there would be no price controls on
medicines and no importation of cheaper medicines from other countries, among other
conditions. [50]
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2.3 Discussion
Addressing issues in the generic drug sector can enhance equitable access to medicines
in countries where patients face high out-of-pocket drug costs, like Cyprus, [279]
Greece, [280] and the United States. [281–283] Several studies indicate that patients
who use generic medicines instead of brand name ones are more likely to adhere to
treatment, [284,285] probably because of greater affordability, which can improve health
outcomes. [284]
Yet, as our results show, there remain large differences in the usage and prices of
generics in Europe and the United States. The barriers to market entry for generic
companies vary between countries, as do pricing and reimbursement policies. Beyond
such features of the market, there are differences in whether, and to what extent,
patients and health care professionals perceive generic and branded medicines to be
bioequivalent. [97, 98, 102] In some countries, negative perceptions of generics may
have contributed to slower uptake of stronger prescribing and substitution measures.
Governments should apply coherent supply- and demand-side policies in generic
drug markets. [2] There are interesting examples from smaller European countries, like
Denmark, [286] Norway, [287] and Sweden, [286] which have achieved low generic
drug prices. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, though, and there are different
ways of achieving similar results. For instance, the United Kingdom is one of the
few EU countries to forbid generic substitution. The electronic prescribing system in
the United Kingdom, however, automatically prompts physicians to prescribe generic
drugs when available. The country has one of the highest rates of generic drug use in
the world, [288] although some analysts argue that substitution should still be made
mandatory in the United Kingdom since physicians can be influenced by the marketing
of drug companies. [289]
The appropriate steps to reduce generic drug prices and to boost demand for such
medicines will vary between countries. For example, in nations with historically high
rates of generic drug use and low generic drug prices, but which are experiencing
generic drug shortages, like the United States, the emphasis should be on facilitating
market entry for generic drug companies. In countries with low rates of generic drug
use, like Greece and Italy, more should be done to improve the perceptions of generics
among physicians, pharmacists, and patients.
Finally, it is important to trace the cultural, political, regulatory, and scientific issues
influencing the adoption of generic drug policies. Historical analyses can help policy-
makers avoid past stumbling blocks when trying to enact reform. [290] For example, in
a comparative study of drug regulation in the United States and Germany, Arthur A.
Daemmrich analyzed the evolution of the medical and political settings of each country
during the 20th century, highlighting points of convergence and divergence. [222]
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Daemmrich noted that legislative changes to prescription-drug laws in the United
States often occur in response to public scandals. In Germany, by contrast, changes
tend to follow protracted negotiations between lawmakers and stakeholders. [222]
Drug regulation is highly politicized and adversarial in the United States, but much
less so in Germany, where health care is widely seen as a right. [222] Such political and
cultural factors help to explain differences in generic drug policies between countries.
Moreover, pharmaceutical policies involve balancing the interests of the health care
system with those of the pharmaceutical industry, with this balance varying between
countries. [291]
2.3.1 Limitations
The price comparisons in this study have limitations. First, an assumption behind
the Laspeyres index is that demand for prescription generic drugs is price inelastic
(ie, change in the price of a generic does not affect demand). Although empirical
data suggest that this is unlikely to be true, [41, 292] other types of weighted indexes
make assumptions that might be less likely to hold. [12, 117, 206] Laspeyres indexes are
therefore commonly used to compare drug prices. [12, 205, 206, 286, 293]
Second, the IMS Health data do not reflect confidential rebates and discounts. The
list prices (ie, official prices before discounts) may overestimate the actual prices paid
for some products. [294] Even so, list prices are meaningful to payers since they are the
starting point for discount negotiations. It is important to strengthen price transparency
in generic drug markets, since opaque pricing makes it easier for drugmakers to charge
the highest prices markets will bear.
Third, to aggregate price data across drug forms and strengths, it is necessary to use
a common unit of volume. As Danzon and Kim explained, “the ideal unit would be a
quality-constant ... course of therapy for a given drug, which should be applicable to all
[forms] and strengths. Such ideal units are not observable”. [206] In calculating prices
per dose, we implicitly assume that a single dose of a drug, in any form or strength, is
of equal therapeutic value to all patients. Some studies have instead calculated prices
per gram of active ingredient, but this measure suffers from other limitations. [206]
Finally, we had to exclude 4.1% of the drugs in our sample due to missing informa-
tion on dosage. These were mostly aerosol, cream, gel, injectable, and powder products.
This might have influenced our findings if there were systematic differences across
countries in the prices of those types of products. Still, the common sample accounted
for a large share of total generic sales in every country but the United Kingdom (25%).
The UK results should be interpreted with caution.
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2.4 Conclusions
Greater use of generic medicines is one way to constrain growth in health care spending
at a time when this is a political imperative everywhere. Yet across high-income
countries, generic prices and market shares vary widely. This is despite the existence of
effective policies to reduce delays in generic availability, stimulate price competition,
and increase generic drug use. There are, however, signs of change. European payers
and policymakers are showing growing interest in tendering to lower prices, something
that seems to be effective.
Given the mixed progress so far, it is critical to understand why previous initiatives
failed. Much can be learned from policy analyses, such as the one in this paper. These
typically highlight the role played by special-interest groups in obstructing reform.
Finally, it is important to be realistic about what can be achieved. Despite some
widely publicized examples of profiteering, discussed earlier, most of the growth in
drug spending will continue to be driven by new medicines. For some treatments, like
certain cancer immunotherapies, the complex manufacturing process means that the
scope for off-patent products is still limited. Yet there are opportunities for significant
cost savings from generics in many countries and, even where there are historically
strong generic markets, like the United States, regulators, policymakers, and payers
can do more to ensure timely generic drug availability.
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Appendix A: Sample of Medicines
Table A. List of the 200 most-prescribed off-patent active ingredients in the European
Union in 2013 (anatomical main group in parentheses).
Acetylcysteine (R/S/V) Acetylsalicylic acid (A/B/N)
Aciclovir (D/J/S) Alendronic acid (M)
Alfuzosin (G) Allopurinol (M)
Alprazolam (N) Alprostadil (C/G)
Amiodarone (C) Amisulpride (N)
Amitriptyline (N) Amlodipine (C)
Amlodipine / perindopril (C) Amoxicillin (J)
Amoxicillin / clavulanic acid (J) Anastrozole (L)
Apomorphine (G/N) Atenolol (C)
Atorvastatin (C) Azathioprine (L)
Azithromycin (J/S) Beclometasone (A/D/R)
Betahistine (N) Betamethasone (A/C/D/H/R/S)
Bicalutamide (L) Bisoprolol (C)
Bisoprolol / hydrochlorothiazide (C) Bromazepam (N)
Budesonide (A/D/R) Buprenorphine (N)
Candesartan cilexetil (C) Candesartan cilexetil / hydrochlorothiazide (C)
Carbamazepine (N) Carbidopa / levodopa (N)
Carvedilol (C) Cefpodoxime proxetil (J)
Ceftriaxone (J) Cefuroxime axetil (J/S)
Cetirizine (R) Ciclosporin (L/S)
Ciprofloxacin (J/S) Citalopram (N)
Clarithromycin (J) Clindamycin (D/G/J)
Clopidogrel (B) Clozapine (N)
Codeine (N/R) Codeine / paracetamol (N)
Cyproterone ethinylestradiol (G) Desloratadine (R)
Desmopressin (H) Desogestrel / ethinylestradiol (G)
Dexamethasone (A/C/D/H/R/S) Diazepam (N)
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Diclofenac (D/M/S) Dienogest / ethinylestradiol (G)
Diltiazem (C) Docetaxel (L)
Domperidone (A) Donepezil (N)
Doxazosin (C) Doxycycline (A/J)
Drospirenone / ethinylestradiol (G) Ebastine (R)
Enalapril (C) Enalapril / hydrochlorothiazide (C)
Erythromycin (D/J/S) Escitalopram (N)
Esomeprazole (A) Estradiol (G)
Estradiol / norethisterone (G) Ethinylestradiol / gestodene (G)
Ethinylestradiol / levonorgestrel (G) Felodipine (C)
Fenofibrate (C) Fentanyl (N)
Finasteride (D/G) Flucloxacillin (J)
Fluconazole (D/J) Fluoxetine (N)
Fluticasone / salmeterol (R) Fluvastatin (C)
Formoterol (R) Furosemide (C)
Gabapentin (N) Galantamine (N)
Gliclazide (A) Glimepiride (A)
Hyaluronic acid (D/M/R/S) Hydrochlorothiazide (C)
Hydrochlorothiazide / lisinopril (C) Hydrochlorothiazide / losartan (C)
Hydrochlorothiazide / ramipril (C) Hydrochlorothiazide / valsartan (C)
Hydrocortisone (A/C/D/H/S) Hydromorphone (N)
Ibandronic acid (M) Ibuprofen (C/G/M)
Indapamide (C) Indapamide / perindopril (C)
Iodine / levothyroxine sodium (H) Ipratropium bromide (R)
Irbesartan (C) Irinotecan (L)
Isosorbide mononitrate (C) Isotretinoin (D)
Ketoprofen (M) Lamotrigine (N)
Lansoprazole (A) Latanoprost (S)
Leflunomide (L) Lercanidipine (C)
Letrozole (L) Leuprorelin (L)
Levetiracetam (N) Levocetirizine (R)
Levofloxacin (J/S) Levothyroxine sodium (H)
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Lidocaine (C/D/N/R/S) Lisinopril (C)
Lorazepam (N) Lormetazepam (N)
Losartan (C) Memantine (N)
Mesalazine (A) Metamizole sodium (N)
Metformin (A) Methadone (N)
Methotrexate (L) Methylphenidate (N)
Metoprolol (C) Metronidazole (A/D/G/J/P)
Mirtazapine (N) Molsidomine (C)
Montelukast (R) Morphine (N)
Moxonidine (C) Naloxone / tilidine (N/V)
Naproxen (G/M) Nebivolol (C)
Nifedipine (C) Nitroglycerin (C)
Ofloxacin (J/S) Olanzapine (N)
Omeprazole (A) Ondansetron (A)
Oxaliplatin (L) Oxycodone (N)
Paclitaxel (L) Pantoprazole (A)
Paracetamol (N) Paracetamol / tramadol (N)
Paroxetine (N) Penicillin (J/S)
Perindopril (C) Phenytoin (N)
Piracetam (N) Pramipexole (N)
Pravastatin (C) Prednisolone (A/C/D/H/R/S)
Prednisone (A/H) Progesterone (G)
Propranolol (C) Quetiapine (N)
Rabeprazole (A) Ramipril (C)
Ranitidine (A) Repaglinide (A)
Rilmenidine (C) Risedronic acid (M)
Risperidone (N) Ropinirole (N)
Rosuvastatin (C) Salbutamol (R)
Sertraline (N) Sildenafil (G)
Simvastatin (C) Spironolactone (C)
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Sumatriptan (N) Tamsulosin (G)
Temazepam (N) Temozolomide (L)
Terbinafine (D) Testosterone (G)
Timolol (C/S) Tolterodine (G)
Topiramate (N) Torasemide (C)
Tramadol (N) Trazodone (N)
Trimebutine (A) Trimetazidine (C)
Valaciclovir (J) Valproic acid (N)
Valsartan (C) Venlafaxine (N)
Verapamil (C) Warfarin (B)
Zolpidem (N) Zopiclone (N)
Note: The data included over-the-counter products, such as ibuprofen and paracetamol, if these were
prescribed by a licensed health care practitioner. The active ingredients listed in bold were available in
at least one form-strength combination in each country. These 80 ingredients comprised the common
sample analyzed in this paper.
Source: Reproduced from IMS Health 2013 (Pricing Insights database); anatomical main groups from
the WHOCC ATC/DDD Index (2015).
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Appendix B: Description of IMS Health Data
Prices
IMS Health collects data on pack prices of medicines in European countries from
government price lists, wholesaler invoices, and other validated sources. The company
collects data at different levels of the distribution chain, based on data availability. IMS
Health regularly—usually quarterly—audits price levels to obtain up-to-date price and
volume data for each country. The company has internal quality assurance procedures.
When data are unavailable at a level of the distribution chain, IMS Health adopts
the same approach taken by national health ministries, or the relevant authorities, to
calculate ex-manufacturer and/or retail prices. In Spain, for example, IMS Health
only collects data on retail prices, exclusive of value-added taxes, and then calculates
ex-manufacturer prices based on official mark-ups regulated by the government (Table
A).
Table A. Price build-up of medicines in Spain (2013).
Ex-manufacturer price (per pack) Corresponding wholesale mark-up
e 0.00 - e 91.63 7.6% of the wholesale price
e 91.64 + e 7.54 (flat fee)
Ex-manufacturer price (per pack) Corresponding retail mark-up
e 0.00 - e 91.63 27.9% of the retail price (excl. VAT)
e 91.64 - e 200.00 e 38.37 (flat fee)
e 200.01 - e 500.00 e 43.37 (flat fee)
e 500.01 + e 48.37 (flat fee)
VAT, value-added tax.
Source: Reproduced from IMS Health (2013).
In some countries, IMS Health collects data on wholesale prices (ie, prices charged
by wholesalers to pharmacies), which they use to calculate ex-manufacturer and retail
prices. For countries where distribution margins are unregulated, IMS Health estimates
average margins, which can vary by product group.
Refer to IMS Health documentation for more information about data sources in each
country.
109
Sales
IMS Health uses price and volume data to report aggregate sales, since a common
denominator (eg, doses) is needed to compare prices across drug forms and strengths.
IMS Health calculates total sales of a product by multiplying the pack price by the
number of packs sold (Table B). IMS Health relies on the latest price in a quarter. The
company excludes value-added taxes to ensure comparability across countries. The
sales figures do not reflect discounts, rebates, clawbacks, and other forms of confidential
price reductions.
Table B. Example calculations for one quarter.
Product Country
Retail
price
per pack
# of
packs
sold
Sales
calculation
Total
retail sales
A Italy e 12.67 12,750 12,750 * e 12.67 e 161,542.50
B Sweden 15.50 kr 5,000 5,000 * 15.50 kr 77,500.00 kr
C
United
Kingdom
£8.23 7,934 7,934 * £8.23 £65,296.82
Source: Reproduced from IMS Health 2013 (Pricing Insights database).
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3A comparison of generic drug prices in
seven European countries: A
methodological analysis
“When faced with a difficult question, we often answer an easier one instead, usually
without noticing the substitution.”
– Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow
Key messages
• There are methodological challenges to comparing generic drug prices interna-
tionally.
• Estimates can vary widely depending on the methods used to calculate price
indexes.
• Results can also differ depending on whether one looks at the prices charged by
manufacturers or those charged by pharmacists.
• Health care stakeholders should be aware of the limitations of drug price compar-
isons.
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Abstract
Context: Policymakers and researchers frequently compare the prices of medicines
between countries. Such comparisons often serve as barometers of how pricing and
reimbursement policies are performing. The aim of this study was to examine method-
ological challenges to comparing generic drug prices.
Methods: We calculated all commonly used price indexes based on 2013 IMS Health
data on sales of 3,156 generic drugs in seven European countries.
Findings: There were large differences in generic drug prices between countries. How-
ever, the results varied depending on the choice of index, base country, unit of volume,
method of currency conversion, and therapeutic category. The results also differed
depending on whether one looked at the prices charged by manufacturers or those
charged by pharmacists.
Conclusions: Price indexes are a useful statistical approach for comparing drug prices
across countries, but researchers and policymakers should interpret price indexes with
caution given their limitations. More research is needed to determine the drivers of
price differences between countries. The data suggest that some governments should
aim to reduce distribution costs for generic drugs.
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MANY European countries are facing severe cost pressures on health carebudgets, in part due to rising drug spending.1 In this context, the savingsfrom greater use of less expensive generic drugs can help pay for other
health care services. Yet recent European Commission reports point to market failures
for generic drugs. [10, 295] It is therefore important to regularly compare generic drug
prices in countries with similar income levels in order to give public payers a sense of
whether they are over-paying for generic drugs or not. Such comparisons can serve as
barometers of how pricing and reimbursement policies are performing. [4, 117, 207, 293,
296–305]
Previous comparisons of generic drug prices have found that prices varied markedly
across European and North American countries. [8, 12, 142, 205, 286, 287, 306–309] The
studies often relied on different methods and samples, however, making it difficult to
compare findings. In addition, most analyses have had small sample sizes, which may
have biased the results. Moreover, some earlier findings are likely out of date given
how often pricing and reimbursement regulations are changed.
As important, the impact of distribution margins and taxes on generic drug prices
has been underexplored, even though studies indicate that those costs can account
for more than 90% of the retail price of a generic drug, ie, the price charged by phar-
macists to patients or third-party payers. [295] Nearly all studies have looked at ex-
manufacturer prices, ie, those charged by manufacturers to wholesalers, which do not
account for distribution costs.
In this study, we compared the ex-manufacturer and retail prices of a large sample
of generic drugs in seven European countries in 2013. We calculated all commonly
used price indexes to outline the methodological challenges to comparing generic drug
prices. It is critical that policymakers are aware of the advantages and limitations of
these types of analyses, given that the results of price comparisons might be used to
justify changes to pharmaceutical policies.
1This chapter was published: Wouters OJ, Kanavos PG (2017). A comparison of generic drug prices in
seven European countries: A methodological analysis. BMC Health Services Research, 17(242): 1-7.
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3.1 Methods
We acquired 2013 data from IMS Health on volumes and sales of 200 off-patent ingredi-
ents in seven country with similar income levels: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and Sweden. These ingredients were available in 3,156 strength-form
combinations.2 Volumes were recorded in doses and grams of active ingredient.3 Sales
were recorded in euros based on average exchange rates for the year.4 We excluded 213
products (6.7%, 213/3156) with missing volume data.
We restricted our analysis to the 110 active ingredients sold in all seven countries,
which accounted for 54 (Italy) to 87% (Sweden) of total spend on generics in each
country. For each ingredient, we calculated the average price per dose and the average
price per gram, both at the ex-manufacturer and retail levels. To do this, we divided
total sales in euros across form-strength combinations by number of doses or grams
sold.5
We then calculated four indexes—unweighted, Paasche, Laspeyres, and Fisher—
using prices per gram and prices per dose. [206] Unweighted indexes (IU) were calcu-
lated as
IU =
∑ni=1 p
c
i
∑ni=1 p
b
i
where p was the price of active ingredient i in the comparator country or the base
country. We selected Germany as the base country, which takes a value of 100 in all
indexes.
The other indexes were weighted to account for consumption patterns. Paasche (IP)
and Laspeyres indexes (IL) were computed as
IP =
∑ni=1 p
c
i q
c
i
∑ni=1 p
b
i q
c
i
and
IL =
∑ni=1 p
c
i q
b
i
∑ni=1 p
b
i q
b
i
where q was the quantity in the comparator or base country (ie, doses or grams). Finally,
2The dataset excluded generic drugs sold in hospital pharmacies, off-patent originator drugs, parallel-
traded products, and off-patent biological drugs.
3IMS Health refers to doses as “standard units”.
4These values were calculated by multiplying the number of packs sold of each product by the corres-
ponding prices on a quarterly basis. For these calculations, IMS Health relied on the latest prices in
each quarter from validated sources, such as government price lists and wholesaler invoices, excluding
value-added taxes.
5If sales of either <1,000 doses or <e 1,000 were recorded in a country for a drug, we decided a priori to
exclude the sales figures for that country, as was done in previous studies. [12, 117, 206] Those values
may reflect data-entry errors or inconsistencies in reporting across countries.
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Fisher indexes (IF) were calculated as
IF =
√
IP · IL
3.1.1 Sensitivity and subgroup analyses
The results of Laspeyres indexes can vary depending on which country is selected
as the base, since this determines which quantity weights are used. For instance,
atorvastatin, a cholesterol-reducing drug, was only the 40th most prescribed generic
drug in Germany, in terms of number of doses sold, whereas it was one of the ten most
prescribed generic drugs in three of the other countries. As a sensitivity analysis, we
re-calculated all the price indexes with France as the base country.
Because medicines are traded goods, [310] we used exchange rate adjustments
in the baseline analyses. However, the results of price indexes can differ depending
on whether exchange rates or purchasing power parities (PPPs) are used to convert
monetary values to a common currency. Since exchange rates are sensitive to currency
fluctuations, we re-calculated all of the indexes based on PPP conversion factors. PPPs,
which are measured in national currency units per US dollar, account for cross-country
differences in the prices of goods and services. In this way, they equalize the purchasing
power of different currencies.
Finally, we compared the prices of generic drugs in different therapeutic subgroups.
To do this, we categorized the 110 active ingredients by anatomical main groups using
the ATC/DDD system developed by the World Health Organization Collaborating
Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology. Table 3.1 shows the breakdown of active
ingredients by group. We excluded ingredients that belonged to more than one group.
For example, timolol is a beta blocker used to treat both high blood pressure (ATC group
C) and glaucoma (ATC group S). We then compared the prices of the active ingredients
belonging to the two largest groups in our sample: cardiovascular system drugs (n
= 25) and nervous system drugs (n = 29). The subgroup analysis used exchange-rate
conversions and Germany as the base country.
The full results of the sensitivity and subgroup analyses can be found in Appendix
A.
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Table 3.1: The breakdown of active ingredients in the common sample (n = 110) by anatomical
main group.
Code Anatomical main group Count
A Alimentary tract and metabolism 8
B Blood and blood-forming organs 1
C Cardiovascular system 25
D Dermatologicals 0a
G Genito-urinary system and sex hormones 7
H Systemic hormonal preparations (excl. sex hormones and insulins) 1
J Anti-infectives for systemic use 3
L Antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents 4
M Musculo-skeletal system 4
N Nervous system 29
P Antiparasitic products, insecticides and repellants 0a
R Respiratory system 5
S Sensory organs 1
V Various 0
- Belong to multiple anatomical main groups 22
a All D and P medicines belonged to multiple groups
Source: World Health Organization Collaborating Centre ATC/DDD index (2015).
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3.2 Results
3.2.1 Ex-manufacturer vs. retail prices
Table 3.2 summarises the main results with Germany as the base country. Prices varied
markedly across countries. Denmark and Sweden consistently had the lowest ex-
manufacturer and retail prices among the seven countries, while Italy had the highest
in most weighted indexes. In the Laspeyres (dose) index, for example, the Italian
ex-manufacturer prices were, on average, 1.6 times the German ones and 2.6 times the
Danish ones. Figure 3.1 (panel a) shows that Belgium, France, and Spain had higher
ex-manufacturer prices than Germany, but the opposite was true at the retail level.
3.2.2 Unit of volume (doses vs. grams of active ingredient)
The results of the unweighted indexes fluctuated widely depending on which unit
of volume was used (Table 3.2). By contrast, most of the weighted results remained
similar across the two units of volume.6 There were some exceptions: in the Laspeyres
indexes, for example, the French ex-manufacturer prices were lower than those in Italy
when doses were used, whereas they were higher when grams of active ingredients
were used (Table 3.2).
3.2.3 Weighting (Laspeyres vs. Paasche vs. Fisher)
The Paasche indexes were always lower than the Laspeyres indexes at both the ex-
manufacturer and retail levels (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 [panel b]). The Fisher results—
which are the geometric means of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes—fell between the
latter two.
3.2.4 Base country
Figure 3.1 (panel c) shows that the Laspeyres values dropped in all countries, except
Denmark, when the French weights were used.7 This indicates that those drugs which
were more highly consumed in France than in Germany were also cheaper in most of
the other countries.
6For the common sample of 110 active ingredients, the average number of grams of active ingredient per
dose ranged from 0.09 grams in Sweden to 0.19 grams in Spain.
7For ease of comparison to the other results, all prices are expressed in relation to those in Germany
(index value = 100).
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3.2.5 Currency conversion (exchange rates vs. purchasing power par-
ities)
The results were largely unchanged when PPPs—rather than exchange rates—were
used to convert sales in local currencies to a common unit. This suggests that variation
in drug prices between these seven countries were, for the most part, not due to
differences in the costs of goods and services.
3.2.6 Subgroup analyses
Figure 3.1 (panel d) shows the ex-manufacturer prices of cardiovascular system drugs
and nervous system drugs. The amount of price variation differed across therapeutic
groups. In the full sample, there was a 2.5-fold difference in prices between the coun-
tries with the highest and lowest prices. By comparison, there were 3.1 and 3.5-fold
differences in the prices of nervous system and cardiovascular drugs, respectively.
Germany had the second highest prices for nervous system drugs, whereas it had
among the lowest prices for cardiovascular system drugs.
Table 3.2: Ex-manufacturer and retail prices with Germany as the base (2013).
Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy Spain Sweden
Ex-manufacturer
Unweighted-D 78.05 48.02 99.31 100 109.84 136.86 65.36
Unweighted-G 115.45 55.07 63.62 100 50.57 63.09 57.28
Laspeyres-D 136.67 61.11 144.46 100 156.66 134.47 85.7
Laspeyres-G 126.9 68.63 164.92 100 154.2 124.26 101.59
Paasche-D 108.75 34.38 87.07 100 105.59 78.32 56.5
Paasche-G 97.19 39.96 87.55 100 63.88 65.26 67.43
Fisher-D 121.92 45.84 112.15 100 128.62 102.62 69.58
Fisher-G 111.06 52.37 120.16 100 99.24 90.05 82.76
Retail
Unweighted-D 70.97 48.96 98.38 100 117.57 129.61 52.91
Unweighted-G 104.09 58.36 57.03 100 56.97 62.75 47.49
Laspeyres-D 92.23 48.29 97.06 100 114.67 86.01 59.12
Laspeyres-G 87.29 54.93 114.85 100 112.28 79.22 69.87
Paasche-D 70.46 32.5 62.17 100 76.27 46.43 44.01
Paasche-G 63.99 37.28 62.92 100 47.73 40.55 52.69
Fisher-D 80.61 39.61 77.68 100 93.52 63.19 51.01
Fisher-G 74.73 45.25 85.01 100 73.2 56.68 60.68
D, doses; G, grams of active ingredient
Source: IMS Health 2013 (Pricing Insights database).
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Figure 3.1: Results for different types of price indexes in 2013 with Germany as the base country.
Note: For ease of interpretation, the unit of volume is the number of doses in all the price indexes. (a) Comparison of retail and ex-manufacturer prices (n = 110)
in a Laspeyres index. (b) Contrast of ex-manufacturer prices (n = 110) in a Laspeyres index with German versus French weights. (c) Ex-manufacturer prices (n =
110) in weighted and unweighted indexes. (d) Comparison of ex-manufacturer prices of cardiovascular system drugs (n = 25), nervous system drugs (n = 29), and
all drugs (n = 110) in a Laspeyres index. (Source: IMS Health 2013, Pricing Insights database.)
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3.3 Discussion
In this analysis, we explored differences in the ex-manufacturer and retail prices of
generic drugs across seven countries in 2013 using various price indexes.
The ex-manufacturer and retail prices varied widely across countries. This is consist-
ent with earlier studies comparing the prices of patented drugs at both levels. [295, 303,
304] More research is needed to disentangle the impact of supply- and demand-side
policies, such as pricing, reimbursement, prescribing, and substitution rules, on the
ex-manufacturer and retail prices of generics. [224] Prices variation is also likely due, in
part, to differences in the regulation of wholesaler and pharmacy margins. [295, 311]
There are various methods for comparing drug prices across settings, [206, 312] and
they often produce remarkably different results. For example, the ex-manufacturer
Laspeyres index (dose) in Table 3.2 suggests that the sample of generic drugs was about
60% more expensive in Italy than in Germany. On the other hand, the ex-manufacturer
Paasche index (grams of active ingredient) indicates that the sample was about 35%
cheaper in Italy than in Germany.
There were even larger differences between some of the weighted and unweighted
indexes. It might be especially important to use weighted indexes when compar-
ing generic drug prices, since studies suggest that these prices are closely linked
to volume. [21, 185] Earlier studies have shown that the results of unweighted and
weighted indexes can differ sharply, [117,206] which is consistent with our findings. Ex-
treme prices can skew the results of unweighted indexes, so these indexes are generally
considered less reliable than weighted ones for comparing drug prices. [206]
There is no consensus on which weighting method is most appropriate for com-
paring drug prices, as each has advantages and disadvantages (Box 3.1). [206, 302]
Academic and government studies have variously calculated unweighted, [299,300]
Fisher, [301] Paasche, [117, 206] and Laspeyres indexes, [12, 117, 206, 313] often using
different units of volume and/or base countries. The likely reason why Paasche results
are usually lower than Laspeyres results, a finding which has been reported in previous
drug price indexes, [117,206] is that patients tend to consume more of the drugs that are
cheaper in their countries. Therefore, when prices are weighted by local consumption,
the indexes show lower average prices—relative to the base country—than when prices
are weighted by consumption in the base country.
The unit of volume can influence the results if there are large, systematic differences
between countries in the average strength per dose. [206] For example, previous studies
have found that price index results for Japan vary significantly depending on whether
number of doses or grams of active ingredient serve as the unit of volume. [12, 117, 205,
206,296] The authors of those studies attributed this finding to the tendency of Japanese
clinicians to prescribe higher quantities of lower-strength products.
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Box 3.1: Key advantages and disadvantages of each type of price index for
pharmaceutical products.
Unweighted index
1. Pros: It requires no volume data and is simple to calculate.
2. Cons: Unweighted indexes do not reflect consumption patterns. The
results can be skewed by price outliers.
Laspeyres index
1. Pros: It assumes that the consumption pattern in the base country
would remain the same even if it paid the prices observed in the com-
parator country, which, depending on the country, might be accurate.
It only requires volume data for a single country.
2. Cons: The assumption above might not hold true. The results depend
on the choice of base country.
Paasche index
1. Pros: It assumes that the consumption pattern in the base country
would look exactly like that of a comparator country if both had the
same prices, which, depending on the country, might be accurate.
2. Cons: The assumption above might not hold true. Also, a Paasche
index requires volume data for all study countries.
Fisher index
1. Pros: Because it uses an average of the quantities in the base coun-
try and the comparator, the prices lie between those in Paasche and
Laspeyres indices. This might be a good approach if one is unsure
about the true price elasticity. The index also has certain theoretical
advantages over the others. [206]
2. Cons: Conversely, depending on the true price elasticity, the res-
ults might be less accurate than those of a Paasche or Laspeyres
index. A Fisher index also requires volume data for all study countries.
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Despite such methodological challenges, it is still possible to glean useful inform-
ation from price indexes. In particular, it is important to look for consistency across
indexes. As an example, our results indicate that Denmark and Sweden had the lowest
ex-manufacturer prices in nearly all weighted indexes, regardless of whether Germany
or France served as the base country. This strongly suggests that generic drugs were
cheaper in Denmark and Sweden in 2013 than in the other five countries. By contrast,
the Italian ex-manufacturer and retail prices were among the highest in all weighted
indexes. Ideally, the results of price indexes should be interpreted alongside other
quantitative and qualitative data about the impact of individual policies on drug prices.
On their own, price indexes do not provide causal evidence on the effects of pricing
and reimbursement rules, generic substitution laws, and other factors on the prices of
generic drugs.
The findings in this study raise questions which merit further research. Both Sweden
and Denmark operate tender-like systems for generic drugs,8 which may account for
the low prices observed in each country. [314,315] Tendering refers to the bulk purchase
of generic drugs from the manufacturers that offer the lowest prices. [140] More work
is needed to understand the impact of tendering on drug prices, and whether any
observed price reductions can be sustained over time. There is concern that relying only
on tendering could create product shortages, drive generic drug firms out of business,
and lead to higher generic drug prices over time. [140] There is little evidence, however,
on the long-term effects of tendering.
It is also important to examine why there are large differences in the prices of drugs
in various therapeutic areas, both within and between countries. Such variation may,
in part, reflect market factors. For example, the marketing exclusivity for a drug can
expire at different times across high-income countries depending on when the drug was
approved in each jurisdiction. Also, some studies have observed an inverse relationship
between the number of competitors in the market and generic drug prices. [45, 187]
The speed of generic entry, in turn, has been found to be correlated with how much
brand-name firms record in revenue in the years leading up to patent expiry. [9, 167] In
other words, generic firms tend to prioritize more lucrative drug markets.
3.3.1 Limitations
This study has limitations, most of which are inherent to drug price indexes.
8National government authorities in Denmark and Sweden operate tender-like systems: the relevant
authority in each country asks drug makers to offer their best prices, and, in most cases, the cheapest
products are the only ones which public payers will reimburse. This bidding process is repeated every
two and four weeks in Denmark and Sweden, respectively. Payers in Germany and Spain also tender
for generic drugs, but the tender results were kept confidential in 2013. The data, therefore, did not
reflect tendering outcomes in either country.
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First, the data did not account for confidential discounts, which can be as high as
50% for some generic drugs in certain countries. All list prices may, therefore, not have
corresponded to the actual prices paid. [294] However, if profits from discounts accrue
to wholesalers or pharmacists, then list prices are more important to payers.
Second, Paasche and Laspeyres indexes are underpinned by assumptions about
the relationship between generic drug prices and usage which may not always hold.
Specifically, the results of Laspeyres indexes are valid if demand for prescription
medicines is price inelastic. While empirical findings contradict this assumption, [41,
292] the Paasche index instead assumes that the consumption pattern in the base
country would look exactly like that of the comparator country if both had the same
prices. The latter assumption might be less likely to hold true, since there are differences
between countries in standards of care, disease prevalence rates, prescription drug
coverage, and patient preferences—all of which can affect demand. [206]
Third, by restricting the analysis to a common sample of drugs, we reduced the
sample size. In some previous price indexes for patented drugs, researchers instead
conducted a series of comparisons between the base country and one other country
at a time, looking at the drugs available in both countries. Such comparisons, which
are called bilateral analyses, maximize the sample size for each country pair. We
chose to instead calculate what are known as multilateral indexes, which compare
the prices of a sample of drugs available in all study countries. Multilateral indexes
provide information on how prices compare across all the countries rather than just
between each pair. While a common sample might over-represent older, internationally
available products, [206] this is less of a concern when comparing generic drug prices.
However, it is important to note that two countries with identical prices could show
up as having differing price levels in a Paasche index if consumption patterns differ.
Thus, multilateral price comparisons using Paasche indexes should be interpreted with
caution.
Fourth, we used common units of volume to aggregate data across formulations of
active ingredients. [206] In using prices per dose, however, we assumed that a dose of
a drug provides the same therapeutic benefit to any patients, regardless of strength-
form combination. By contrast, prices per gram of active ingredient are sensitive to
the selection of drugs, given that drug strengths often vary considerably between
drugs. [301] The price per defined daily dose is an alternative metric. A defined daily
dose is the “assumed average maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its main
indication in adults”. [316] We could not identify this dose for each drug in our dataset,
as we did not have information about drug indications. However, defined daily doses
are not always of equal therapeutic value to all patients, and they may not accurately
reflect consumption patterns. [206] For example, a defined daily dose is not adjusted
for differences in the duration of treatment. They are, therefore, not necessarily a better
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unit of comparison than doses or grams of active ingredient. [206, 316] Also, because
defined daily doses are specified in terms of grams of active ingredient per day, indexes
based on defined daily doses and indexes based on grams should generate similar
findings if the average number of treatment days are fairly consistent across countries
for most drugs. [117]
Fifth, the drugs were listed by active ingredient, and no information was available
on the indications for which the drugs were prescribed. However, a prior study found
that the results of price indexes were “virtually unchanged” when products were
defined by active ingredient instead of active ingredient plus indication. [206]
Lastly, we had to exclude 6.7% of drugs (213/3,156) due to missing volume data.
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3.4 Conclusions
Generic drug policy is an important topic given rising drug expenditures and concerns
about the financial sustainability of many health care systems. More research is needed
to better understand the causes of variation in the prices of generic drugs across
countries. This will help to identify which measures are most effective at reducing
prices. Our findings suggest that some countries should focus on containing the
distribution costs for generic drugs.
There are a number of methodological issues that can arise when trying to compare
drug prices internationally. Drugs often differ across countries in terms of names,
pack sizes, formulations, strengths, and manufacturers. They can also vary in terms of
whether they are sold over-the-counter or through prescriptions, and whether they are
sold in hospital or retail pharmacies. There is a trade-off between matching all of these
factors—which produces more accurate price comparisons of individual products—and
the sample size.
Once a sample of drugs has been chosen, there are various ways of calculating price
indexes to aggregate the data, each with its own advantages and disadvantages, as
discussed in this paper. There is no gold standard for comparing drug prices. Our
results showed that such comparisons are highly sensitive to the choice of method—for
example, Laspeyres versus Paasche indexes—which is consistent with the findings of
earlier studies of patented drugs.
Overall, price indexes are a useful statistical approach for comparing drug prices
across countries, but policymakers and researchers should interpret price indexes with
caution given their limitations.
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Appendix A: Sensitivity and subgroup analyses
Table A. Ex-manufacturer and retail prices with France as the base country (2013).
Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy Spain Sweden
Ex-manufacturer prices
Unweighted-D 78.59 48.36 100 100.69 110.61 137.81 65.81
Unweighted-G 181.48 86.56 100 157.19 79.49 99.17 90.04
Laspeyres-D 106.44 80.64 100 114.84 138.8 117.96 77.23
Laspeyres-G 99.42 77.05 100 114.22 127.4 94.44 85.43
Paasche-D 98.02 29 100 69.22 91.58 68.71 51.07
Paasche-G 79.74 28.07 100 60.64 79.08 62.68 50.09
Fisher-D 102.14 48.36 100 89.16 112.74 90.03 62.8
Fisher-G 89.04 46.5 100 83.22 100.37 76.94 65.41
Retail prices
Unweighted-D 72.14 49.77 100 101.65 119.51 131.74 53.78
Unweighted-G 182.51 102.33 100 175.35 99.89 110.03 83.27
Laspeyres-D 108.28 87.73 100 160.86 147.25 111.29 78.87
Laspeyres-G 101.04 84.89 100 158.94 134.96 89.03 86.43
Paasche-D 98.3 36.75 100 103.03 99.04 63.62 54.21
Paasche-G 79.61 35.29 100 87.07 85.97 57.72 52.45
Fisher-D 103.17 56.78 100 128.74 120.76 84.15 65.39
Fisher-G 89.69 54.73 100 117.64 107.71 71.69 67.33
D, doses; G, grams of active ingredient
Source: IMS Health 2013 (Pricing Insights database).
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Table B. Ex-manufacturer and retail prices based on PPP adjustments with Germany as
the base country (2013).
Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy Spain Sweden
Ex-manufacturer
Unweighted-D 74.39 37.15 94.28 100 114.45 157.94 51.18
Unweighted-G 110.04 42.6 60.39 100 52.69 72.81 44.86
Laspeyres-D 130.26 47.27 137.13 100 163.24 155.18 67.11
Laspeyres-G 120.95 53.09 156.56 100 160.67 143.4 79.55
Paasche-D 103.66 26.6 82.66 100 110.02 90.38 44.24
Paasche-G 92.63 30.91 83.11 100 66.56 75.32 52.8
Fisher-D 116.2 35.46 106.47 100 134.01 118.43 54.49
Fisher-G 105.85 40.51 114.07 100 103.41 103.92 64.81
Retail
Unweighted-D 67.65 37.87 93.39 100 122.5 149.57 41.43
Unweighted-G 99.21 45.15 54.14 100 59.36 72.41 37.19
Laspeyres-D 87.91 37.35 92.14 100 119.48 99.26 46.29
Laspeyres-G 83.19 42.49 109.03 100 116.99 91.42 54.71
Paasche-D 67.15 25.14 59.01 100 79.48 53.58 34.46
Paasche-G 60.99 28.84 59.73 100 49.73 46.79 41.26
Fisher-D 76.83 30.64 73.74 100 97.45 72.93 39.94
Fisher-G 71.23 35.01 80.7 100 76.28 65.41 47.51
D, doses; G, grams of active ingredient; PPP, purchasing power parity
Source: IMS Health 2013 (Pricing Insights database).
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Table C. Ex-manufacturer and retail prices of cardiovascular system medicines (n = 25)
with Germany as the base country (2013).
Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy Spain Sweden
Ex-manufacturer
Unweighted-D 132.27 93.24 138.78 100 108.37 131.4 61.37
Unweighted-G 36.83 69.01 45.56 100 31.82 36.26 33.94
Laspeyres-D 218.08 67.45 235.22 100 155.92 178.09 96.41
Laspeyres-G 193.33 64.03 262.42 100 169.33 176.21 107.84
Paasche-D 186.92 48.96 161.27 100 128.38 130.94 64.06
Paasche-G 106.46 46.44 117.94 100 33.18 58.58 72.16
Fisher-D 201.9 57.47 194.77 100 141.48 152.7 78.59
Fisher-G 143.46 54.53 175.93 100 74.95 101.59 88.21
Retail
Unweighted-D 90.57 69.55 99.8 100 86.25 88.17 48.71
Unweighted-G 24.12 44.57 30.43 100 23.9 23 25.4
Laspeyres-D 113.15 46.28 128.59 100 91.25 86.76 61.19
Laspeyres-G 99.94 44.82 143.99 100 99.15 85.93 68.32
Paasche-D 101.7 37.28 104.37 100 82.95 74.95 47.63
Paasche-G 63.24 36.23 77.73 100 24.45 36.06 53.52
Fisher-D 107.27 41.53 115.85 100 87 80.64 53.99
Fisher-G 79.5 40.3 105.79 100 49.23 55.67 60.47
D, doses; G, grams of active ingredient
Source: IMS Health 2013 (Pricing Insights database).
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Table D. Ex-manufacturer and retail prices of nervous system medicines (n = 29) with
Germany as the base country (2013).
Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy Spain Sweden
Ex-manufacturer
Unweighted-D 74.2 28.15 87.51 100 84.09 91.41 47.57
Unweighted-G 137.93 45.23 56.84 100 43.7 55.74 20.52
Laspeyres-D 94.62 32.29 100.38 100 98.14 89.11 58.15
Laspeyres-G 103.92 36.06 97.08 100 80.77 82.69 64.8
Paasche-D 102.02 27.7 93.4 100 118.6 87.31 51.84
Paasche-G 113.27 32.57 96.33 100 111.16 75.89 55.55
Fisher-D 98.25 29.91 96.83 100 107.89 88.21 54.9
Fisher-G 108.49 34.27 96.7 100 94.75 79.21 60
Retail
Unweighted-D 65.19 31.71 77.06 100 91.51 85.08 40.67
Unweighted-G 124.59 50.17 50.38 100 50.17 55.89 18.27
Laspeyres-D 78.43 34.25 84.33 100 99.31 77.62 47.36
Laspeyres-G 86.15 37.94 83.98 100 82.6 72.55 53.61
Paasche-D 65.12 29.9 60.59 100 90.42 58.44 41.42
Paasche-G 64.49 33.97 66.05 100 82.54 53.66 45.16
Fisher-D 71.47 32 71.48 100 94.76 67.35 44.29
Fisher-G 74.53 35.9 74.48 100 82.57 62.39 49.2
D, doses; G, grams of active ingredient
Source: IMS Health 2013 (Pricing Insights database).
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4The impact of pharmaceutical tendering
on prices and market concentration in
South Africa over a 14-year period
“There are more profits in pharmaceuticals than in oil. My message to [drug companies]
is that they are in a sector that is very sensitive. They mustn’t fish from our troubled
waters.”
– Dr. Aaron Motsoaledi, Minister of Health of South Africa (Dec. 2010)
Key messages
• Tendering was linked to large price cuts for many medicines in South Africa.
• It did not appear to have an adverse effect on market concentration.
• Yet there has been a drop in the number of firms winning contracts over time.
• The South African government should improve its forecasts of drug demand.
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Abstract
Context: The procurement of medicines through government tenders is increasingly
common, yet little has been written about the impact of tenders on prices, competition,
and supply security in the pharmaceutical sector. In this study, we investigated the
South African tendering system for medicines, which has been in operation since 1982.
The objective of this paper was to (i) outline a conceptual framework for analyzing the
system and (ii) present evidence on its impact on prices and competition over the past
15 years.
Methods: We calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes to measure market concentra-
tion in tenders issued between 2003 and 2016. We estimated price indexes to track how
medicine prices evolved over this period.
Findings: Since 2003, there have been large price decreases for medicines in most
therapeutic categories. For instance, the average prices of antiretroviral therapies,
anti-infective medicines, small-volume parenterals, drops and inhalers, solid-dose
medicines, and family-planning agents dropped by roughly 40% or more over this
period. Many tender contracts in South Africa remained competitive over time, based
on the Herfindahl-Hirschman results, with some notable exceptions. However, the
number of different firms winning contracts decreased over time in most tender categor-
ies. Also, there were large discrepancies between the drug quantities the health ministry
estimated it would need to meet patient demand and the quantities the ministry went
on to procure during tender periods.
Conclusions: Tendering may be an effective policy to lower drug costs. South African
government officials should monitor the availability and prices of medicines to ensure
continued access to affordable medicines for patients, as it may be undermined by the
decreasing number of firms winning contracts over time. Given the large discrepancy
between forecasts and procurements, the government would benefit from improving
the accuracy of its demand forecasts.
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PHARMACEUTICAL tendering refers to the bulk purchase of medicines from sup-pliers at agreed-upon prices over contracted periods.1 The procurement ofmedicines through government tenders is increasingly common in the face
of budgetary pressures. [2, 111, 140, 142, 143, 224, 279, 317–319] Tendering is a form of
strategic purchasing of health care inputs, which the World Health Organization (WHO)
defines as "active, evidence-based engagement in defining the service-mix and volume,
and selecting the provider-mix in order to maximize societal objectives." [320] Put
differently, strategic purchasing is “the on-going search for the best means to optimize
health systems performance by deciding which interventions should be purchased,
how they should be purchased and from what providers”. [321] The strategic pur-
chasing of medicines from pharmaceutical firms is vital for improving health system
performance (ie, improve quality, efficiency, equity, and responsiveness of health care
service provision [321]), promoting universal health coverage, and ensuring timely
access to affordable medicines for patients. [322] Figure 4.1 shows the relationships
between purchasers, providers (eg, drug suppliers), government agencies, and patients
during strategic purchasing.
Studies have looked at the impact of tendering on the prices of and spending on
medicines sold in hospital pharmacies, [136–138, 323, 324] off-patent biologicals (ie,
biosimilars), [135] vaccines, [139] and medicines sold in retail pharmacies. [62, 129,
141, 144, 325, 326] The latter set of studies have generally found that the introduction
of tenders was associated with large price decreases for generic medicines. In the
Netherlands, for example, the prices of some generic drugs dropped by as much as 90%
overnight in retail pharmacies when insurers first started issuing tenders, suggesting
that tenders can scoop significant one-off savings from price competition. [129] Danzon
and colleagues found, based on regression analysis of data from 37 low- and middle-
income countries, that originator and generic drugs procured for international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) through tenders were priced, on average, 42% and
34% lower than the same products sold in retail pharmacies in these countries. [62]
In China, where tendering at provincial level was introduced by 2010 in all regions
through government-led bidding platforms, the national government reported that
prices of essential medicines dropped by 17%, on average, between 2009 and 2011. [130]
However, such results cannot necessarily be generalized across therapeutic groups
or medicine forms (tablets versus creams, for instance), and it is not clear whether
subsequent tenders would sustain such low prices—or if prices would instead creep
back up as manufacturers drop out of the market. The study periods of existing analyses
have been short: all studies have examined six years of data or fewer, with the exception
1This chapter was published: Wouters OJ, Sandberg DM, Pillay A, Kanavos PG (2019). The impact of
pharmaceutical tendering on prices and market concentration in South Africa over a 14-year period.
Social Science & Medicine, 220: 362-370. This chapter presents the submitted version of the paper. Some
of the results and text were updated or re-analysed during the peer review process.
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of one study which looked at data on medicines sold in hospital pharmacies over an
eight-year period. [323] The majority of studies have examined at most four consecutive
years of data, [62, 136, 138, 139, 144, 324, 327–332] with several of these studies looking
at drugs sold in hospital pharmacies, biosimilars, or vaccines. Moreover, data from
more countries, especially developing ones, are needed to determine which features of
tendering systems are associated with lower prices.
Figure 4.1: Key strategic purchasing actions in relation to purchaser, providers, government,
and citizens.
Source: Reproduced from WHO (2016, p. 5), with permission. [321]
The short-term cost savings from tendering must be weighed against the potential
adverse long-term effects on competition. Proponents of tendering claim it will result
in prices which more accurately reflect costs of production. [129, 141] Critics claims
tendering will drive losing firms out of business and lead to higher prices over time, as
manufacturers exit the market. [70, 129, 140, 333] Yet there is little empirical evidence
on the effects of tendering on the prices, competition, and supply security in the
pharmaceutical sector over a period of six years or longer.
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In this study, we investigated the South African tendering system for medicines,
which has been in operation since 1982 in the public health care system. South Africa is
categorized by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country, ranked 32nd in the
world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). Its population of around 55 million
faces one of the worst Gini coefficients globally at 0.634.
Total health expenditure is about 8.8% of GDP, according to recent government
figures. About 48% and 52% of health spending is publicly and privately funded,
respectively. By contrast, the average total health expenditure among member states of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is 12.4% and
the average among low- and middle-income countries is 5.8%. Out-of-pocket health
spending has steadily decreased over the past two decades in South Africa—from
29.9% of private expenditure in 1995 to 12.5% in 2014. [344] In 2015, pharmaceutical
spending was estimated at 35.6 billion rand (US$ 2.6 billion), or US$ 47.3 per capita,
with over 80% of this amount spent in the private sector. [345] Roughly two-thirds
(63%) of prescriptions are filled generically in South Africa—about the same amount as
in Denmark [94]—with generics accounting for 36% of total drug spending. [346]
South Africa is home to the largest number of people living with human immun-
odeficiency virus (HIV) in the world. The challenges for both health and economic
development are vast. [347–351] It is against this backdrop that the health ministry is
compelled to leverage procurement to maximize health outcomes within budgetary
constraints.
The aims of this study were to: (i) outline a conceptual framework for analyzing the
South African tendering system for medicines and (ii) present evidence on its impact
on prices and competition in the country’s pharmaceutical sector over the past 15 years.
This is one of very few studies to present evidence on the effects of tendering over a
period of six years or longer.
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4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Documentary analysis
To outline a conceptual framework for medicine tenders in South Africa, we reviewed
all tender contracts awarded by the national government between 2003 and 2016, as
well as relevant legislation. We accessed all contracts via the National Treasury and
National Department of Health (NDoH) websites, as well as in person from NDoH
archives (Pretoria, South Africa). These contracts outline the conditions of award with
which manufacturers must comply.
The conceptual framework was developed through internal discussions between the
authors and senior officials from the NDoH. The framework outlines the key variables
the NDoH considers when awarding tenders: price, equity, local economic growth, and
supply security.
4.1.2 Quantitative data analysis
Tender contracts contain information on medicine prices, quantities, manufacturers,
and lead times.2 We calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes (HHIs) to measure the
degree of market concentration in each medicine tender issued by the government
since 2003. A HHI is calculated by summing the squared market shares of every
manufacturer
HHI =
N
∑
i=1
s2i
HHIs are measured on a scale of 0 to 10,000, with a score of close to 0 indicating
perfect competition, and a score of 10,000 indicating a monopoly. We adopted the
US Department of Justice definition of market concentration: an HHI of 1,499 or
lower indicates a competitive market, an HHI of 1,500 to 2,499 indicates a moderately
concentrated market, and an HHI of 2,500 or higher indicates a highly concentrated
market.
To track how the prices of medicines in each tender category evolved between 2003
and 2016, we calculated Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher indexes. [206, 208] Laspeyres
indexes (PL) are estimated as
PL =
∑nj p
t
jq
0
j
∑nj p
0
j q
0
j
where pjt is the price of product j at time t, and qj0 is the quantity of product j in the
first period (measured in number of packs), and pj0 is the price of product j in the first
2A lead time is defined by the health ministry as “the [maximum permissible] time from submission
of order to supplier to time of receipt by the department as confirmed by the Proof of Delivery docu-
ment”. [352]
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period. Paasche indexes (PS) are calculated as
PS =
∑nj p
t
jq
t
j
∑nj p
0
j q
t
j
and Fisher indexes are quantified as
PF =
√
PL · PS
We restricted the price-index analysis to medicines included in every tender since
2003, which resulted in a sample of 7 anti-tuberculosis medicines, 39 anti-infective
medicines, 5 family-planning agents, 32 oncological products, 117 small-volume par-
enterals, 32 drops and inhalers, 34 semi-solid medicines, 116 solid-dose medicines, 11
biological products, 12 large-volume parenterals, 20 liquids and spirits, and 8 antiretro-
viral therapies. We excluded data on diagnostic agents (ie, category 5 in Box 4.1) and
packaging materials (ie, category 14), since these categories do not include medicinal
products. As a sensitivity analysis, we dropped the first two tender contracts in each
category to increase the sample size; these results are presented in Appendix A.3
We then examined prices changes for medicines in six therapeutic classes: angiotensin-
converting enzyme inhibitors, angiotensin receptor blockers, atypical antipsychotics,
calcium channel blockers, proton-pump inhibitors, selective serotonin reuptake inhibit-
ors, and statins. These medicines have been selected as “tracer” drugs in other studies
of the impact of tendering on drug prices. [129, 141] We also analyzed price changes for
oncology products which were priced at ZAR 300 or more per pack in 2003 and which
have been included in every tender since then, as well as price changes for first- and
second-line therapies for HIV and tuberculosis (TB).
For each of these medicines, we compared the estimated quantities in the respective
tender contracts issued between 2012 and 2014 to the quantities the government went
on to procure in each tender period.4 Data on procured quantities were obtained from
the “Republic of South Africa Pharmaceutical Database” (Jan. 2011 - Apr. 2017). This
database is generated from a web-based reporting platform through which contracted
suppliers provide information on all transactions (ie, orders received and delivered) to
allow the government to monitor stock levels.
Finally, we compared the prices of these medicines to those in the private sector,
which were obtained from the “Private-Sector Database of Medicine Prices” (Jan. 2009 -
3We excluded biological products, large-volume parenterals, liquids and spirits, and small-volume
parenterals from the sensitivity analysis, as there have been four or fewer tenders issued since 2003 for
these categories. Dropping the first two tenders would have resulted in short time series.
4We looked at the 2012 and 2014 tenders given the availability of complete data for each period. We
excluded oncology products due to lack of data.
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Apr. 2017).5 If a product was sold by multiple manufacturers in the private sector then
the lowest price was used for the comparison.
All data were analyzed in Stata 14 (StataCorp), with prices adjusted for inflation
based on consumer price indexes. [353] We calculated weighted prices for split awards.6
5We did not examine the private-sector prices of medicines for HIV, acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS), and TB, since these products are primarily sold in public facilities.
6For instance, if one firm was asked to supply 60% of the contracted volume at a price of 5 ZAR per
pack, and another was asked to supply 40% of the volume at a price of 10 ZAR per pack, the weighted
price was 7 ZAR (5*0.6 + 10*0.4).The method applied by the NDoH to split awards is outlined in the
conceptual framework.
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4.2 Results
4.2.1 Conceptual framework
In the South African public sector, the NDoH issues tenders to set the prices of essential
medicines.7 The NDoH divides medicines into fourteen categories (Box 4.1). The health
ministry puts out a tender for all medicines in each category every two-to-three years.
Tenders outline the quantity of each product that is needed, as well as other relevant
information like lead times. The NDoH accepts bids from national and international
manufacturers with the right to sell a product in South Africa.
Although tendering happens at national level, procurement is done independently
by the nine provincial authorities. The estimation and quantification of volumes also
starts at provincial level, with the NDoH playing an oversight role.
Demand is estimated based on usage in previous years and epidemiological fore-
casts.8 The national and provincial health departments consider other relevant informa-
tion, such as forthcoming changes to clinical guidelines which are expected to increase
or decrease demand for products. The quantities are not binding: the NDoH can
procure smaller or larger amounts of drugs than those specified on the tender contracts.
However, provincial health departments must confirm that they have adequate funds
to pay for the estimated quantities, in accordance with the Preferential Procurement
Policy Framework Act of 2000. Figure 4.2 illustrates the tendering process.
4.2.1.1 Price
Whilst an auction is designed to sell something so as to maximize profit for the auc-
tioneer, tenders aim to encourage price competition for a specific item. The purchaser
determines the rules of bidding and attempts to gain the greatest value for the lowest
price, minimizing the cost faced by reducing the profit margins for the bidders. [354]
Tenders are expected to reduce the prices of products being procured through econom-
ies of scale and scope through centralized procurement, as well as reduce administrative
inefficiencies from fragmented distribution systems. These theoretical advantages re-
quire the buyer to exercise its monopsony power to purchase medicines on behalf of a
large population. [130, 325]
7Medicines which have not yet been reviewed for inclusion on the essential medicines list are sometimes
tendered for, as are certain high-volume products which have been excluded from the list for historical
reasons.
8The forecasting procedures have changed over time; more simplistic methods were used in the past due
to lack of data and resources.
138
Box 4.1: List of medicine tender categories in South Africa (2017).
1. Anti-tuberculosis medicines
2. Anti-infective medicines (ie, antibiotic, anti-fungal, antiprotozoal, and
anti-viral agents)
3. Family planning agents
4. Oncology and immunological agents
5. Diagnostic agents and contrast media
6. Small-volume parenterals and insulin devices
7. Drops, aerosols, inhalers, and inhalants
8. Semi-solid-dose medicines (incl. powders)
9. Solid-dose medicines and transdermal patches
10. Biological preparations
11. Large-volume parenterals
12. Pharmaceutical liquids, alcohols, ethers, glycerin, and methylated
spirits
13. Antiretroviral medicines
14. Pharmaceutical packaging materials
Note: The groupings have changed since 2003. For instance, between 2003 and 2008, the second group
only included antibiotics. In 2009, the group was expanded to include other types of anti-infective
medicines.
139
Figure 4.2: Overview of tendering steps and duration.
Note: The timeline is indicative, and durations may vary. In the past, administrative inefficiencies on
the part of the National Department of Health have occasionally resulted in delays in the transition
between tender contracts. In such cases, outgoing firms have been asked by the health ministry to supply
medicines beyond their contracted periods, which increases the risk of supply disruptions.
In a basic tender model, the buyer awards each contract to the supplier offering
the lowest price. Bids in public tenders are usually sealed, meaning bidders do not
know the prices offered by competitors, unless there is collusion. [137] If the award is
based solely on price, and if there are enough competitors, each supplier is incentivized
to bid the lowest price at which it still makes a profit. This would make the supplier
indifferent as to whether the tender is won or not.9
The NDoH, however, also considers other variables than price when awarding
tender contracts, as outlined in the conditions of award. The winning bid will be the
one that maximizes the utility of the NDoH, defined as
U = P +V
9For patent-protected products sold by a single manufacturer, the tendering process is effectively a
negotiation: if the health ministry concludes that a bid is unreasonably high, it will ask for a price
reduction. This ad hoc assessment is largely based on the prices of products in the same therapeutic
class and the estimated budget impact. The NDoH uses the lowest price in the private sector as an
upper limit. In 2010, the government started comparing the prices of single-source products with those
in other countries to ensure that it does not overpay for these products. For HIV drugs, for instance, the
health ministry looks at countries with comparable demand, whereas for oncology products it looks at
countries with low prices from the same suppliers.
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where P refers to price and V refers to a value function. Emphasis on V often means
the purchaser pays a premium P.
In the following sub-sections, we examine the parameters of the value function, V,
for the South African government when it procures medicines.10,11
4.2.1.2 Equity
In South Africa, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act of 2000 requires the
government to use tenders to redistribute wealth and opportunities to certain groups
to redress past inequalities. This is given legal and binding expression for all tender
contracts worth more than ZAR 1 million in the country. For these tenders, a 90/10
points system determines the winner.
First, the firm offering the lowest price automatically receives 90 points. Points for
other firms are allocated based on the formula
Ps = 90 (1− Bt − BminBmin )
where Ps is the points scored, Bt is the bid by supplier t, and Bmin is the lowest bid. In
this way, each firm receives a deduction which is proportional to their distance from
the lowest bid.
Second, the remaining 10 points are allocated based on “preference scores”, as per
the rules set out in the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003. In brief,
each company is rated on a 10-point scale based on criteria, such as the proportion of
equity owners that belong to previously disadvantaged racial groups under Apartheid
and the proportion of the management team that belong to these groups.12 This
information is provided by individual companies with supporting documentation. The
scores may be audited by accredited verification agencies. This system is meant to
provide a transparent and predictable way to facilitate structural economic change.13
10The Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965, the Public Finance Management Act
No. 1 of 1999, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act of 2000, the South African National
Drug Policy of 1996, the Pharmacy Act 53 of 1974, and the Health Act 63 of 1977 outline the terms
and conditions for the registration, manufacturing, distribution, and consumption of medicines in the
country. Tendering procedures must adhere to these laws and their subsequent amendments.
11Ordinarily, when goods are required by multiple South African government departments, tenders
are administered by the National Treasury. Until 2011 this was the case with pharmaceuticals and
medical devices, which were required by the NDoH, Department of Correctional Services, and the
South African Military Health Service. In 2011, however, the NDoH gained control of the tender
process for all medicines used in the public sector.
12Between 1994 and 2000, factors like previous disadvantage were evaluated and included to varying
degrees in all centralized tenders, including those for pharmaceuticals, on an ad hoc basis. With the
introduction of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act of 2000, the applicable formulas
became applied more transparently and systematically to all government procurement.
13It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the merits and demerits of this employment equity scheme.
Bolton [355] analyzed the legal aspects of procurement in South Africa, including the complexity of
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As such, the utility function is
U = 0.9P + 0.1B
where B is the empowerment score.
4.2.1.3 Local economic growth
Since 2011, pharmaceutical tenders in South Africa include a “local designation” cri-
terion for selected products: the health ministry is willing to pay a premium corres-
ponding to up to 10 points to local drug makers for these items.14 This is part of a
broader move, under the National Development Plan 2030, to promote local economic
growth, industry diversification, job creation, inequality reduction, and a positive trade
balance. [364] The most recent Industrial Policy Action Plan (2017/18-2019/20) named
the pharmaceutical sector as an area of local strategic importance for state investment.
Local designation is also meant to strengthen medium to long-term supply security,
as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is concerned about the fragility of global
politics and economics and the risk of supplies being terminated. [365] Currently, South
Africa imports about 95% of active pharmaceutical ingredients sold in the country,
including all ingredients for antiretroviral and tuberculosis medicines. [337]
Local designation alters the weights in the value function for designated products
U = 0.8P + 0.1B + 0.1I
where I is local industry status. Thus, the NDoH is willing to pay a premium of up to 20
points for designated medicines supplied by local companies with high empowerment
scores.
4.2.1.4 Supply security
In a winner-takes-all tender, where a single company is asked to supply a medicine for
the duration of the contract, the risk of supply disruptions, intuitively, increases. [134]
In the case of a supply disruption, the government can buy off-contract from another
supplier, but this comes with additional financial and transactional costs. Theoretical
studies indicate that the splitting of awards can be economically advantageous for
buyers when considering a whole portfolio of products being procured if it reduces the
occurrence of supply disruptions and the associated costs. [366–369]
balancing cost-effectiveness and equity goals. Much has been written internationally about the role of
state procurement as a tool to achieve policy objectives. [356–363]
14A product cannot receive a local designation if the health ministry deems there is a potential risk to
supply security. The national health ministry sometimes allows local manufacturers to match the
lowest price for designated products.
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To reduce the risk of supply disruptions, the health ministry sometimes splits
contracts between multiple manufacturers. Splits are based on overall points scored. If
two manufacturers score equal points, the award is split evenly (50-50). If the difference
in points is between 0.1 and 5, the award is split 60-40, with the higher-scoring firm
asked to supply the larger quantity. If the difference is 5.1 to 10 points, the split is 70-30.
And if the difference is 10.1 to 20 points, the split is 80-20. This means that the health
ministry is willing to pay an additional premium of up to 20 points to secure multiple
sources of some medicines.15
The health ministry adheres to the formula for splitting awards, unless a manufac-
turer reports capacity constraints.16 In such cases, the ministry may deviate from this
algorithm at its discretion. The NDoH generally also splits awards, regardless of point
differentials, in three other situations: (i) the required volume is high, meaning there is
a heightened risk of supply disruptions, (ii) the product is of strategic importance for
the country (eg, first-line antiretroviral drugs used to treat HIV and AIDS), or (iii) the
highest scoring bidder had poor performance history in the previous tender.
4.2.1.5 Summary
Continuing with the simple formulaic representation of interests, a full utility function
from a health system and industrial perspective can be written as
U = P +V(B, I, S)
That is, the best tender outcome would be one that achieves the lowest possible price,
considering broad-based black economic empowerment (B), preference for local in-
dustry (I), and supply security (S).17
Once a tender has been awarded, the winning bidder enters into a contract with
the NDoH based on the conditions specified in the tender advertisement. The NDoH
manages the relationship, ensuring the supplier complies with these conditions. In this
way, public service tenders differ markedly from commercial auctions: rather than a
one-off economic transaction, service provision requires the purchaser to continually
navigate issues with high political and economic stakes.
In any contractual relationship, it is important to allow for risk sharing to deal with
exogenous shocks that affect production costs and demand. In South Africa, tender
15If the difference in points exceeds 20, the health ministry will occasionally still split the award 90/10.
16The health ministry sometimes splits contracts between three or more firms, at its discretion, while
taking into consideration the price and logistical implications of such splits.
17Product quality and due diligences are pre-selection criteria which are not considered in the bid
evaluations. It is worth noting, though, that the Global Fund does not consider the South African
Medicines Control Council to be a “stringent regulatory authority”, as per the fund’s Quality Assurance
Policy for Pharmaceutical Products from July 1, 2009.
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prices are eligible for adjustments every six months for exchange-rate fluctuations.18
The health ministry strives to be responsive to changes in exchange rates, while minim-
ising the administrative burden from frequent price updates. Previously, manufacturers
could also claim adjustments for increases to production costs, such as changes to the
prices of active ingredients sourced abroad, with adequate documentation.19 The health
ministry eliminated price adjustments for changes to cost structures in 2013 to reduce
gaming among drug manufacturers.
Figure 4.3 shows a timeline of important events and milestones affecting the tender-
ing system since the fall of Apartheid in 1994.
18Due to extreme exchange-rate fluctuations in the South African rand in recent years, an optional
3-monthly adjustment was implemented in February 2016 if variance to the base rate exceeded 10%.
19Each bidder must provide a breakdown of costs: raw materials, active pharmaceutical ingredients,
inactive ingredients, formulation and packaging, logistics, and gross profit margin. Bidders must also
disclose the sources of active ingredients so that the health ministry can evaluate the risk of supply
disruptions.
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Figure 4.3: Key events in the South African health care system (1994 - present).
Source: Authors based on [335, 347, 370]
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4.2.2 Tender outcomes
4.2.2.1 Overview
Between 2003 and 2016, the South African government tendered for 7,645 products
(2,198 unique products), ranging from 63 biological products to 3,004 solid-dose medi-
cines. The two largest categories, solid-dose and anti-infective medicines, accounted for
more than half the products (50.2%, 4,345/8,655). The average price per pack during
this period was ZAR 283.24, and the median price was ZAR 46.09.20 The cheapest
product was a lubricating jelly (2.5 g sachets) priced at ZAR 0.36 per pack in 2003.
The most expensive product was a human coagulation factor VIIa concentrate (5 mg
injection) priced at ZAR 63,925.21 per pack in 2016.21
Table 4.1 shows the projected budget impact of tenders issued between 2003 and
2016, based on the prices and estimated quantities listed in contracts. The value of
tenders in the public sector roughly doubled between 2004-2005 and 2014-2015, reaching
ZAR 27.3 billion. Most of this increase was driven by spending on medicines in three
categories: solid-dose, antiretroviral, and tuberculosis therapies. Estimated spending
on solid-dose drugs rose by 65% (4.73/2.87 billion) in real terms between the first
and most recent tenders, while it increased by 124% (14.19/6.33) for antiretroviral
medicines. Spending on tuberculosis medicines went up by roughly 49% (0.94/0.63)
over this period. In most other categories, expenditures remained similar over time or,
in a few cases, decreased slightly.
Volumes have increased over time in all contracts (authors’ calculations). For solid-
dose tenders, for instance, an estimated 1.1 billion kg of active ingredients (3.1 billion
defined daily doses) were procured in 2003, compared to 2.7 billion kg in 2016 (9.4
billion defined daily doses).22
There has been an increase in the number of split contracts. From 2003 to 2010, the
NDoH issued 195 split contracts between as many as seven firms. Since 2010, it has
awarded 218 split contracts between as many as six firms. Between 2003 and 2016, most
split contracts were awarded in one of six categories: anti-infective (94 split contracts),
family-planning (21), oncological (25), small-volume-parenteral (29), solid-dose (185),
and antiretroviral medicines (21).
20All currencies are reported in 2017 rand.
21By comparison, 7,546 unique products were sold in the private sector between 2009 and 2016 at an
average price of ZAR 1,120.35 per pack, and a median price of ZAR 170.26. The most expensive product
was ipilimumab (5 mg/ml intravenous therapy), priced at ZAR 243,448.67 per pack in 2015.
22Excluding combination products with multiple active ingredients, as well as minerals, proteases,
saccharins, and vitamins.
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Table 4.1: Estimated budget impact of each tender in billions of ZAR (2003-2016).
2003/04 2005/06 2007/08 2009/10 2011/12 2013/14 2015/16
Anti-tuberculosis medicines - - 0.63 0.17 0.60 1.05 0.98
Anti-infective medicines 2.08 2.45 1.16 2.53 1.23 1.64 2.07
Family planning agents 0.87 0.56 0.45 0.31 0.38 0.27 0.32
Oncological products 0.42 0.76 0.46 0.50 0.57 0.38 0.42
Small-volume parenterals - - 2.16 1.72 1.45 1.91 -
Drops and inhalers - 0.66 0.68 0.86 0.70 0.79 -
Semi-solid medicines 0.48 0.59 0.69 0.71 0.53 0.58 -
Solid-dose medicines 2.87 2.85 4.06 3.32 3.14 2.95 4.73
Biological products - - - - 0.69 0.93 0.84
Large-volume parenterals - - 0.92 - 0.56 0.96 -
Liquids and spirits - - 0.59 0.20 1.10 0.68 -
Antiretroviral therapies 6.33 - 6.41 5.29 - 6.66 14.84
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4.2.2.2 Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes
Between 2003 and 2016, 183 different companies were awarded at least one tender con-
tract. More than half the contracts (50.6%, 4402/8701) were awarded to 13 companies:
Aspen Pharmacare (1,021 contracts), Adcock Ingraham (759), Fresenius (366), Pfizer
(325), Sanofi-Aventis (277), Sandoz (264), GlaxoSmithKline (243), Be-Tabs Pharmaceutic-
als (233), Novartis (227), Biotech Laboratories (192), Roche (187), Barrs Pharmaceutical
Industries (158), and Janssen (150). Five of these firms (Aspen, Adcock Ingraham,
Be-Tabs Pharmaceuticals, Biotech Laboratories, and Barrs Pharmaceutical Industries)
are South African drug manufacturers which mostly produce generic products.23
Table 4.2 shows the HHIs for each tender since 2003. The results indicate that many
markets have stayed competitive over time, including those for solid-dose, semi-solid,
oncological, and anti-infective medicines. For instance, the solid-dose tender had an
HHI of 836 in 2003, compared to 1,174 in 2016. The market for antiretroviral therapies
grew increasingly competitive over time.
The markets for biologicals, drops and inhalers, large-volume parenterals, anti-TB
medicines, and family-planning agents were highly concentrated in most years. The
largest percentage increases between the earliest and latest tenders occurred in the
markets for semi-solid medicines (778 to 1,848 between 2003 and 2014) and family-
planning agents (1,439 to 2,666 between 2003 and 2015). The market for family-planning
agents was the only one to go from highly competitive to highly concentrated at any
point over the past 15 years.
The number of manufacturers winning at least one contract has decreased over
time in most categories. For example, the number of winners in the solid-dose tender
dropped from 51 to 35 between 2003 and 2016, while the number of winners in the
oncological tender fell from 25 to 13 during this time (Table 4.2).
23Be-Tabs Pharmaceuticals was acquired by the Indian drug firm Ranbaxy Laboratories in 2006.
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Table 4.2: Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes for each tender (2003-2016) with number of different winning firms in parentheses.
2003/04 2005/06 2007/08 2009/10 2011/12 2013/14 2015/16
Anti-tuberculosis medicines - - 4173 (6) 3513 (4) 3828 (6) 5508 (10) 5233 (9)
Anti-infective medicines 1467 (25) 1376 (28) 1735 (27) 1513 (24) 1340 (22) 959 (28) 783 (24)
Family planning agents 1439 (16) 2616 (9) 2544 (9) 2847 (9) 3395 (7) 2387 (6) 2666 (7)
Oncological products 939 (25) 772 (28) 855 (28) 865 (25) 1093 (20) 1308 (14) 1211 (13)
Small-volume parenterals - - 1840 (39) 1020 (30) 1062 (25) 936 (28) -
Drops and inhalers - 2623 (19) 4905 (17) 3176 (14) 3119 (16) 3136 (11) -
Semi-solid medicines 778 (38) 1433 (33) 938 (36) 1018 (36) 1381 (30) 1848 (22) -
Solid-dose medicines 836 (51) 742 (51) 687 (49) 1017 (54) 961 (47) 1099 (38) 1174 (35)
Biological products - - - - 3684 (7) 2982 (6) 2725 (6)
Large-volume parenterals - - 4801 (15) - 5517 (8) 5969 (4) -
Liquids and spirits - - 882 (25) 2021 (15) 1949 (32) 1307 (18) -
Antiretroviral therapies 2701 (7) - 2758 (9) 2431 (9) - 1440 (14) 2054 (8)
Note: A Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 1,499 or lower indicates a highly competitive market, a score of 1,500 to 2,499 indicates a moderately concentrated
market, and a score of 2,500 or higher indicates a highly concentrated market.
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4.2.2.3 Price indexes
Figure 4.4 shows price trends by tender category. The results were largely consistent
across the three types of price indexes.
Trends varied between categories. The prices of antiretroviral therapies, oncological
products, small-volume parenterals, and solid-dose medicines fell consistently over
time. For example, the Laspeyres results indicate that the prices of medicines in the
oncological tenders dropped by an average of 61% between 2003 and 2016, while the
prices of antiretroviral therapies decreased by an average of 78% between 2004 and
2015.
The prices of anti-infective medicines, drops and inhalers, and family-planning
agents decreased by roughly 50% between the first and last tenders, but with price
increases in some of the intervening years. The prices of anti-TB and semi-solid medi-
cines only dropped by around 15% over this period, whereas the prices of biological
products, semi-solid medicines, and liquids and spirits remained stable.
The figure shows spikes in the prices of anti-infective and solid-dose products in
the most recent tenders. The NDoH stopped tendering by therapeutic group in the
2016 solid-dose tender, which may account for part of this increase. There have also
been global shortages of benzathine penicillin, which may explain the price increases
for anti-infective medicines in the 2013 and 2015 tenders.
The results of the sensitivity analysis (Appendix A) are similar to those shown in
Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Price trends by medicine category (2003-2016).
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4.2.2.4 Sub-group analyses
Table 4.3 presents the prices of solid-dose products in seven therapeutic classes: an-
giotensin converting enzyme inhibitors, angiotensin receptor blockers, atypical an-
tipsychotics, calcium channel blockers, proton-pump inhibitors, selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors, and statins. The prices of all products in these classes (2003-2016)
can be found in Appendix B.
The prices of nine products fell by more than half upon generic entry: amlodipine 5
mg (80% drop in price), amlodipine 10 mg (71%), atorvastatin 10 mg (74%), atorvastatin
20 mg (82%), pravastatin 20 mg (57%), risperidone 2 mg (95%), risperidone 3 mg (96%),
simvastatin 10 mg (76%), and simvastatin 20 mg (65%). The prices of citalopram 20 mg,
clozapine 25 mg, and clozapine 100 mg fell by 40%, 45%, and 35% respectively. These
decreases were sustained over time.
All strength-pack-size combinations of enalapril and fluoxetine were already avail-
able in generic versions in 2003. The prices of both ingredients remained low over
the 15-year period, with the exception of an increase in the prices of both fluoxetine
products in 2016.
Table 4.4 shows the prices of all first and second-line therapies used to treat TB. The
prices of ethambutol (400 mg, 60 tablets) and rifampicin (150 mg) increased between
2007 and 2015, while the price of most strength-form combinations of isoniazid and
pyrazinamide remained stable. The prices of ethionamide went down over this period.
Table 4.5 displays the prices of 20 oncology products with a high budget impact.
Nine of the products became available in generic versions between 2003 and 2016.24
The prices of four products (docetaxel 20 mg, docetaxel 80 mg, gemcitabine 200 mg,
and gemcitabine 1g) decreased by more than 40% when the first generic hit the market.
Prices of the other five products fell by between 15% and 35%, with the exception of
mercaptopurine 50 mg which increased in price by 2% the year a generic entered the
market.
Table 4.6 lists the prices of all first and second-line therapies for HIV and AIDS.
The prices of most of these products dropped considerably between 2004 and 2015.
Between 2004 and 2010, efavirenz was the antiretroviral therapy with the largest budget
impact. Efavirenz tablets of various strengths accounted for 29% of the total value
of the antiretroviral tender in 2004, 35% in 2008, and 25% in 2010. However, the
percentage dropped to 11% in 2013 and 3% in 2015, when the combination therapy
efavirenz/emtricitabine/tenofovir became available and captured 72% and 46% of the
market, respectively.
24Six products were already available as generics in 2003.
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Table 4.3: Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of selected solid-dose medicines (2003-2016).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2003 2005 2007 2009 2012 2014 2016
Amlodipine 5 30 109.96 34.63 6.78 4.13 2.93 2.41 3.19
Amlodipine 10 30 252.15 92.65 26.67 6.77 3.88 3.44 4.23
Atorvastatin 10 30 210.44 55.23 49.25 36.32 16.30 12.39 11.10
Atorvastatin 20 30 381.07 67.97 60.61 44.82 22.73 22.93 17.66
Citalopram 20 30 72.04 43.31 16.92 9.76 9.36 7.08 8.00
Clozapine 25 100 183.77 103.12 84.57 46.15 39.92 34.29 36.10
Clozapine 100 100 463.26 268.12 219.88 143.12 123.81 110.38 115.60
Enalapril 5 30 5.40 3.98 3.21 3.36 2.99 2.94 3.13
Enalapril 10 30 6.66 4.41 3.60 3.68 3.18 3.74 4.57
Enalapril 20 30 10.50 7.01 6.16 4.64 4.24 4.92 7.08
Fluoxetine 20 100 30.84 18.56 16.12 15.45 15.14 11.13 21.63
Fluoxetine 20 30 18.67 7.59 9.55 9.21 8.97 3.61 6.00
Pravastatin 20 30 377.69 360.93 156.32 30.57 20.38 16.99 19.95
Risperidone 2 30 394.59 402.90 377.22 17.00 10.76 5.01 5.59
Risperidone 3 30 591.85 604.31 565.80 20.09 12.35 8.15 7.70
Simvastatin 10 30 50.92 12.41 7.74 5.44 4.16 4.46 6.00
Simvastatin 20 30 56.59 19.79 11.47 8.32 6.36 6.37 7.70
Note: The gray cells indicate the year in which the first generic became available.
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Table 4.4: Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of first- and second-line anti-TB medicines (2007-2015).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Ethambutol 400 100 57.75 53.45 46.46 51.20 45.17
Ethambutol 400 60 22.54 33.26 33.34 34.72 32.76
Ethionamide 250 100 270.96 - 151.23 145.28 96.55
Ethionamide 250 250 628.48 581.01 451.19 433.41 283.69
Ethionamide 250 30 70.38 - 50.52 48.53 35.26
Ethionamide 250 60 180.63 - 100.83 96.85 67.35
Isoniazid 100 100 - - 19.77 18.74 18.76
Isoniazid 100 1000 - - 100.91 94.90 -
Isoniazid 100 30 - - 9.88 9.31 9.27
Isoniazid 300 30 - - 16.94 15.25 15.40
Pyrazinamide 500 100 39.54 - 38.83 33.40 40.11
Pyrazinamide 500 1000 428.25 - 355.84 - -
Pyrazinamide 500 30 16.65 - - 14.57 17.62
Pyrazinamide 500 60 28.60 - 31.07 26.64 30.33
Rifampicin 150 100 75.68 67.30 72.26 96.50 95.78
Rifampicin 450 100 153.90 144.64 129.81 - -
Rifampicin 600 100 193.57 187.72 105.05 139.28 -
Terizidone 250 100 1035.40 - 795.00 793.67 789.95
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Table 4.5: Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of selected oncology medicines (2003-2016).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(injection)*
2003 2005 2007 2009 2012 2014 2016
Bleomycin 15 1 445.53 340.30 318.16 321.92 258.13 230.13 296.40
Carboplatin 450 1 599.89 574.97 487.35 366.31 282.01 414.84 353.40
Ciclosporin 100 1 2,804.48 2,062.43 1,471.26 1,298.31 1,148.06 1,074.70 901.62
Cisplatin 50 1 380.97 192.12 156.45 118.05 73.41 61.74 70.68
Docetaxel 20 1 2,139.68 2,143.90 1,249.79 1,050.36 363.57 273.17 225.00
Docetaxel 80 1 7,564.51 7,579.43 4,279.17 3,596.32 1,456.62 863.42 650.00
Epirubicin 50 1 656.12 338.78 270.71 193.39 184.01 139.44 245.10
Gemcitabine 200 1 432.26 412.49 172.82 165.58 93.82 70.09 51.30
Gemcitabine 1 1 2,053.23 1,959.31 864.14 827.91 448.62 282.01 176.70
Goserelin 3.6 1 1,469.68 1,340.58 1,195.40 1,004.64 465.88 435.73 478.80
Idarubicin 10 1 1,068.42 1,167.17 1,124.03 1,039.13 898.88 921.58 998.81
Interferon alfa-2a 3 1 360.20 294.75 262.83 186.41 161.26 127.95 232.13
Interferon alfa-2a 4.5 1 430.80 408.67 309.74 258.45 223.57 191.93 246.98
Mercaptopurine 50 25 679.29 778.98 736.29 711.61 723.48 834.62 991.62
Methotrexate 100 1 3,153.21 2,846.79 2,583.90 2,747.05 879.60 784.29 869.83
Paclitaxel 30 1 1,177.90 758.94 605.05 440.48 121.64 89.63 99.42
Paclitaxel 100 1 3,533.71 2,418.99 2,188.50 1,468.30 203.11 149.65 140.35
Tacrolimus 5 50 10,260.99 9,368.11 8,154.43 6,526.85 5,645.93 4,530.13 4,075.50
Vinorelbine 10 1 410.65 48.47 475.40 225.66 113.64 85.13 79.94
Vinorelbine 50 1 2,053.23 2,423.35 2,377.00 1,128.29 568.22 423.12 380.00
* Except mercaptopurine and tacrolimus, which are taken as tablets. Note: The gray cells indicate the year in which the first generic became available.
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Table 4.6: Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of first- and second-line antiretroviral drugs (2004-2015).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2004 2008 2010 2013 2015
Abacavir 300 60 463.04 166.64 118.16 124.78
Didanosine 100 60 134.97 98.11 87.46 73.67 -
Didanosine 250 30 - 269.22 94.87 72.35 -
Didanosine 400 30 - 347.43 140.83 116.34 -
Efavirenz 600 30 400.35 159.70 51.35 34.93 31.18
Efavirenz, Emtricitabine, and Tenofovir 300 30 - - - 103.42 109.02
Lamivudine 150 60 66.27 43.23 25.52 17.77 -
Lamivudine 300 30 - 61.47 28.93 19.23 16.84
Lamivudine and Zidovudine 150 6 - 82.45 - - -
Lamivudine and Zidovudine 150 60 - 132.77 95.22 - -
Lamivudine and Zidovudine 300 60 - - - 76.96 86.09
Lopinavir and Ritonavir 80 1 584.62 461.50 400.89 246.15 -
Lopinavir and Ritonavir 80 120 - - - - 155.32
Nevirapine 200 60 77.73 46.45 30.12 21.40 28.79
Stavudine 20 60 36.63 24.52 17.68 15.91 16.47
Stavudine 30 60 38.10 24.72 17.42 14.42 -
Tenofovir 300 30 - 230.68 72.97 34.56 31.77
Zidovudine 100 100 211.49 102.45 58.91 42.94 58.85
Zidovudine 300 60 144.81 102.83 81.17 51.37 68.84
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4.2.2.5 Procurement figures
Table 4.7 shows the estimated and procured quantities for selected medicines. Ap-
pendix C gives the full results for every medicine in the sub-group analysis for which
data were available (2011-2016).
The table shows large discrepancies between the two quantities for many products.
For example, the NDoH estimated that it would require 279,500 packs of risperidone 1
mg (30 tablets) in the 2012 tender (August 1, 2012 - July 31, 2014), whereas it actually
procured 155,719 packs (44% less). Over the same period, the department forecasted
that it would need 1,262,900 packs of enalapril 5 mg (28 tablets), but went on to procure
over 2 million packs (62% more).
In total, the NDoH estimated that it would require 34,594,171 packs of angiotensin-
converting enzyme inhibitors, angiotensin receptor blockers, atypical antipsychotics,
calcium channel blockers, proton-pump inhibitors, selective serotonin reuptake inhibit-
ors, and statins in the 2012 tender, and 121,566,800 packs in the 2014 tender. In the end,
the department procured 16,640,339 packs (52% less) in the 2012 tender, and 83,593,114
packs (31% less) in the 2014 tender, suggesting that the forecasts for these products
became more accurate over time (Appendix C).
In the 2013 tender for antiretroviral drugs, the estimated quantities of all products
totaled 16,821,770 packs, whereas only 7,295,537 packs were procured, or 57% less than
predicted. In the 2013 anti-tuberculosis tender, the estimated quantities of all products
totaled 130,871,700 packs, whereas only 101,796,577 packs were procured, or 22% less
than predicted.
4.2.2.6 Public vs. private-sector prices
Table 4.8 shows the retail prices of statins in the private and public sectors in 2009, 2012,
2014, and 2016—the years in which the four most recent solid-dose tenders were issued.
The private-sector prices were always higher than the tender prices. For example, the
price of a 30-tablet pack of atorvastatin 20 mg cost 511% more in the private sector in
2009, and 178% more in 2016. Price differences for other products ranged from 127%
(atorvastatin 40 mg in 2014) to 996% (pravastatin 20 mg in 2014).
Appendix D presents the private and public-sector prices of all medicines included
in the sub-group analyses above.
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Table 4.7: Estimated versus actual procurement figures for selected solid-dose medicines in the 2012 and 2014 tenders.
2012 Tender 2014 Tender
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
%
diff.
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
%
diff.
Amisulpride 50 30 5,700 5,279 -7.39% 18,700 31,283 67.29%
Amisulpride 200 30 43,200 29,115 -32.60% 105,200 134,839 28.17%
Amlodipine 5 30 10,119,872 784,200 -92.25% 27,923,400 19,526,680 -30.07%
Amlodipine 10 30 2,032,900 367,424 -81.93% 3,228,100 7,117,977 120.50%
Atorvastatin 20 30 393,900 10,976 -97.21% 382,000 224,738 -41.17%
Citalopram 20 30 713,900 121,006 -83.05% 800,500 939,472 17.36%
Enalapril 5 28 1,262,900 2,043,530 61.81% 261,100 7,627,046 2821.12%
Fluoxetine 20 100 190,800 215,995 13.20% 126,000 247,710 96.60%
Losartan 50 30 172,100 41,136 -76.10% 320,100 371,039 15.91%
Risperidone 0.5 30 15,000 10,125 -32.50% 69,200 135,018 95.11%
Risperidone 1 30 279,500 155,719 -44.29% 574,500 547,342 -4.73%
Risperidone 2 30 733,400 83,417 -88.63% 908,300 728,915 -19.75%
Risperidone 3 30 243,100 46,047 -81.06% 349,700 295,323 -15.55%
Simvastatin 10 28 3,244,900 637,187 -80.36% 26,347,200 8,088,499 -69.30%
Simvastatin 20 28 2,914,100 210,600 -92.77% 5,852,800 4,118,794 -29.63%
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Table 4.8: Public vs private-sector prices for statins (2009-2016).
2009 2012 2014 2016
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Atorvastatin 10 30 36.32 172.42 475% 16.30 73.66 452% 12.39 33.56 271% 11.10 29.94 270%
Atorvastatin 20 30 44.82 229.25 511% 22.73 89.60 394% 22.93 35.65 155% 17.66 31.49 178%
Atorvastatin 40 30 57.19 229.25 401% 33.84 94.86 280% 43.35 54.86 127% 29.29 51.55 176%
Atorvastatin 80 30 77.28 382.17 495% 62.71 129.01 206% - - - - - -
Fluvastatin 20 30 90.00 179.07 199% 79.52 158.22 199% - - - - - -
Pravastatin 10 30 27.92 108.18 388% 18.75 142.37 759% 14.90 134.32 901% - - -
Pravastatin 20 30 30.57 139.09 455% 20.38 181.79 892% 16.99 169.26 996% 19.95 161.88 811%
Simvastatin 10 30 5.44 40.65 748% 4.16 29.95 720% 4.46 22.70 510% 6.00 23.50 392%
Simvastatin 20 30 8.32 54.10 650% 6.36 29.95 471% 6.37 23.55 370% 7.70 26.11 339%
Total 377.86 1534.17 406% 264.75 929.42 351% 121.38 473.91 390% 91.69 324.47 354%
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4.3 Discussion
The results indicate that tendering can achieve large price decreases for medicines, and
that such decreases can be sustained over time. The public-sector prices of medicines in
South Africa are considerably lower than those in the private sector. Moreover, the HHI
findings suggests that many tender contracts remained competitive between 2003 and
2016. However, there were notable exceptions: the prices of some products increased
over this period, and certain tender contracts grew increasingly uncompetitive. Also,
the number of different firms winning tender contracts decreased over time in most
tender categories.
These findings highlight the need for health ministry officials and other stakeholders
to closely monitor the impact of tendering on medicine prices and availability to
mitigate issues. The NDoH and its provincial counterparts should also work to improve
the accuracy of forecasting methods. In past tenders, there were large discrepancies
between the estimated and procured quantities for many products. This can make it
difficult for pharmaceutical firms to plan production and delivery schedules, and likely
increases the risk of stock-outs. The results of this study are worrisome since forecasting
estimates should be easier for the selected products than for infectious disease products,
given the epidemiologic profile of the country and the high budget impact of these
items.
It is possible to glean policy lessons from the South African experience with tender-
ing. Policymakers in countries looking to tender for essential medicines should consider
(i) weighting of value parameters, (ii) issues which may arise during the management
of tender contracts, and (iii) barriers to generic competition. All three affect prices and
supply security.
4.3.1 Weighting
Although the 90/10 points system provides a framework for awarding tender contracts
in South Africa, it is important to remember that factors other than price influence the
award of tender contracts. As outlined by Gray and Smit, [371] improving access to
medicines in South Africa is often a case of “colliding interests”, with tensions between
promoting health and local industrial objectives.
The utility function framework adopted in this analysis is useful insofar as it assists
in adopting a more structured approach to understanding the factors driving tender
processes. In reality, though, the utility functions of stakeholders are not linear, with
ad hoc decisions common. It is important to promote a transparent and explicit tender
procedure, and to foster dialog between policymakers, industry representatives, and
the public about the trade-offs inherent in the tendering process.
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Perceptions about how various factors should be weighted differ between govern-
ment stakeholders, with the health ministry generally placing more emphasis on price
and DTI focusing on economic and industrial development. The interest in price for the
NDoH is motivated by a desire to increase both cost savings and access, particularly
for antiretroviral therapies. DTI favors an increase in the number of local industry
designations to promote economic growth, citing several studies in support of local
designation of the pharmaceutical industry. [372–380]
It is important to consider the potential health-related costs of increased medicines
prices. Findings in other sectors suggest that subsidizing inefficient bidders can have
adverse long-term effects on prices and spending. [381] Also, some local producers
keep their manufacturing facilities abroad, so the value added to the domestic economy
may be limited. There needs to be clarity around the verifiable benefits of designating
the pharmaceutical sector as one of high importance to the local economy, as such a
move may have adverse effects on competition and medicine prices.
The South African government also attaches considerable weight to broad-based
black economic empowerment scores for historical reasons. Unequivocally, addressing
past injustices and promoting equitable development lie at the heart of industrial object-
ives in the country. The combination of enormously unequal income distribution, [382]
low education levels, [383] and lack of access to essential health care services [384]
results in a vicious cycle of poverty and social exclusion for many, tracing back to the
structural inequalities inherited from the racially divided Apartheid state.
Overall, there is a trade-off between obtaining the lowest possible prices and achiev-
ing other policy objectives. Policymakers in countries considering the use of tenders
should apply clear and transparent criteria for the award of tenders, with input from
relevant stakeholders.
4.3.2 Contract management
Risk management of awarded contracts is essential to prevent shortages. [385–389]
The federalist-fiscal arrangement in South Africa means that although tendering is
conducted centrally by the NDoH, the procurement of, and payment for, medicines is
done by provinces, with provincially held budgets. Representatives from each provin-
cial health department are involved throughout the tender process, as are stakeholders
from policy and finance units in the national government. The uncertainty around
estimated and actual demand is a potential cause of supply disruptions in South Africa.
As shown in this paper, the estimated quantities sometimes far exceed, or fall well short
of, the amounts needed. This makes it difficult for suppliers to determine the capacity
at which to operate to meet orders within lead times. It may be important to start a
dialogue with suppliers to understand the challenges they are facing, with an aim to
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introduce corrective measures prior to issues arising.
Challenges also exist in coordinating information sharing between the NDoH, pro-
vincial health departments, and suppliers to ensure adequate stock levels and to manage
the supply chain. Information systems are not standardized across provinces, resulting
in usage and demand data which are poor and patchy. Maladministration and miscom-
munication on the part of provinces causes poor order and payment coordination, with
late payments common. This puts suppliers under undue financial pressure, which
might influence their willingness to reserve extra capacity. The failure of some suppliers
to meet contractual agreements has also previously caused shortages, [389] as have
budget deficits and government corruption. [386] In past tenders, delays in the award of
pharmaceutical tenders by the NDoH have also precipitated supply disruptions. [389]
In short, it is critical to manage relationships between provincial purchasers and sup-
pliers in order to ensure accountability for stock-outs and to minimize demand and
supply-side issues. [390]
In 2015, the health ministry launched an early warning system to identify products
at risk of shortages in South Africa. Previously, stock-outs were often only identified
once facilities alerted the NDoH about shortages. For instance, in 2012, country-wide
stock-outs of tenofovir, a widely used antiretroviral therapy, caused public outrage
and concern. In the same year, there were shortages of aspirin, the anti-TB medicine
isoniazid, and the antibiotic cotrimoxazole, as well as various pediatric medications,
vaccines, and vitamins.25 In recent years, South Africa has experienced shortages of
other essential medicines, like the HIV drug lopinavir/ritonavir.
The effects of stock-outs are significant. Apart from the cost implications for the
government of buying off-contract—often at a substantial premium—and the patient-
borne costs of having to return to clinics to pick up medicines, treatment compliance
is paramount in managing infection rates in a country with a high infectious disease
burden, like South Africa. [392, 393] Stock-outs can also harm patient motivation and
trust in the health care system. [394]
Finally, purchasers need market knowledge about cost functions to spot gaming
and to negotiate prices effectively, especially for fragile tender markets. For example,
firms producing tuberculosis and family-planning agents are unable to manufacture
other products at the same facilities, due to risk of cross-contamination. Losing bidders
for these products must usually shut down their facilities, which adds financial risk
and may make it more likely for losing firms to exit these markets.
25There have been documented cases of medicine shortages in other countries which use medicine
tenders, including the Netherlands [129] and New Zealand, [391] often owing to problems at manufac-
turing facilities and issues in sourcing drug ingredients.
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4.3.3 Generic competition
The South African government adopted a so-called Bolar provision in 2002 to speed
up the availability of generic drugs.26 This provision permits generic firms to conduct
clinical tests required for market authorization prior to the loss of market exclusivity
for originator firms.
Yet there remain regulatory barriers to entry in South Africa. The registration
process for the Medicines Control Council, the national agency in charge of evaluating
medicinal products and granting firms marketing authorization, is often slow and
laborious, largely due to lack of resources. [338] Applications for new drug registration
can take up to four years, while amendments to existing registrations, such as notifying
the NDoH of a difference source of an active ingredient, can take two years. There is
little coordination of registration of key products, which results in some items being
excluded from tenders, further weakening competition. The South African Health
Products Regulatory Agency is expected to be introduced in 2017 as a replacement
to the Medicines Control Council, which may result in more transparent, efficient
regulatory processes. South African authorities may wish to consider other options,
such as granting waivers to procure a medicine without marketing authorization if
it has been approved in a country with a stringent regulatory authority. There are
also regional marketing authorization initiatives to increase the number of approved
medicines (eg, ZanZiBoNa in Southern Africa).
The issuance of voluntary licenses has sped up the availability of some generics.
Notably, the increase in voluntary licensing agreements for antiretroviral drugs led to
more competition in this tender, putting downward pressure on prices. Merck, Sharpe
& Dohme, for instance, issued voluntary licenses for efavirenz to Adcock in 2007, and
to Aspen, Cipla and Sonke in 2008. Similarly, in 2006 Gilead granted Aspen Pharmacare
a license for tenofovir, which resulted in Aspen acquiring 70% of the tenofovir market
and the price decreasing by 64%.
The pricing of therapies for HIV/AIDS and TB is highly politicized in South Africa,
with non-governmental organizations and activists putting pressure on companies,
lawmakers, and policymakers to keep prices low. There are ongoing discussions
between governmental and non-governmental stakeholders about the role of voluntary
and compulsory licensing in guaranteeing access to affordable medicines for patients.27
26The Patents Amendment Act of 2002 inserted a new section 69A in Act 57 of the original Patents Act of
1978 which included a Bolar provision.
27See Makgoba, [401] Geffen, [402] and Nattrass [403] for political overviews, and Ford, [404] Marc, [405]
Bass, [406] Roffe, [407] and Collins-Chase [408] for discussion of compulsory and voluntary licensing
battles between industry, government, and activist groups.
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4.3.4 Limitations
This study has limitations. First, the procurement data (“RSA Pharmaceutical database”)
are self-reported by suppliers, without independent verification. The data are patchy
and of variable quality, although the information relating to high-priority items, like
antiretroviral therapies and anti-TB medicines, are more reliable. Still, the results
highlight the large discrepancies between estimated and procured quantities for most
products, even if the point estimates might not be exact.
Second, we did not examine within-contract price adjustments for exchange rate
fluctuations due to lack of availability for many of the tenders. The results likely
underestimate the actual prices paid by the South African government.
Third, the three types of price indexes apply different weights to reflect consumption
patterns. The Laspeyres index uses quantities from the base period, whereas the Paasche
index relies on period-specific quantities, leading to different estimates of price levels.
The Fisher index is the geometric mean of the other two indexes. Each approach has
its pros and cons. [409] Moreover, the sample sizes for some of the price indexes were
small, given the need to track a common sample of products over time.
Finally, the HHI analyses may over or understate competition in some drug classes,
since the results are presented at the tender-wide level. Moreover, the analyses of mar-
ket concentration did not consider different licensing arrangements for antiretroviral
therapies and other products.
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4.4 Conclusions
It is important to examine whether existing procurement processes in South Africa can
secure adequate quantities of essential medicines, at cost-effective prices, both now and
in the future. As it stands, the acceptable price premiums are capricious, and there is
little agreement on an evidence-based balance between health and industrial priorities.
Without agreement, tendering might simply turn into a means for short-sighted and,
potentially, Pyrrhic victories.
In South Africa, disruptions occur occasionally due to unforeseen demand, manu-
facturing problems, provincial maladministration, supply-chain inefficiencies, and poor
communication between the national health ministry, provincial health departments,
and suppliers. Poor supply and logistics management at provincial level is a key cause
of stock-outs. Countries which aim to introduce tendering systems should carefully
manage these issues to guarantee supply of high-quality medicines at low prices.
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Appendix A: Price index sensitivity analysis
Figure A. Price trends by medicine category (2003-2016) in a sensitivity analysis
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The sensitivity analysis was based on a sample of 25 anti-tuberculosis medicines, 44
anti-infective medicines, 7 family-planning agents, 34 oncological products, 37 drops
and inhalers, 42 semi-solid medicines, 142 solid-dose medicines, and 18 antiretroviral
therapies.
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Appendix B: Full results of sub-group analyses
In all tables, the gray cells indicate the year in which the first generic became available.
Table A. Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of statins (2003-2016).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2003 2005 2007 2009 2012 2014 2016
Atorvastatin 10 30 210.44 55.23 49.25 36.32 16.30 12.39 11.10
Atorvastatin 20 30 381.07 67.97 60.61 44.82 22.73 22.93 17.66
Atorvastatin 40 30 - - - 57.19 33.84 43.35 29.29
Atorvastatin 80 30 - - - 77.28 62.71 - -
Fluvastatin 20 30 105.22 53.62 86.44 90.00 79.52 - -
Pravastatin 10 30 301.94 288.74 119.54 27.92 18.75 14.90 -
Pravastatin 20 30 377.69 360.93 156.32 30.57 20.38 16.99 19.95
Simvastatin 10 30 50.92 12.41 7.74 5.44 4.16 4.46 6.00
Simvastatin 20 30 56.59 19.79 11.47 8.32 6.36 6.37 7.70
Table B. Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of angiotensin receptor blockers (2003-2016).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2003 2005 2007 2009 2012 2014 2016
Losartan 50 30 - - - 23.18 8.29 6.72 7.69
Losartan 100 30 - - - - - 13.44 14.91
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Table C. Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of proton-pump inhibitors (2003-2016).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2003 2005 2007 2009 2012 2014 2016
Lansoprazole 30 14 - - - - - 4.26 6.95
Lansoprazole 30 30 - - - 58.98 - 7.12 12.18
Omeprazole 10 30 - - - - 12.03 38.83 36.83
Omeprazole 20 30 152.31 45.23 23.71 14.22 8.91 - -
Pantoprazole 40 30 350.13 371.58 201.65 146.57 - - -
Ranitidine 150 60 32.86 18.98 13.53 13.87 11.69 - 13.20
Ranitidine 300 30 32.42 22.99 16.41 14.91 - 9.48 -
Table D. Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (2003-2016).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2003 2005 2007 2009 2012 2014 2016
Citalopram 20 30 72.04 43.31 16.92 9.76 9.36 7.08 8.00
Fluoxetine 20 100 30.84 18.56 16.12 15.45 15.14 11.13 21.63
Fluoxetine 20 30 18.67 7.59 9.55 9.21 8.97 3.61 6.00
Fluvoxamine 100 30 272.32 307.30 221.61 186.71 - - -
Paroxetine 20 30 170.36 170.15 44.36 17.92 21.39 - -
Sertraline 50 30 - - - - - 8.74 -
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Table E. Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitors (2003-2016).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2003 2005 2007 2009 2012 2014 2016
Captopril 12.5 100 31.13 26.23 23.46 - - - -
Captopril 25 60 10.11 5.55 - 8.77 7.06 6.76 10.00
Captopril 50 60 14.11 8.63 - 19.36 - - -
Enalapril 5 30 5.40 3.98 3.21 3.36 2.99 2.94 3.13
Enalapril 10 30 6.66 4.41 3.60 3.68 3.18 3.74 4.57
Enalapril 20 30 10.50 7.01 6.16 4.64 4.24 4.92 7.08
Fosinopril 10 30 79.44 - - - - - -
Fosinopril 20 30 104.39 - - - - - -
Lisinopril 5 30 - - 7.02 8.60 - - -
Lisinopril 10 30 - - 8.18 10.70 - - -
Lisinopril 20 30 - - 12.86 16.22 - - -
Perindopril 4 30 24.25 23.81 21.21 16.68 9.96 - 25.47
Quinapril 5 30 31.70 - 21.07 19.48 - - -
Quinapril 10 30 53.43 - 20.00 18.49 - - -
Quinapril 20 30 106.85 - 58.32 34.00 - - -
Ramipril 2.5 30 45.96 30.61 16.64 11.52 8.97 - -
Ramipril 5 30 49.52 35.14 20.23 13.56 10.54 - -
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Table F. Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of calcium-channel blockers (2003-2016).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2003 2005 2007 2009 2012 2014 2016
Amlodipine 5 30 109.96 34.63 6.78 4.13 2.93 2.41 3.19
Amlodipine 10 30 252.15 92.65 26.67 6.77 3.88 3.44 4.23
Isradipine 2.5 60 72.10 59.27 215.17 224.91 - - -
Isradipine 5 30 56.52 41.25 47.25 46.37 - - -
Nifedipine 5 100 35.81 33.65 30.01 26.44 25.80 - 34.34
Nifedipine 10 100 44.44 - - - - 50.87 55.76
Nifedipine 10 250 118.87 99.92 82.53 - - - -
Nifedipine 30 30 47.79 45.61 24.83 14.68 12.84 - 23.70
Nifedipine 60 30 129.49 123.56 48.74 29.37 25.33 - 41.00
Nimodipine 30 100 1007.56 123.56 942.40 856.44 - - -
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Table G. Changes in prices (ZAR per pack) of atypical antipsychotics (2003-2016).
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
2003 2005 2007 2009 2012 2014 2016
Amisulpride 50 30 - 217.93 194.33 163.32 141.28 132.24 125.82
Amisulpride 200 30 - 483.46 431.10 362.31 313.41 293.38 279.20
Clozapine 25 100 183.77 103.12 84.57 46.15 39.92 34.29 36.10
Clozapine 100 100 463.26 268.12 219.88 143.12 123.81 110.38 115.60
Olanzapine 2.5 30 - - - 234.99 26.74 20.26 18.24
Olanzapine 5 30 - - 503.71 469.55 40.11 30.39 24.73
Olanzapine 10 30 - - 1007.42 939.54 60.16 39.33 30.94
Risperidone 0.5 30 - - - - 9.78 7.33 8.21
Risperidone 1 30 - - 321.84 12.36 7.84 4.51 4.79
Risperidone 2 30 394.59 402.90 377.22 17.00 10.76 5.01 5.59
Risperidone 3 30 591.85 604.31 565.80 20.09 12.35 8.15 7.70
Sulpiride 50 100 34.49 32.17 32.31 42.24 - - -
Sulpiride 200 50 136.60 136.86 108.23 94.91 - - -
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Appendix C: Full results of analysis of procurement figures
Table A. Estimated and actual procurement figures for ACE inhibitors, ARBs, atypical antipsychotics, CCBs, PPIs, SSRIs, and statins in
the 2012 and 2014 solid-dose tenders.
2012 tender 2014 tender
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
% difference
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
% difference
Amisulpride 50 30 5,700 5,279 -7.39% 18,700 31,283 67.29%
Amisulpride 200 30 43,200 29,115 -32.60% 105,200 134,839 28.17%
Amlodipine 5 30 10,119,872 784,200 -92.25% 27,923,400 19,526,680 -30.07%
Amlodipine 10 30 2,032,900 367,424 -81.93% 3,228,100 7,117,977 120.50%
Atorvastatin 10 30 - - - 750,000 145,719 -80.57%
Atorvastatin 20 30 393,900 10,976 -97.21% 382,000 224,738 -41.17%
Atorvastatin 40 30 - - - 21,000 38,239 82.09%
Captopril 25 60 - - - 97,100 48,597 -49.95%
Citalopram 20 30 713,900 121,006 -83.05% 800,500 939,472 17.36%
Clozapine 25 84 - - - 73,100 79,226 8.38%
Clozapine 100 84 - - - 144,900 175,189 20.90%
Enalapril 5 28 1,262,900 2,043,530 61.81% 261,100 7,627,046 2821.12%
Enalapril 10 28 - - - 37,836,200 23,531,287 -37.81%
Enalapril 20 28 - - - 6,725,800 3,798,550 -43.52%
Fluoxetine 20 28 - - - 1,052,700 1,198,960 13.89%
Fluoxetine 20 30 806,800 468,255 -41.96% - -
Fluoxetine 20 100 190,800 215,995 13.20% 126,000 247,710 96.60%
Lansoprazole 30 14 - - - 2,251,300 1,095,632 -51.33%
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2012 tender 2014 tender
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
% difference
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
% difference
Lansoprazole 30 28 - - - 3,734,400 2,672,970 -28.42%
Losartan 50 30 172,100 41,136 -76.10% 320,100 371,039 15.91%
Losartan 100 28 - - - 34,900 66,190 89.66%
Nifedipine 10 100 - - - 30,900 36,886 19.37%
Nifedipine 30 28 8,403,200 6,790,655 -19.19% - -
Olanzapine 5 28 - - - 58,100 52,536 -9.58%
Olanzapine 10 28 - - - 85,600 181,979 112.59%
Olanzapine 2.5 28 - - - 11,400 18,520 62.46%
Omeprazole 10 28 9,100 1,630 -82.09% - -
Omeprazole 20 28 2,201,400 4,378,223 98.88% - -
Pantoprazole 20 30 - - - 20,000 46,436 132.18%
Paroxetine 20 30 40,600 2,340 -94.24% - - -
Ranitidine 150 60 767,799 237,480 -69.07% - - -
Ranitidine 300 30 - - - 1,049,400 238,913 -77.23%
Risperidone 0.5 30 15,000 10,125 -32.50% 69,200 135,018 95.11%
Risperidone 1 30 279,500 155,719 -44.29% 574,500 547,342 -4.73%
Risperidone 2 30 733,400 83,417 -88.63% 908,300 728,915 -19.75%
Risperidone 3 30 243,100 46,047 -81.06% 349,700 295,323 -15.55%
Sertraline 50 30 - - - 323,200 32,610 -89.91%
Simvastatin 10 28 3,244,900 637,187 -80.36% 26,347,200 8,088,499 -69.30%
Simvastatin 20 28 2,914,100 210,600 -92.77% 5,852,800 4,118,794 -29.63%
173
2012 tender 2014 tender
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
% difference
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
% difference
Total 34,594,171 16,640,339 -51.90% 121,566,800 83,593,114 -31.24%
174
Table B. Estimated and actual procurement figures for anti-tuberculosis therapies in the 2013 tender.
2013
Strength
(mg)*
Pack size
(tablets)*
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
%
diff.
Capreomycin 1 (g/ml) 1 (vial) 314,000 128,860 -58.96%
Ethambutol 400 100 202,200 93,532 -53.74%
Ethambutol 400 56 238,500 83,832 -64.85%
Ethambutol 400 84 250,800 104,601 -58.29%
Ethionamide 250 250 30,600 16,221 -46.99%
Ethionamide 250 28 42,700 19,767 -53.71%
Ethionamide 250 56 47,700 35,391 -25.81%
Ethionamide 250 84 164,000 125,602 -23.41%
Isoniazid 100 1000 20,000 10,754 -46.23%
Isoniazid 100 28 724,800 388,970 -46.33%
Isoniazid 100 84 260,800 137,407 -47.31%
Isoniazid 300 28 4,308,200 2,437,891 -43.41%
Kanamycin Sulphate 1 (g/ml) 1 (vial) 1,787,300 145,066 -91.88%
Levofloxacin 250 28 130,000 6,700 -94.85%
Levofloxacin 250 5 24,000 63,878 166.16%
Moxifloxacin 400 10 300,000 46,019 -84.66%
Moxifloxacin 400 28 319,470 310,825 -2.71%
Pyrazinamide 500 28 181,600 81,086 -55.35%
Pyrazinamide 500 56 164,600 106,422 -35.35%
Pyrazinamide 500 84 188,600 141,525 -24.96%
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2013
Strength
(mg)*
Pack size
(tablets)*
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
%
diff.
Rifampicin 150 100 18,700 15,724 -15.91%
Rifampicin 600 100 7,100 4,375 -38.38%
Rifampicin and Isoniazid 300/150 56 1,494,600 557,060 -62.73%
Rifampicin and Isoniazid 150/75 56 753,400 355,198 -52.85%
Rifampicin and Isoniazid 150/75 84 1,091,900 349,187 -68.02%
Rifampicin and Isoniazid 60/60 28 477,600 245,330 -48.63%
Rifampicin and Isoniazid 60/60 56 642,400 351,744 -45.25%
Rifampicin, Isoniazid,
Pyrazinamide, and Ethambutol
150/75
400/275
100 529,800 47,363 -91.06%
Rifampicin, Isoniazid,
Pyrazinamide, and Ethambutol
150/75
400/275
112 504,360 157,502 -68.77%
Rifampicin, Isoniazid,
Pyrazinamide, and Ethambutol
150/75/
400/275
28 182,340 75,998 -58.32%
Rifampicin, Isoniazid,
Pyrazinamide, and Ethambutol
150/75
400/275
56 420,840 209,273 -50.27%
Rifampicin, Isoniazid,
Pyrazinamide, and Ethambutol
150/75/
400/275
84 551,160 283,861 -48.50%
Terizidone 250 100 447,700 158,573 -64.58%
Total 16,821,770 7,295,537 -56.63%
* Unless otherwise stated
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Table C. Estimated and actual procurement figures for antiretroviral therapies in the 2013 tender.
2013
Strength
(mg)*
Pack size
(tablets)*
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
%
diff.
Abacavir 20 (mg/ml) 1 (vial) 2,600,000 1,924,842 -25.97%
Abacavir 300 56 900,000 1,654,869 83.87%
Abacavir and Lamivudine 600/300 28 500,000 504,364 0.87%
Atazanavir 150 56 2,000 7,823 291.15%
Darunavir 300 120 1,000 2,685 168.50%
Didanosine 100 60 130,000 60,082 -53.78%
Didanosine 250 30 20,000 36,304 81.52%
Didanosine 25 60 20,000 15,596 -22.02%
Didanosine 400 30 40,000 44,242 10.61%
Didanosine 50 60 70,000 26,463 -62.20%
Efavirenz 200 84/90 1,500,000 613,298 -59.11%
Efavirenz 50 28 2,000,000 1,921,826 -3.91%
Efavirenz 600 28 18,001,000 13,936,673 -22.58%
Etravirine 100 112 100 818 718.00%
Lamivudine 10 (mg/ml) 1 (vial) 1,000,000 1,253,964 25.40%
Lamivudine 150 56 20,000,000 10,125,812 -49.37%
Lamivudine 300 28 12,000,000 9,308,585 -22.43%
Lopinavir and Ritonavir 100/25 60 320,000 561,631 75.51%
Lopinavir and Ritonavir 200/50 120 2,000,000 2,663,767 33.19%
Lopinavir and Ritonavir 80/20 (mg/ml) 5 (vials) 500,000 450,355 -9.93%
177
2013
Strength
(mg)*
Pack size
(tablets)*
Estimated
volume
Actual
volume
%
diff.
Nevirapine 200 56 2,000,000 3,743,633 87.18%
Nevirapine 50 (mg/5ml) 1 (100 ml vial) 500,000 806,640 61.33%
Nevirapine 50 (mg/5ml) 1 (240 ml vial) 300,000 229,330 -23.56%
Raltegravir 400 56 600 3,137 422.83%
Ritonavir 100 84 15,000 27,517 83.45%
Ritonavir 80 (mg/ml) 1 (vial) 28,000 24,630 -12.04%
Stavudine 15 56 125,000 222,107 77.69%
Stavudine 1 (mg/ml) 1 (vial) 100,000 26,718 -73.28%
Stavudine 20 56 4,800,000 301,239 -93.72%
Stavudine 30 56 1,600,000 817,996 -48.88%
Tenofovir and Emtricitabine 300/200 28 100,000 567,414 467.41%
Tenofovir and Lamivudine 300/300 28 500,000 619,469 23.89%
Tenofovir 300 28 24,999,000 4,632,222 -81.47%
Tenofovir, Emtricitabine, and Efavirenz 300/200/60 28 30,000,000 40,687,273 35.62%
Zidovudine and Lamivudine 300/150 56 1,200,000 1,418,615 18.22%
Zidovudine 100 100 100,000 110,811 10.81%
Zidovudine 300 56 2,800,000 2,176,685 -22.26%
Zidovudine 50 (mg/5ml) 1 (vial) 100,000 267,142 167.14%
Total 130,871,700 101,796,577 -22.22%
* Unless otherwise stated
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Appendix D: Full results of analysis of public versus private-sector prices
Table A. Public vs private-sector prices for calcium-channel blockers (2009-2016).
2009 2012 2014 2016
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Amlodipine 10 30 6.77 107.42 1588% 3.88 99.79 2573.79% 3.44 65.56 1905% 4.23 72.69 1718%
Amlodipine 5 30 4.13 67.93 1646% 2.93 63.11 2154.40% 2.41 36.95 1532% 3.19 40.97 1284%
Isradipine 2.5 60 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Isradipine 5 30 46.37 342.62 739% - - - - - - - - -
Nifedipine 10 100 - - - - - - 50.87 77.88 153% 55.76 84.72 152%
Nifedipine 10 250 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Nifedipine 30 30 14.68 174.88 1191% 12.84 152.73 1189.30% - - - 23.70 150.97 637%
Nifedipine 5 100 26.44 50.79 192% 25.80 48.19 186.79% - - - 34.34 53.33 155%
Nifedipine 60 30 29.37 387.59 1320% 25.33 360.10 1421.48% - - - 41.00 245.34 598%
Nimodipine 30 100 856.44 954.83 111% - - - - - - - - -
Total 984.19 2086.06 212% 70.78 723.92 1022.74% 56.72 180.38 318% 162.22 648.02 399%
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Table B. Public vs private-sector prices for angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitors (2009-2016).
2009 2012 2014 2016
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Captopril 12.5 100 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Captopril 25 60 8.77 16.73 191% 7.06 15.88 225% 6.76 18.44 273% 10.00 20.45 204%
Captopril 50 60 19.36 24.20 125% - - - - - - - - -
Enalapril 10 30 3.68 44.43 1208% 3.18 44.08 1385% 3.74 41.57 1111% 4.57 48.74 1066%
Enalapril 20 30 4.64 61.81 1333% 4.24 74.64 1761% 4.92 73.33 1490% 7.08 82.56 1167%
Enalapril 5 30 3.36 30.46 906% 2.99 30.90 1033% 2.94 29.65 1009% 3.13 34.19 1093%
Fosinopril 10 30 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fosinopril 20 30 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Lisinopril 10 30 10.70 23.96 224% - - - - - - - - -
Lisinopril 20 30 16.22 23.96 148% - - - - - - - - -
Lisinopril 5 30 8.60 23.96 279% - - - - - - - - -
Perindopril 4 30 16.68 137.56 825% 9.96 84.96 853% - - - 25.47 68.40 269%
Quinapril 10 30 18.49 53.72 290% - - - - - - - - -
Quinapril 20 30 34.00 81.35 239% - - - - - - - - -
Quinapril 5 30 19.48 70.12 360% - - - - - - - - -
Ramipril 2.5 30 11.52 32.46 282% 8.97 89.65 999% - - - - - -
Ramipril 5 30 13.56 38.64 285% 10.54 135.62 1286% - - - - - -
Total 189.06 663.35 351% 46.95 475.73 1013% 18.37 162.99 887% 50.25 254.34 506%
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Table C. Public vs private-sector prices for angiotensin-receptor blockers (2009-2016).
2009 2012 2014 2016
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Losartan 100 30 - - - - - - 13.44 86.79 646% 14.91 85.42 573%
Losartan 50 30 23.18 115.92 500% 8.29 86.20 1040% 6.72 - - 7.69 107.84 1402%
Total 23.18 115.92 500% 8.29 86.20 1040% 20.16 86.79 431% 22.60 193.26 855%
Table D. Public vs private-sector prices for selective-serotonin-reuptake inhibitors (2009-2016).
2009 2012 2014 2016
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Citalopram 20 30 9.76 41.72 428% 9.36 67.66 723% 7.08 67.56 954% 8.00 69.21 865%
Fluoxetine 20 100 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fluoxetine 20 30 9.21 25.48 277% 8.97 22.89 255% 3.61 21.43 594% 6.00 20.65 344%
Fluvoxamine 100 30 186.71 278.57 149% - 258.99 - - 258.50 - - 286.60 -
Paroxetine 20 30 17.92 156.82 875% 21.39 148.81 696% 0.00 133.55 - - - -
Sertraline 50 30 - - - - - - 8.74 76.64 876% - - -
Total 223.60 502.59 225% 39.72 498.35 1255% 19.44 557.68 2869% 14.00 376.46 2689%
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Table E. Public vs private-sector prices for atypical antipsychotics (2009-2016).
2009 2012 2014 2016
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Amisulpride 200 30 362.31 702.61 194% 313.41 666.71 213% 293.38 665.48 227% 279.20 686.36 246%
Amisulpride 50 30 163.32 207.14 127% 141.28 196.56 139% 132.24 196.20 148% 125.82 202.36 161%
Clozapine 100 100 143.12 852.85 596% 123.81 720.41 582% 110.38 695.86 630% 115.60 797.24 690%
Clozapine 25 100 46.15 302.18 655% 39.92 233.39 585% 34.29 232.95 679% 36.10 258.28 715%
Olanzapine 10 30 939.54 1,689.75 180% 60.16 618.45 1028% 39.33 507.85 1291% 30.94 281.46 910%
Olanzapine 2.5 30 - - - 26.74 306.49 1146% 20.26 224.80 1109% 18.24 134.26 736%
Olanzapine 50 28 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Olanzapine 5 30 - - - 40.11 516.03 1287% 30.39 396.10 1303% 24.73 219.45 887%
Risperidone 1 30 12.36 159.35 1289% 7.84 303.30 3869% 4.51 172.83 3835% 4.79 196.08 4094%
Risperidone 2 30 17.00 578.14 3400% 10.76 510.81 4747% 5.01 369.51 7378% 5.59 420.66 7525%
Risperidone 3 30 20.09 845.30 4207% 12.35 746.85 6048% 8.15 572.14 7024% 7.70 520.00 6753%
Sulpiride 200 50 94.91 327.23 345% - - - - - - - - -
Sulpiride 50 100 42.24 144.05 341% - - - - - - - - -
Total 1,841.04 5,808.59 316% 776.38 4,819.00 621% 677.94 4,033.73 595% 648.71 3,716.15 573%
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Table F. Public vs private-sector prices for proton-pump inhibitors (2009-2016).
2009 2012 2014 2016
Strength
(mg)
Pack size
(tablets)
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Tender SEP
%
diff.
Omeprazole 10 30 - - - 12.03 150.50 1251% 38.83 141.96 366% 36.83 135.77 369%
Lansoprazole 30 14 - - - - - - 4.26 244.91 5753% 6.95 234.24 3370%
Lansoprazole 30 30 58.98 138.66 235% - - - 7.12 121.65 1709% 12.18 134.88 1107%
Omeprazole 20 30 14.22 46.37 326% 8.91 40.11 450% - - - - - -
Pantoprazole 40 30 146.57 315.30 215% - - - - - - - - -
Ranitidine 150 60 13.87 52.73 380% 11.69 29.02 248% - - - 13.20 32.10 243%
Ranitidine 300 30 14.91 30.91 207% - - - 9.48 25.76 272% - - -
Total 248.56 583.97 235% 32.63 219.63 673% 59.69 534.28 895% 69.16 536.99 776%
183
5What is the price impact of tendering
for medicines by therapeutic class? A
difference-in-differences estimation
“Many people feel marginalized and powerless in the face of what seems like unbridled
capitalism. The global movement for treatment access said: ’Hold on a minute,
corporate entities have a social duty and responsibility.’ But treatment activists and
international NGOs tend to sulk too much if we don’t get everything we want. We’ve
made huge advances in bringing the price down. The medicines I take today were
priced ten times higher before we started our campaign. ... That doesn’t mean we’ve
got everything, though. It’s important to remain vigilant.”
– Zackie Achmat, South African activist (July 2004)
Key messages
• Many new medicines offer little or no additional therapeutic benefit over existing
therapies.
• Therapeutic tendering is one policy option to reduce spending on so-called me-too
medicines.
• In South Africa, the introduction of therapeutic tendering was associated with an
estimated 33% to 44% reduction in the prices of solid-dose drugs in 2014.
• The national health ministry saved an estimated ZAR 1.13 to 1.50 billion on
solid-dose medicines in 2014 through therapeutic tendering.
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Abstract
Context: Many new medicines offer little or no additional therapeutic benefit over
existing therapies. One option to reduce spending on so-called me-too drugs, and
to indirectly incentivise drug companies to develop truly innovative medicines, is
for payers to tender for medicines by therapeutic class. Under a therapeutic tender-
ing policy, the payer only buys the least expensive products in defined therapeutic
classes. The aim of this study was to measure the association between implementation
of therapeutic tendering and medicine prices and government spending in South Africa.
Methods: I carried out a retrospective observational study of changes in the pack prices
of solid-dose medicines (n = 138) over an 11-year period (2003-2014) before and after the
introduction of a national therapeutic tendering system in South Africa and compared
the findings with changes over the same period for solid-dose medicines which were
not subjected to the policy (n = 672). I ran various difference-in-differences models,
with and without adjustments for product characteristics, to estimate the impact of the
new policy on medicine prices and spending.
Findings: Compared to trends in the prices of solid-dose medicines not subjected to
therapeutic tendering, implementation of therapeutic tendering was associated with a
33.0% (95% CI, 4.0%-53.3%) to 43.7% (95% CI, 20.7%-60.0%) reduction in the average
price paid per medicine, depending on the statistical model used. Spending by the
health ministry declined by an estimated 1.13 billion (95% CI, ZAR 138.01 million -
ZAR 1.83 billion) to 1.50 billion rand (95% CI, ZAR 709.65 million - ZAR 2.06 billion) as
a result of therapeutic tendering.
Conclusions: Therapeutic tendering was associated with large drops in the prices of
solid-dose medicines, which likely saved the South African health ministry millions of
rand in 2014.
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MANY new medicines offer little or no additional therapeutic benefit over exist-ing therapies. [57, 67]1 Data, mostly from high-income countries, highlightthe potential for large savings on therapeutic substitutes, [250] as described
in Chapter 2. To incentivise drug companies to develop truly innovative medicines,
regulators in some countries have adopted policies to cut spending on so-called me-too
medicines, such as therapeutic drug substitution and reference pricing. [116, 123]2
Another option to reduce spending on me-too drugs is to tender for medicines by
therapeutic class. [33] Pharmaceutical tendering refers to the bulk purchase of medicines
from suppliers at agreed-upon prices over a contracted period. [2, 111, 140, 142, 143, 208,
224, 279, 317–319] Under a therapeutic tendering policy, a payer only buys the least
expensive product in a defined therapeutic class.
Tendering by therapeutic class can generate greater savings than tendering by
individual products in two ways. First, the prices of some products might fall due to
increased competition, especially when one or more of the medicines in the therapeutic
group are patent protected. Second, the average volume-weighted price per class might
decrease after patients switch to the cheapest product in each class. In the latter case,
the volume-weighted price can go down even if the price of the cheapest product did
not change, or even increased.
In this study, I investigate the South African therapeutic tendering system. The
country’s national government has issued pharmaceutical tenders since 1982. In 2014,
the national health ministry implemented a therapeutic tendering system for solid-dose
medicines with a view to maximize savings on therapeutically-equivalent products.
The aim of this study was to estimate the effect of the introduction of this policy
on: (i) the prices of medicines subjected to the policy and (ii) the total spending on
these products. Before describing the methods and dataset, I present basic theories
underpinning pharmaceutical tenders.
1This chapter is being prepared for submission to a peer-reviewed journal.
2Refer to Chapters 1 and 2 for more information on reference pricing and substitution policies.
186
5.1 Theoretical background
Auction, agency, and contract theory are all helpful frameworks against which to
analyze findings relating to pharmaceutical tenders. [321, 410, 411] Tenders are closely
linked to the theory of auctions, one of the oldest forms of markets. [410–412] McAfee
and McMillan (1987) define an auction as “a market institution with an explicit set of
rules determinng resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market
participants.” [411] A seminal paper by Vickrey [413] brought the topic into the field of
economic research, with much having been written since. The present article will focus
on the literature relevant to public tenders, but recent overviews by Milgrom [414] and
Klemperer [410] offer useful insights into auction theory.
Theoretical studies have outlined basic models of first-price, sealed-bid reverse
auctions for homogeneous products. The descriptions below were derived from work
conducted by Milgrom and Weber, [415] McAfee and McMillan, [411] Huh and Roundy,
[416] and Klemperer, [410] unless otherwise indicated.3
Consider a scenario in which there are at least two pharmaceutical firms which
produce a generic product, say a 28-tablet pack of the cholesterol-reducing drug simvast-
atin (20 mg). Each simvastatin manufacturer i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) has a cost of production
c (ci = c1, c2, · · · , cn). A successful bidder earns a profit which is equal to its bid value,
bi, minus its cost of production, ci.
There are four key assumptions to this model. First, bidders are risk neutral, mean-
ing they are neither risk averse nor risk seeking. In other words, the bidding decisions
of suppliers are not affected by the amount of uncertainty present in the bidding process.
Second, manufacturers’ production costs are independent of each other, and these costs
are private knowledge. Third, profits are solely a function of a firm’s bid. And, fourth,
bidders possess symmetric information, meaning no firm has any advantage over
another one due to additional knowledge about other firms or the tendering process.
(There are several reasons why these assumptions may not hold, as discussed at the
end of this section.4)
Each firm assumes that the other firms follow a bidding rule, β, based on their
costs of production. In other words, given a cost of simvastatin production ci, a firm
will always bid β(ci), which can also be written as bi. β is a monotonically increasing
function, meaning that a higher cost of production always results in a higher bid.
A firm’s probability of winning corresponds to the probability that the lowest cost
of production among all other bidders, cj, is larger than its own. That is, β(cj) > bi.
3As described in Chapters 1 and 2, generic medicines can be assumed to be homogeneous products for
most patients.
4Maskin and Riley [417] relax each of these assumptions in their analysis.
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This probability can be expressed as
1− F( 1
β(bi)
)n−1
where F is the probability distribution function of production costs for the n− 1 other
firms. It is assumed that each firm tries to maximize expected profits, pii, which can be
written as
pii = (bi − ci)(1− F[ 1β(bi) ]
n−1
i )
The profits that firm i would earn if it won with bid bi are multiplied by the probability
of winning with this bid.
The profit maximization problem can be solved at a Nash equilibrium, in which
each bidder is assumed to behave rationally and in a way that is consistent with the
assumptions outlined above. Under such conditions, the optimal bid for supplier i res-
ults in a price that is close to the marginal cost of production. The solution corresponds
to a situation in which bidder i is indifferent as to whether the tender is won or not.
Interested readers should consult the relevant theoretical studies for the solutions to this
Nash equilibrium problem, which is outside the scope of this thesis. [410, 411, 415, 416]
This basic model is a useful starting point for analyzing tenders. It indicates that
tenders should put downward pressure on prices of multi-source products. More
specifically, the model suggests that a drug purchaser which issues a tender—and is
able to attract a sufficient number of bids—would end up paying close to the marginal
cost of production of the cheapest firm.
Yet there are many reasons why the results of this basic model may not hold.
Importantly, in South Africa and elsewhere, there are often additional variables beyond
best price which are used to determine the winners. These variables can either be
written into the conditions of award or involve ad hoc decisions by the buyer, as
described in Chapter 4. In other words, although auctions or tenders provide a forum
for price competition, the buyer may select the final winner in response to non-price
considerations specific to the circumstances and needs of the buyer. For example, the
national health ministry in South Africa allows local manufacturers to match the lowest
price for designated products. A local firm might therefore bid a higher price knowing
they are likely to receive an opportunity to revise its offer. Moreover, part of the bid
evaluation is based on broad-based black economic empowerment scores, and the
health ministry regularly splits awards to reduce the risk of supply disruptions. Still,
theoretical models suggest that when buyers award sizable market shares to the lowest
bidders, reverse auctions should stimulate strong price competition. [418–422]
Moreover, the degree of risk aversion may differ between companies. For example,
large-size firms which produce many products may be more willing to take risks than
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small and medium-size ones, given that firms prepare bids based on their medicine
portfolios (ie, joint probability of winning a number of contracts, rather than any one
contract). There might be differences in risk perceptions between local and international
companies. Also, repeat bidders might obtain useful insights about the tendering pro-
cess which may affect their bidding strategy, resulting in firms possessing asymmetric
information. For instance, a manufacturer might be reluctant to offer its best price if it
experienced late payments or incorrect volume forecasts in previous tenders.
Therapeutic tendering, in theory, should make the system even more competitive by
treating all products in a designated class as homogeneous. By increasing the number
of potential bidders, the probability of the payer obtaining a lower bid increases. Yet,
given the reasons above for why the basic theoretical assumptions may not always
hold, it is important to assess empirically whether therapeutic tendering is associated
with a reduction in prices and spending.
189
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Institutional background
As described in Chapter 4, the national government in South Africa issues tenders to
set the prices of essential medicines in the public health care system.5 The National
Department of Health (NDoH) divides medicines into fourteen categories (see Box 4.1
in Chapter 4). The health ministry puts out a tender medicines in each category every
two-to-three years. Tenders outline the quantity of each product that is needed, as
well as other information like lead times. The NDoH accepts bids from national and
international manufacturers with the right to sell a product in South Africa.
Before the implementation of therapeutic tendering, the national government issued
tenders for each medicine listed on the country’s standard treatment guidelines. For
example, in 2012, the NDoH separately tendered for atorvastatin (10 mg), fluvastatin
(40 mg), and simvastatin (10 mg). In 2014, in an effort to enhance price competition,
the South African NDoH began tendering by therapeutic class for medicines which it
considers interchangeable. The health ministry designated therapeutic classes in all
of the categories shown in Box 4.1, with the exceptions of anti-tuberculosis medicines
and large-volume parenterals.6 For instance, in the tender for solid-dose medicines and
transdermal patches, the NDoH views the cholesterol-reducing drugs atorvastatin (10
mg), fluvastatin (40 mg), lovastatin (20 mg), rosuvastatin (5 mg), and simvastatin (10
mg) as therapeutically equivalent. Under the new policy, the health ministry started
only buying the least expensive product in this group (simvastatin, 10 mg, in 2014).
The NDoH stopped tendering by therapeutic class in 2016 due to concerns about
patient adherence to therapy, since therapeutic tendering resulted in changes to treat-
ment regimens for some patients. There is ongoing policy discussion at national level
to reintroduce the policy.
5.2.2 Data sources
In this paper, I focus on tenders for solid-dose medicines and transdermal patches,
which were awarded every two years between 2003 and 2009 and then every two
years between 2012 and 2016; Appendix A lists the therapeutic classes for solid-dose
medicines and transdermal patches. I focused on products in this category for three
reasons. First, the tender category is by far the largest, accounting for roughly 40%
of products on contract between 2003 and 2016 (3,294/8,655). Second, by restricting
5Between 2003 and 2011, the National Treasury issued tenders. The National Department of Health took
over the tendering process in 2012.
6The health ministry did not designate therapeutic categories for diagnostic agents, contrast media, and
pharmaceutical packaging materials, but none of these categories contain medicines.
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the analysis to a single tender category, it allowed us to minimize any differences in
the results which might have arisen due to variation in tendering procedures across
categories. Third, it reduced confounding due to differences in the results attributable
to medicinal forms (eg, liquids vs. powders vs. tablets vs. injections).
I obtained all tender contracts for solid-dose drugs procured in the public sector
between 2003 and 2016. Tender contracts contain information on medicine prices,
quantities, manufacturers, and lead times.7
The dataset contained 3,294 products, which were defined by active ingredient
and indication (ATC level 4). The number of products per year ranged from 289
line items in 2016 to 508 in 2003, including split contracts. I excluded 359 products
which belonged to one or more of the following categories: combination products
with multiple active ingredients, products not on the country’s “essential medicines
list”, minerals, vitamins, proteases, and saccharins. I also dropped the 2016 data from
the analysis, since therapeutic tendering was halted in that year. I was left with 2,648
observations: 2,300 products which did not belong to a therapeutic tendering class (ie,
control arm) and 348 products which belonged to such a class in 2014 (ie, treatment
arm).
The prices per pack were adjusted for inflation based on consumer price indexes, [353]
with all costs reported in 2016 rand. I calculated average volume-weighted prices for
split awards.8 I also calculated the average volume-weighted price per therapeutic
class, since this is the outcome of interest.9
This product-level panel dataset consisted of five pre-intervention periods (2003,
2005, 2007, 2009, 2012) and one post-intervention period (2014). The panel dataset was
unbalanced, since not all products were procured in each year and new products were
added to the tender in each year.
I restricted the products to those available in all six tender years to account for
the changing composition of the control and treatment groups over time, as done in
other studies. This was done to limit selection bias, [423] since average prices are
very susceptible to extreme prices. For example, if a larger number of new on-patent
medicines enter the control arm each year—which are usually accompanied by higher
price tags—then this would raise the average price in the control group. This could
then potentially lead to the parallel trends assumption not being met as a result of the
7A lead time is defined by the health ministry as “the [maximum permissible] time from submission
of order to supplier to time of receipt by the department as confirmed by the Proof of Delivery docu-
ment”. [352]
8For instance, if one firm was asked to supply 60% of the contracted volume at a price of 5 ZAR per
pack, and another was asked to supply 40% of the volume at a price of 10 ZAR per pack, the weighted
price was 7 ZAR (5*0.6 + 10*0.4). The method applied by the NDoH to split awards is outlined in the
conceptual framework.
9For example, if a therapeutic class consists of two products, one priced at 10 ZAR (15,000 packs) and the
other at 20 ZAR (5,000 packs), the volume-weighted price would be 12.5 ZAR (10*0.75 + 20*0.25).
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changing composition of the control and treatment arms. Although this led to a smaller
sample size and a loss of statistical power, the remaining dataset still consisted of 135
products with measurements at six points in time (i.e. 810 observations). This included
138 observations for the intervention group, and 672 in the control group.
Trends in medicine prices are influenced by market characteristics, such as the avail-
ability of new medicines, loss of exclusivity for branded medicines, and competition
between brand-name and generic firms. [424] In order to estimate the impact of thera-
peutic tendering on the prices of medicines subjected to this policy, it is necessary to
distinguish between the impact of the policy on the prices and the impact of underlying
market factors. To control for the latter, I selected those medicines in the solid-dose
tender which were not grouped into therapeutic classes as control groups.
5.2.3 Econometric model
I followed a similar identification strategy to that in Pavcnik (2002). [186] To address
potential observed and unobserved confounding, I estimated the following multi-
variable difference-in-differences model
ln(pit) = αi + βDi + γAt + δDi · At + mi + Tt + eit
where p was the price (expressed as a natural logarithm) of product i at time t, D an
indicator variable for products subjected to therapeutic tendering (ie, treatment group),
A an indicator variable for post-treatment period, m a product fixed effect, T a time
fixed effect, and e an error term. The measurement of treatment effect was done using
ordinary least squares.
The interaction term D · A was the main result of interest. This term captured the
impact of the introduction of therapeutic tendering in 2014 on the weighted-average
prices of drugs subjected to the policy. The prices were expressed as natural logarithms
since the data were positively skewed. The use of log-transformed prices also allows
for an intuitive interpretation of the results in terms of the relative price change.
All models included a product fixed effect to control for any individual character-
istics of units–in both treatment and control arms—that affect price levels but do not
vary over time. This includes time-invariant characteristics such as the therapeutic
value of a medicine, form (eg, tablet vs. modified-release capsule vs. patient-ready
pack), therapeutic class, and strength. Similarly, the time fixed effect controlled for
any changes over time which affected prices, such as efficiency improvements in the
tendering process as the Treasury or National Department of Health gained experience.
I ran various difference-in-differences models with and without adjustment the
generic status of a medicine, ie, a dummy variable indicating whether a product was
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off-patent or not 10. The generic status of a medicine could change over time, ie, time-
variant covariate. In each model, I clustered the standard errors by medicine (ie, robust
standard errors) to account for potential heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. [425]
This corrects for any within-medicine correlation between repeated measures.
I calculated a supplementary model as a robustness check: I collapsed the time-series
data from 2003 to 2012 into a single pre-treatment period (ie, average values for each
product), and then re-ran the models. [425] By ignoring the time-series dimension of the
data, this model addresses the potential for the standard errors to be underestimated
due to serial autocorrelation. The results of a widely-cited simulation exercise found
that this approach helps solve this issue. [425]
The methods outlined above adhere to guidelines on how to evaluate the impact of
changes to pharmaceutical pricing policies. [426] All statistical tests were two-tailed
and used a type I error rate of 0.05. The data were analyzed in Stata version 15.
5.2.4 Model assumptions
A difference-in-differences analysis compares changes in the outcome variable among
units in a treatment group (ie, units subjected to a new policy or event) and units
in a control group (ie, units not subjected to the intervention). The key assumption
is that the trends in the outcome variable would have followed parallel paths in the
post-intervention period had the intervention not occurred. Under such a scenario, the
outcome in the control group can serve as a proxy for what would have happened in the
treated group in the absence of treatment (ie, unobserved counterfactual). [427] Thus,
by taking the difference in the pre- and post-treatment outcomes in the treated and
control groups, and then taking the difference of these differences, the model eliminates
the effect on prices of market-level factors that affected both groups. [424, 428] This
accounts for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity between the two groups, as
long as the trends then follow parallel paths.
To verify the parallel trends assumption,11 researchers often plot the mean outcome
values in the treatment and control groups to visually inspect whether the trends are
parallel. However, medicines can go off-patent at various times, which may result in an
unbalanced pattern if you do not control for the off-patent status of a drug (ie, whether
it is still patent-protected or available in generic form). It is important to account for
any relevant product characteristic that can change over time at different rates in the
treatment and control groups and that is likely to impact prices.
10To determine the off-patent status of a product, I triangulated information contained in the “Private-
Sector Database of Medicine Prices”, “Republic of South Africa Pharmaceutical Database”, and tender
contracts.
11This assumption is sometimes referred to as the common trends assumption or parallel paths assump-
tion. Wing and colleagues define it as: “[difference-in-differences designs] assume that confounders
varying across the groups are time invariant, and time-varying confounders are group invariant”. [428]
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Therefore, to test for parallel trends, I adjusted the model above for the off-patent
status of a product and included leads of the treatment in each of the other years
(2003-2012). This was done by interacting the treatment indicator with the year vari-
able.12 [429] These are sometime referred to as “placebo tests”. In other words, I
controlled for the generic status of medicines and then examined the treatment effect in
each year. If the parallel trend assumption were to hold, I would observe a statistically
significant treatment effect in the intervention year (D · T), but no significant effects in
any of the earlier years when the policy was not yet in place.
There are three other assumptions underpinning difference-in-differences analyses.
First, it is assumed that the intervention is unrelated to the outcomes at baseline. In
other words, the allocation of medicines to treatment or control groups was not influ-
enced by their starting prices.13 This is unlikely to be the case for therapeutic tendering,
since the inclusion or exclusion of products is due to their perceived therapeutic in-
terchangeability. Second, the composition of the intervention and comparison groups
must remain stable over time, which is part of the stable unit treatment value assump-
tion (SUTVA). This was accounted for by restricting the analyses to those products
observed in all study periods, as outlined in the section above on data sources. Third,
SUTVA also requires that the intervention had no spillover effects on other units not
subjected to treatment.
12I could not test for lags in the treatment since I only had one post-treatment observation.
13Bertrand et al explain that difference-in-differences estimation “is appropriate when the interventions
are as good as random, conditional on time and group fixed effects”. [425]
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5.3 Results
5.3.1 Summary statistics in year prior to intervention
Table 5.1 shows summary statistics about the costs per pack and market shares of the
most and least expensive products in each therapeutic class in 2012.14 The table only
displays information for those therapeutic classes with two or more therapeutically
equivalent products on tender in that year.
These data highlight the rationale behind the introduction of therapeutic tendering
in 2014. In 2012, the NDoH purchased multiple products in 15 out of the 34 therapeutic
classes.15 The median price difference between the lowest- and highest-priced product
in each class was R 12.92 (range: R 1.27 - R 328.94). The median share of the highest-
priced product in a class was 47.7% (range: 1.8% - 93.4%). In brief, sizable savings were
lost in most therapeutic classes with multiple products on tender.
5.3.2 Parallel trends assumption
The products in the control group by definition differ from those in the treated arm,
since therapeutic tendering cannot be applied to any product (ie, it is not possible
to randomly apply the policy to any product). In other words, the products in the
treated arm are likely to differ systematically from those in the control group in terms of
observed and unobserved characteristics. Thus, it is important to examine the trends in
prices of medicines in the treatment and control groups to see whether it is reasonable to
assume that the medicines in the control group can be used to account for market-level
factors which affect both groups.
To test whether the parallel trends assumption holds, I ran the model with leads
in the treatment.16 This was done by interacting the treatment indicator and time
variables, to see whether the there was a significant treatment effect in any other year.
A significant term would indicate that the trends differed between the products in the
control and treatment arms in a given year, which would violate the parallel trends
assumption. Table 5.2 shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors, none of
which are significant at the 5% level. These “placebo tests” indicate that the parallel
trends assumption holds, since otherwise the results would have shown a significant
treatment effect in other years. Thus, the difference-in-differences model should provide
a reliable estimate of the true causal effect.
14As mentioned in the methods, all monetary values reported in inflation-adjusted 2016 rand, based
on consumer price index data for South Africa (World Bank, 2017). Volume-weighted prices were
calculated for split awards.
15Between 2003 and 2016, multiple therapeutic substitutes were purchased in 23 out of the 34 classes.
16As explained in the methods, I adjusted for the off-patent status of a product, which influences the
parallel trends.
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Table 5.1: Prices and market shares across therapeutic tendering classes (2012).
Drug class
ATC
(Level 4)
Tender
group
Quantity
(no. of packs)
Price of drug in class
(ZAR per pack)
∆ price
(ZAR)
Share of drug
in class (%)
Least
expensive
Most
expensive
Least
expensive
Most
expensive
Aminosalicylic acid
and similar agents
A07EC 124,900 R 279.30 R 356.63 R 77.33 92.8% 7.2%
Sulfonylureas A10BB 1 1,074,100 R 3.27 R 6.50 R 3.23 9.3% 90.7%
2 3,718,400 R 3.78 R 12.13 R 8.35 2.7% 97.3%
Dihydropyridine derivatives
(calcium-channel blockers)
C08CA 1 23,099,500 R 3.12 R 13.66 R 10.54 63.6% 36.4%
2 2,876,000 R 4.12 R 26.94 R 22.82 70.7% 29.3%
ACE inhibitors C09AA 25,716,200 R 3.38 R 10.59 R 7.21 47.7% 52.3%
HMG CoA reductase
inhibitors (statins)
C10AA 1 3,590,900 R 4.42 R 17.34 R 12.92 90.4% 9.6%
2 3,326,000 R 6.76 R 35.99 R 29.23 87.6% 11.8%
Drugs for urinary
frequency and incontinence
G04BD 135,700 R 34.83 R 363.77 R 328.94 85.6% 10.8%
Alpha-adrenoreceptor antagonists
(for benign prostatic hypertrophy)
G04CA 581,700 R 23.87 R 56.88 R 33.01 10.3% 28.0%
Ethers chemically
close to antihistamines
N04AB 389,200 R 26.38 R 45.97 R 19.59 93.3% 6.7%
Serotonin-norepinephrine
reuptake inhibitors
N06AX 102,800 R 53.84 R 313.69 R 259.85 1.8% 2.8%
Anti-inflammatory and anti-
rheumatic products, non-steroids
M01AB 1 1,758,000 R 2.72 R 3.99 R 1.27 2.7% 97.3%
2 1,074,800 R 2.67 R 5.24 R 2.57 47.0% 53.0%
3 2,470,100 R 7.07 R 11.70 R 4.63 30.8% 69.2%
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Table 5.2: Sensitivity analysis to test the common trends assumption.
Coefficient
(Standard error)
Treatment * 2005
-0.266
(0.144)
Treatment * 2007
-0.307
(0.163)
Treatment * 2009
-0.333
(0.183)
Treatment * 2012
-0.426
(0.215)
Off-patent status (covariate) X
Product indicator X
N 810
Robust standard errors, shown in parentheses, were clustered by product. 2003 is the omitted year
indicator.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
5.3.3 Estimated impact of therapeutic tendering on prices
Table 5.3 shows the difference-in-differences estimator for each model. The results
indicate that therapeutic tendering was associated with a large reduction in prices, with
the estimated size of the reduction ranging from 33% in model 4 to 44% in model 1.17
In the basic model (1), which does not include any adjustments for covariates, the
estimated size of the price decline was 44% (p<0.001), with a 95% confidence interval of
22% (-0.232) to 60% (-0.916).
In the second (2) model, a covariate was included to adjust for the off-patent status
of a product (ie, whether it was available in generic form or not). The estimated price
reductions (p<0.01) and standard errors were lower than in the basic model, and the R2
value increased.
In the third model (3), I interacted the difference-in-differences estimator with
17These estimates are obtained by exponentiating the coefficients reported in the second row, since prices
were expressed as natural logarithms in all models.
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the off-patent status. The reasoning behind this was that the effect of the policy on
medicines prices might differ depending on how long a product’s been on the market
and its price prior to the intervention. For example, a generic medicine which has been
around for a long time and is very cheap in the year prior to the intervention cannot,
in general, drop as much in price as a newer products which higher prices. In other
words, there is bigger room for price drops for products which have gone off patent
more recently. The triple interaction term was not significant (although the off-patent
covariate was), and the difference-in-differences estimator provided similar results to
the second model (2).
As expected, the standard error in the collapsed model (4) was larger than the others,
since the model ignored most of the time series information. In this model, the average
values in the pre-intervention periods were used, resulting in just one period before
the intervention and one after. This robustness check is often conducted as part of
difference-in-differences analyses due to concern that these analyses may understate
standard errors due to severe autocorrelation in the outcome measure—usually highly
positive serial correlation. The estimated price reduction in the collapsed model, in
which the standard errors were also clustered by product, was comparable to those in
models 2 and 3 and still significant at the 5% level, providing further support for the
claim that therapeutic tendering had an effect on the prices of medicines in therapeutic
clusters.
5.3.4 Estimated savings from therapeutic tendering
In 2014, the mean price among the medicines in the treated arm was R 20.16, meaning
the introduction of therapeutic tendering was associated with an estimated average
reduction in price of R 6.65 based on model 4 or R 8.87 based on model 1. By multiplying
these values by 169,975,410—the number of packs of these medicines purchased in 2014
(ie, products subjected to therapeutic tendering)—the estimated savings ranged from R
1.13 billion (model 4, 95% CI: 138.01 million - 1.83 billion rand) to R 1.50 billion (model
1, 95% CI: 709.65 million - 2.06 billion rand), in inflation-adjusted 2016 values. This
corresponded to a range of US$ 100.32 million (95% CI: US$ 12.23 - 161.95 million) to
US$ 132.63 million (95% CI: US$ 62.88 - 182.18 million), based on the yearly average
exchange rate (11.286) reported by the US Internal Revenue Service.
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Table 5.3: The impact of therapeutic tendering on prices, by model (2014).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment * post
-0.574***
(0.175)
-0.451**
(0.152)
-0.428**
(0.135)
-0.401*
(0.182)
95% confidence intervals (CI) -0.916 to -0.232 -0.751 to -0.152 -0.696 to -0.161 -0.762 to -0.0411
Year indicators X X X
Off-patent status (covariate) X X
Off-patent status * treatment * post X
Collapse pre-intervention periods X
Product indicator (fixed effect) X X X X
R-squared (overall) 0.0529 0.2213 0.2150 0.2329
Robust standard errors, shown in parentheses, were clustered by product. 2003 is the omitted year indicator. N is 810 in all models except the the collapsed
difference-in-differences model (5), where N was 270 since there were only two time periods.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
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5.4 Discussion
The results indicate that the introduction of therapeutic tendering in South Africa in
2014 for solid-dose medicines and transdermal patches was associated with a large
drop in the volume-weighted prices of medicines grouped by therapeutic class. The
estimated average size of this price decline ranged from 33% to 44%, depending on
the model. The new tendering system is estimated to have saved the South African
NDoH between ZAR 1.13 and 1.50 billion in 2014. Given that solid-dose medicines and
transdermal patches only account for around 16% of total drug spending (Chapter 4),
there is potential for even greater savings in other medicine categories.
Other studies have examined, using difference-in-differences models, the impact
of internal reference pricing at ATC level 4—also called therapeutic reference pricing—
on prices and spending for medicines included in therapeutic clusters. [128, 186, 424,
430–432] Under a therapeutic reference pricing scheme, a payer establish a maximum
reimbursement level for medicines included in a therapeutic cluster, which can include
both patent-protected and generic products (ie, both chemically- and therapeutically-
equivalent drugs). Those studies generally found that therapeutic reference pricing was
associated with a decline in the prices of medicines subjected to the policy, which offers
further support for measures which aim to capitalize on the therapeutic substitutability
of medicines to put downward pressure on prices.
More research is needed to determine the impact of therapeutic reference pricing on
different medicines types (ie, non-solid dose forms) and medicines in other therapeutic
areas (eg, oncology and anti-infective medicines) which are tendered for separately in
South Africa. Also, it is important for future work to try to disentangle effect of greater
competition (ie, increase in number of bidders) from the effect of an increase in the
tendered quantity—both of which could account for part of observed change in price
levels.
Policymakers aiming to implement therapeutic tendering must consider potential
issues which may arise. First, therapeutic tendering is only applicable to groups of
medicines which can reasonably be considered perfect or near-perfect substitutes, ie,
no significant differences in efficacy, safety, or side effect profiles. It is important to
obtain buy-in from pharmacists and physicians on designated therapeutic classes to
avoid disagreements over the perceived substitutability of medicines those classes. For
therapeutic tendering to be more widely practiced, as with therapeutic substitution
or reference pricing (see Chapter 2), the relevant authorities should disseminate and
enforce guidelines to ensure the buy-in of physicians, pharmacists, and insurers.
Second, the achievement of low prices through therapeutic tendering is not sufficient
on its own to guarantee the availability of medicines at these prices. It is also important
to put in place safeguards to prevent supply disruptions, which might be more likely
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to occur if a single firm is asked to supply a larger quantity of medicines (ie, satisfy the
entire patient demand within a therapeutic cluster). To this end, it may be important
for payers to split the awards of a therapeutic tender between two or more firms to
minimize the risk of shortages.
Third, it is possible that patient adherence may decline if the reason for a therapeutic
switch is not well explained, especially since medicines can have different shapes, sizes,
and colors. This might be particularly problematic for chronically ill patients who
consume a large number of medicines (ie, polypharmacy). Physicians and other health
stakeholders need to communicate such changes to patients to promote continued
adherence to treatment.
5.4.1 Limitations
This study has several limitations.
First, the model suffers from potential endogeneity issues. For example, tender
prices are not necessarily independent: what happens in another tender category (ie,
Box 4.1 in Chapter 4) could affect solid-dose prices. It was also not possible to determine
whether there were any spillover effect on the prices of other medicines (eg, in the
private sector). Moreover, there was no way to tell whether products in the treated
arm were selected because they were thought to be products which were particularly
well-suited for therapeutic tendering (ie, selection bias). [425] However, since this
policy cannot be randomly allocated to any unit, it is reasonable to assume that the
products were selected only based on therapeutic interchangeability—as opposed to
any other reason which might have influenced prices—which was confirmed through
discussions with health ministry officials. It is also impossible to determine definitively
that nothing other than the policy changed in 2014, and that we can attribute the entire
treatment effect only to the introduction of therapeutic tendering, although, again, this
was confirmed qualitatively through discussion with ministry officials.
Second, I only had one post-intervention observation, and was thus unable to
determine any change in underlying trends of prices. Thus, the results are only a point
estimate of the immediate impact of the policy change on prices and spending. Tender
outcomes, however, are categorically different from drug utilization rates or drug prices
set in a free market. In such cases, utilization rates sometimes only stabilize several
months after the intervention, which, in turn, leads to delays before the full impact on
prices and expenditures can be observed. In addition, there might be cyclical trends in
utilization, such as seasonal variation in prescribing, which can only be captured with a
large set of post-intervention observations. This is less of a concern with tendering: one
would expect that companies have assessed the implications of the policy change and
changed their bidding strategy in the first tender. Instead, pre-intervention observations
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are more important in this case.
Third, I was unable to distinguish between quantity and competition effects, due
to lack of data on the number of bidders. It is possible that either the larger quantities
obtained through pooling procurement in therapeutic tenders or an increase in the
number of bids was the driver behind the observed price reductions. Future analyses
should explore the relationships between quantities and prices, as well as number of
bids and prices.
Fourth, as an additional robustness check, I would ideally have used propensity-
score matching to control for product mix, quantity, number of bids, year, product
type, therapeutic class, off-patent status, number of products in a class (ATC level 3),
and product age. These are all factors which influence price levels, based on empirical
studies (Chapter 1). Propensity-score matching is meant to create balanced groups as
per randomization and improve the precision of estimates, although estimates are still
vulnerable to unobserved confounding. However, I did not have data on all of the
relevant variables mentioned above. For instance, I had no data on how long product
has been off patent (ie, age of a molecule). Also, as the sample size was small, pruning
the data through propensity-score matching would have likely decreased the statistical
power considerably.
Finally, the effect of therapeutic tendering is dependent on when the policy is
introduced (ie, “status quo” prior to implementation). Point estimates may differ if the
policy is introduced after tendering is used for years, as in South Africa, or immediately
introduced without tendering having been used previously.
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5.5 Conclusions
Policymakers should promote the use of less expensive, therapeutically-equivalent
medicines, preferably generics, whenever possible. Therapeutic tendering is a poten-
tially important policy lever to cut spending on more expansive therapeutic substitutes,
especially patented products which face limited market competition. Therapeutic
tendering is associated with a large decline in the volume-weighted average prices
of medicines included in therapeutic clusters, and the introduction of this policy can
generate sizable savings.
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Appendix A: List of therapeutic categories
Table A. Solid-dose medicines included in therapeutic classes and groups (2014).
Class Group ATC-4 Medicine Strength Pack size
1 1 A02BC Lansoprazole 15 mg 28 capsules
Omeprazole 10 mg 28 tablets/capsules
Pantoprazole 20 mg 28 tablets
Rabeprazole 10 mg 28 tablets
2 A02BC Esomeprazole 20 mg 28 enteric-coated tablets
Lansoprazole 30 mg 28 capsules
Omeprazole 20 mg 28 capsules
Pantoprazole 40 mg 28 enteric-coated tablets
Rabeprazole 20 mg 28 tablets
3 A02BC Esomeprazole 20 mg 14 tablets
Lansoprazole 30 mg 14 capsules
Omeprazole 20 mg 14 tablets
Pantoprazole 40 mg 14 enteric-coated tablets
4 A02BC Esomeprazole 40 mg 28 enteric-coated tablets
Lansoprazole 30 mg 28 capsules
Omeprazole 40 mg 28 capsules
Pantoprazole 40 mg 28 enteric-coated tablets
Rabeprazole 20 mg 28 tablets
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Class Group ATC-4 Medicine Strength Pack size
5 A02BA Ranitidine 150 mg 56 film-coated tablets
Ranitidine 300 mg 28 film-coated tablets
2 1 A07EC Mesalazine 400 mg 90 tablets
Mesalazine 500 mg 90 tablets
Sulphasalazine 500 mg 100 tablets
3 1 A10BB Gliclazide 80 mg 28 tablets
Glimepiride 1 mg 28 tablets
2 A10BB Gliclazide 80 mg 56 tablets
Glimepiride 2 mg 28 tablets
3 A10BB Gliclazide 80 mg 112 tablets
Glimepiride 4 mg 28 tablets
4 1 C02CA Doxazosin 4 mg 30 modified-release tablets
Prazosin 5 mg 30 tablets
2 C02CA Doxazosin 1 mg 30 tablets
Prazosin 1 mg 100 tablets
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Class Group ATC-4 Medicine Strength Pack size
5 1 C08CA Amlodipine 5 mg 28 tablets
Felodipine 5 mg 30 tablets
Lercanidipine 10 mg 28 tablets
Nifedipine 30 mg 28 modified-release tablets
2 C08CA Amlodipine 10 mg 28 tablets
Felodipine 10 mg 30 tablets
Lercanidipine 20 mg 28 tablets
Nifedipine 60 mg 28 modified-release tablets
3 C09AA Enalapril maleate 10 mg 28 tablets
Fosinopril 20 mg 30 tablets
Perindopril 4 mg 28 tablets
Quinapril 20 mg 28 tablets
4 C09AA Enalapril maleate 10 mg 56 tablets
Enalapril maleate 20 mg 28 tablets
Fosinopril 40 mg 30 tablets
Perindopril 8 mg 28 tablets
Quinapril 40 mg 28 tablets
6 1 C10AA Atorvastatin 10 mg 28 tablets
Fluvastatin 40 mg 28 capsules
Lovastatin 20 mg 28 tablets
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Class Group ATC-4 Medicine Strength Pack size
Rosuvastatin 5 mg 28 tablets
Simvastatin 10 mg 28 tablets
2 C10AA Atorvastatin 20 mg 30 tablets
Atorvastatin 40 mg 30 tablets
Rosuvastatin 20 mg 28 tablets
Simvastatin 20 mg 28 tablets
7 1 G04BD Darifenacin 7.5 mg 28 tablets
Flavoxate HCl 200 mg 84 tablets
Oxybutynin chloride 5 mg 84 tablets
Tolterodine-l-tartrate 4 mg 28 modified-release tablets
8 1 G04CA Alfuzosin 10 mg 28 tablets
Doxazosin 4 mg 30 modified-release tablets
Tamsulosin HCl 0.4 mg 28 sustained-release capsules
Terazosin 5 mg 28 tablets
9 1 B01AC Aspirin 80 mg 28 dispersible tablets
Aspirin 81 mg 28 enteric-coated tablets
Aspirin 100 mg 28 tablets
Aspirin 300 mg 14 soluble scored tablets
10 1 N04AB Biperiden HCl 2 mg 28 tablets
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Class Group ATC-4 Medicine Strength Pack size
Orphenadrine HCl 50 mg 28 tablets
Trihexyphenidyl HCl 2 mg 28 tablets
2 N04AB Biperiden HCl 2 mg 56 tablets
Orphenadrine HCl 50 mg 56 tablets
Trihexyphenidyl HCl 2 mg 56 tablets
3 N04AB Biperiden HCl 2 mg 84 tablets
Orphenadrine HCl 50 mg 84 tablets
Trihexyphenidyl HCl 2 mg 84 tablets
11 1 G02CB Pramipexole 0.125 mg 100 tablets
Pramipexole 0.25 mg 100 tablets
Pramipexole 1 mg 100 tablets
Bromocriptine 2.5 mg 28 tablets
Bromocriptine 5 mg 28 tablets
Ropinirole HCl 0.25 mg 84 tablets
Ropinirole HCl 0.5 mg 84 tablets
Ropinirole HCl 1 mg 84 tablets
Ropinirole HCl 5 mg 84 tablets
12 1 N06AX Bupropion HCl 150 mg 56 tablets
Sertraline 50 mg 30 tablets/capsules
Venlafaxine 37.5 mg 28 tablets
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Class Group ATC-4 Medicine Strength Pack size
Venlafaxine 75 mg 28 modified-release capsules
Venlafaxine 150 mg 28 modified-release capsules
13 1 N06AB Citalopram 20 mg 28 tablets
Escitalopram 10 mg 28 tablets
14 1 M01AB Diclofenac sodium 25 mg 15 enteric-coated tablets
Ibuprofen 400 mg 15 coated tablets
Naproxen 250 mg 10 tablets
2 M01AB Diclofenac sodium 25 mg 30 enteric-coated tablets
Diclofenac sodium 50 mg 15 enteric-coated tablets
Ibuprofen 400 mg 30 tablets
Naproxen 250 mg 20 tablets
3 M01AB Diclofenac sodium 25 mg 84 enteric-coated tablets
Ibuprofen 400 mg 84 tablets
Naproxen 250 mg 56 tablets
4 M01AB Diclofenac sodium 25 mg 100 enteric-coated tablets
Ibuprofen 400 mg 100 tablets
Naproxen 250 mg 100 tablets
15 1 P02CA Albendazole 200 mg 2 tablets
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Class Group ATC-4 Medicine Strength Pack size
Albendazole 400 mg 1 tablet
16 1 R06AE Cetirizine dihydrochloride 10 mg 28 tablets
Desloratadine 5 mg 28 tablets
Loratadine 10 mg 28 tablets
17 1 C09CA Candesartan 8 mg 28 tablets
Losartan 50 mg 28 tablets
Valsartan 40 mg 28 tablets
2 C09CA Candesartan 16 mg 28 tablets
Losartan 100 mg 28 tablets
Valsartan 80 mg 28 tablets
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6Transitioning to a national health
system in Cyprus: A stakeholder
analysis of pharmaceutical policy
reform
“I like maxims that don’t encourage behavior modification.”
– Bill Watterson, Calvin and Hobbes (19 Jan. 1991)
Key messages
• Cyprus is one of the few high-income countries in the world that has yet to
establish a national health system which covers a basic set of health care services
for all legal residents.
• There are issues in the country’s pharmaceutical sector, notably underuse of
generic medicines, high medicine prices, and high out-of-pocket drug spending.
• The national government will need to adapt its tendering system and other
pharmaceutical policies as it transitions to a national health system in 2017.
• A key challenge is how to raise awareness among patients, physicians, and
pharmacists about the benefits of greater generic drug use.
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Abstract
Context: Cyprus intends to introduce a national health insurance scheme in 2017. The
aim of this study was to review the pharmaceutical sector in Cyprus in terms of the
availability and affordability of medicines and to explore pharmaceutical policy options
for the national health system finance reform.
Methods: We conducted semi-structured interviews in April 2014 with senior repres-
entatives from seven key national organisations involved in pharmaceutical care. The
captured data were coded and analysed using the predetermined themes of pricing,
reimbursement, prescribing, dispensing, and cost sharing. We also examined secondary
data provided by the Cypriot Ministry of Health; these data included the prices and
volumes of prescription medicines in 2013.
Findings: We identified several key issues, including high medicine prices, underuse
of generic medicines, and high out-of-pocket drug spending. Most stakeholders recom-
mended the national government review existing pricing policies to ensure medicines
within the forthcoming national health system are affordable and available, introduce
a national reimbursement system and incentivize the prescribing and dispensing of
generic medicines. There were disagreements over how to (i) allocate responsibilities
to governmental agencies in the national health system, (ii) reconcile differences in
opinion between stakeholders and (iii) raise awareness among patients, physicians,
and pharmacists about the benefits of greater generic drug use.
Conclusions: In Cyprus, if the national health system is going to provide universal
health coverage in a sustainable fashion, then the national government must address
the current issues in the pharmaceutical sector. Importantly, the country will need to
increase the market share of generic medicines to contain drug spending.
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IN 2013, Cyprus had a population of about 858,000 and a gross domestic product(GDP) of about 16,500 euros (e) per capita. [433,434]1 The country’s health systemconsists of a public and a private sector. Individuals with annual incomes of no
more than e 15,400, the chronically ill and civil servants—together representing about
83% of the population—are eligible for public-sector coverage. [435] The government
pays for public-sector health care while patients and private health insurers pay for
private-sector health care. Total health expenditure is about 7.3% of the GDP. [344]
About 43% and 57% of health spending is publicly and privately funded, respect-
ively. [433] In 2010, pharmaceutical expenditure—e 322 per capita—accounted for
19.8% of total health expenditure in Cyprus. [433]
In 2013, Cyprus agreed to a memorandum of understanding with creditors from
the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund
and introduced an economic adjustment programme to address the country’s financial,
fiscal, and structural challenges. [436] The memorandum calls for the introduction of a
national health system finance reform to allow free choice of provider, social equality
and solidarity, financial sustainability, and universal coverage of a minimum benefit
basket. [437] Initially, the memorandum called for the introduction of a national health
system by mid-2016. The implementation of this health system is now expected to take
place in 2017.
In the forthcoming system, the government will pay for all health care services
in the benefit basket—subject to cost sharing—and supplement current tax revenues
with other sources of funding, including taxes on employers, employees, and pen-
sioners. [438] The reform will bring major changes in financing, coverage, provider
payment, and data collection and monitoring. [435] The government still needs to
decide which drugs to cover, which pricing and reimbursement policies to apply and
what type of cost sharing to introduce.
Given the lack of research on the Cypriot pharmaceutical system, [144, 439–442] the
aim of this study was to review the current system of pharmaceutical care in the private
and public sectors in terms of the availability and affordability of medicines. We also
wanted to explore how the public and private markets could be efficiently merged in
the national health system and to assess the key barriers to the implementation of the
new system.
1This chapter was published: Wouters OJ, Kanavos PG (2015). Transitioning to a national health system in
Cyprus: A stakeholder analysis of pharmaceutical policy reform. Bulletin of the World Health Organization,
93(9): 606-613.
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6.1 Methods
To collect primary data, we conducted interviews in April 2014 with senior representat-
ives from seven national organizations (Box 6.1). [443] The interviewees represented all
but one of the organizations involved in pharmaceutical care in Cyprus. The exception
was the Cyprus Medical Association, whose representatives were unavailable to meet.
The interviewees were jointly selected by the researchers, the World Health Organiza-
tion Regional Office for Europe, and the Cypriot Ministry of Health. We met with the
representatives from each organization separately over three days and each interview
lasted between 30 minutes and two hours. All interviews were held at the headquarters
of the health ministry’s department of pharmaceutical services, in Nicosia. At least
three members of this department were present at each interview.
Box 6.1: National organizations represented by interviewees, Cyprus (2014).
1. Cyprus Association of Pharmaceutical Companies, representing Cyp-
riot drug importers and distributors
2. Cyprus Association of Research and Development Pharmaceutical
Companies, representing research-based manufacturers
3. Cyprus Pharmaceutical and Chemical Manufacturing Company, rep-
resenting Cypriot manufacturers of generic drugs
4. Cyprus Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Association, representing Cyp-
riot pharmacists
5. Health Insurance Organization, the government agency in charge of
implementing the national health system reforms
6. Pancyprian Federation of Patients Associations and Friends, repres-
enting Cypriot patients
7. Ministry of health’s department of pharmaceutical services, the gov-
ernment department in charge of national pharmaceutical policies
The interviews were semi-structured (Box 6.2) but the discussions varied based on
the roles of each organization. One of the researchers and a ministry of health employee
took notes during each interview, and these notes were discussed with health ministry
officials after each meeting, to confirm our understanding of the data. We followed
the consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research checklist [444] and used
NVivo 10 (QSR International, Melbourne, Australia) to organize, code, and analyse the
interview data.
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The department of pharmaceutical services also provided secondary data to help us
understand the current policies and features of the pharmaceutical markets. These data
included the prices and volumes of all prescription medicines used in the public and
private sectors in 2013, relevant legislative documents and internal ministry of health
reports. The quantitative data were analysed using Excel 2007 (Microsoft, Redmond,
United States of America).
Box 6.2: Semi-structured interview template used to assess the Cypriot
pharmaceutical market.
1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the pharmaceutical policies
in the public sector?
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the pharmaceutical policies
in the private sector?
3. Which pharmaceutical policies should be changed before the introduc-
tion of the national health system reforms?
4. Which pharmaceutical policies should be applied in the national health
system?
5. What are the key barriers to the successful implementation of the
national health system reforms?
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6.2 Results
6.2.1 Current pharmaceutical policies
6.2.1.1 Public sector
Public-sector drugs, which are freely available to patients with public health insurance,
are procured centrally by the ministry of health through two types of tenders: open
invitations and negotiations. [144, 441]
In an open invitation, which is used for about 75% of the drugs consumed in the
public sector, the ministry of health issues a request for a quantity of drugs and invites
confidential bids from manufacturers worldwide. The manufacturer that offers the
lowest price is then asked to supply the entire market for two years. A tender category
usually includes a single molecule—ie, the originator brand drug and generic drugs
with the same active ingredient—but may also include all drugs that treat the same
condition—eg, the class of cholesterol-reducing drugs known as statins. The invitation
process lasts about eight months—excluding drug delivery time—and accounted for e
54.5 million of government expenditure in 2013. The remaining 25% of drugs used in
the public sector, which are mostly on-patent, are procured through negotiations and
accounted for e 50 million of government expenditure in 2013. Once a tender price has
been accepted by both the ministry of health and the manufacturer, it is legally binding
and cannot be changed.
The public-sector tender prices of generic drugs are usually 20-70% lower than the
private-sector wholesale prices. In extreme cases, prices in the private sector may be
more than 30-fold higher than in the public sector (Table 6.1). For on-patent drugs,
however, the public-sector prices are usually only 5-10% lower than the private-sector
prices.
For all tenders, the government buys the stock in three to four installments and
distributes the drugs to the 11 hospital and 34 retail pharmacies in Cyprus, which
together represent one public pharmacy for every 15,500 public-sector patients. Public-
sector pharmacists receive a government salary. The annual storage, distribution, and
dispensing costs for drugs sold in retail pharmacies total about e 6.3 million.
Table 6.2 summarizes the drug expenditure in the public sector for the year 2013;
the ten and 50 highest-selling products accounted for 17.6% and 44.0% of expenditure,
respectively. In the same year, there were 18 foreign research-based manufacturers that
each had over e 1 million in public-sector drug sales in Cyprus—together representing
56.0% of all such sales. All foreign manufacturers sell their drugs in Cyprus via about
45 importers. These importers serve as wholesalers and handle national pharmacovigil-
ance requirements. There are three Cypriot generic drug manufacturers, which export
as much as 93% of their output to foreign markets.
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Table 6.1: Anonymised tender results for three selected medicines, Cyprus (2013).
Product, condition, bid Quantity, packs Bid price, e /pack Budget impact, e a
Private-sector
wholesale price, e /pack
Product A (hypertension)
Bid 1 (winner) 36,000,000 0.0189 678,857 0.35
Bid 2 0.0223 804,000
Bid 3 0.0225 801,000
Bid 4 0.0239 861,428
Bid 5 0.026 936,000
Bid 6 0.0333 1,200,000
Bid 7 0.0411 1,478,571
Bid 8 0.0463 1,668,215
Bid 9 0.15 5,399,999
Product B (osteoporosis and
other bone disease)
Bid 1 (winner) 5,000 12 60,000 208.02
Bid 2 29.29 146,450
Bid 3 29.5 147,500
Bid 4 29.85 149,250
Bid 5 33.97 169,850
Bid 6 38.9 194,500
Bid 7 50.09 250,439
Bid 8 105 525,000
Bid 9 129 645,000
Product C (colorectal cancer)
Bid 1 (winner) 2,800 9.12 25,536 50.00
Bid 2 12.00 33,600
e , euros.
a Actual budget impact may vary due to rounding.
Source: Data provided by the Department of Pharmaceutical Services, Ministry of Health, Nicosia, Cyprus.
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All drugs sold in the Cypriot public sector are listed in a national formulary, which
included 1,767 products in 2013. Nearly all of the drugs used in Cyprus for the treat-
ment of cancer, haemophilia, hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and human immunodeficiency
virus are sold exclusively in public pharmacies because all patients with these illnesses
are eligible for public coverage. There is a co-payment plan, with an annual budget
of e 600,000, that allows public-sector patients to buy medicines only available in the
private sector.
Table 6.2: Drug expenditure in the public and private sectors, Cyprus (2013).
Category
Expenditure (millions of euros)a
Public sector Private sector
Prescription drugsb 98.5 80.6
Inpatient 59.5 9.7
Outpatient 39 70.9
On-patent originator brand 7.7 8.4
Off-patent originator brand 10.8 46.6
Generic 19.3 11.4
Vaccines and others 1.2 4.5
Over-the-counter drugs 5 14.3
Total drug expenditure 103.5 94.9
a Excluding value-added tax.
b Inpatient and outpatient drugs are sold in hospital and retail pharmacies, respectively.
Source: Data provided by the Department of Pharmaceutical Services, Ministry of Health, Nicosia,
Cyprus.
6.2.1.2 Private sector
Private-sector drug prices are set by the health ministry based on the recommendations
of a pricing committee. For on-patent products, this committee bases the Cypriot
wholesale price on the mean of the wholesale prices in one high-price country—ie,
Sweden, two medium-price countries—ie, Austria and France, and one low-price
country—ie, Greece. If a medicine is not available in one of these countries, the
committee uses the price in a pre-selected alternate country. To account for the cost
of importing the drug into Cyprus, the committee adds a 3% mark-up to the derived
mean price. The committee recalculates the prices of most drugs every two years. It
revises the price of each newly launched product annually for the first two years. The
private-sector prices in Cyprus are among the highest in Europe, [445] largely because
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this pricing system captures the official prices in the reference countries and does not
take into account confidential discounts.
After patent expiry, originator brand drugs continue to be priced through interna-
tional price referencing. Generic drugs must be priced at least 20% below the price of
the originator brand at the time of patent expiry. Consumption of generic drugs in the
private sector is low, partly because pharmacists are forbidden by law to substitute
such drugs for any originator brand drugs prescribed by physicians (Box 6.3).
In 2013 there were 481 private pharmacies in Cyprus—ie, about one for every 300
private-sector patients. The pharmacy price of a drug includes the pharmacist’s mark-
up and a value-added tax of 5%. The mark-up is determined by the wholesale price of
the drug pack and is set at 37%, 33%, and 25% for packs that cost no more than e 50,
between e 50 and e 250, and more than e 250, respectively. Private-sector pharmacists
also charge a flat fee of e 1.00 per prescription.
Table 6.2 summarizes the 2013 drug expenditure in the private sector. The ten and
50 highest-selling products accounted for 11.5% and 34.5% of private drug spending,
respectively. About 87% of the total health expenditure within the Cypriot private sec-
tor was out-of-pocket while private health insurers paid the rest. [344] Only 2,054 of the
5,241 products registered for sale in the private sector were available in 2013—mostly
because of insufficient demand for the other products.
Box 6.3: Current issues in the Cypriot pharmaceutical market (2014).
1. The private-sector prices are among the highest in Europe, largely
because international price referencing does not capture confidential
discounts in other countries.
2. On-patent drugs in the public sector are expensive. As public-sector
prices are published online—and may therefore influence prices in
countries that use the Cypriot prices for reference—manufacturers are
not willing to provide large discounts to the ministry of health. The
national association for research-based manufacturers has confirmed
this observation.
3. There is underuse of generic drugs in the private sector and generic
substitution by pharmacists is forbidden. Over 77% of spending in
private retail pharmacies is on branded products—ie, on-patent and
off-patent originator brands.
4. Although there is a national list of approved pharmaceutical products,
the government does not disseminate any prescribing guidelines and
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there are no information systems to monitor or control prescribing
behaviour.
5. There are few limits on the financial relationships between physicians
and manufacturers, which may lead to conflicts of interest.
6. Private-sector patients pay for drugs almost entirely out-of-pocket.
This could expose patients to undue financial risks or deter some from
seeking beneficial treatment.
6.2.2 Policy options
We investigated pharmaceutical policy options for the national health system, dividing
the main feedback and suggestions of the stakeholders into the categories of pricing,
reimbursement, prescribing, dispensing, and cost sharing. Below, to contextualize the
stakeholders’ statements, we have added references to relevant studies.
6.2.2.1 Pricing
The consensus was that reviewing the current pricing policies to facilitate the transition
to the national health system was important. To decrease the prices of on-patent
drugs in the public sector, the association representing research-based manufacturers
recommended the ministry of health keep price discounts confidential—thus limiting
the spill-over effect on markets that use Cypriot prices for reference. The health
ministry representatives agreed to investigate legal options that could be followed
to strike confidential agreements on drug prices. To reduce private-sector prices, the
ministry of health offered to adjust its system of international price referencing—eg, it
could apply the lowest price paid in the reference countries.
Stakeholders held differing views about which pricing policy to follow. The national
associations for drug importers, local generic drug manufacturers, pharmacists, and
research-based manufacturers each noted that there is a possible trade-off between low
prices and the availability of medicines. As Cyprus is a small market, these groups
posited that, if prices drop too low, the manufacturers of originator brand and generic
drugs might not sell their products in Cyprus—because it would produce insufficient
returns on the manufacturers’ investments and/or adversely affect prices in other
markets that use Cypriot prices for reference. The same groups urged the Cypriot
government to use international price referencing in any future national health system
and to apply a reimbursement system to receive confidential discounts. Other things
being equal, however, a small population size does not appear to be associated with a
relatively low market penetration by generic drugs. [8]
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The ministry of health claimed the current wholesale prices of drugs in the private
sector would be unaffordable in a national health system and that tendering could be
used more widely. The health insurance organization suggested the prices of drugs in
the national health system should be set somewhere between the current public- and
private-sector prices, but did not elaborate further.
6.2.2.2 Reimbursement
All stakeholders were in favour of introducing a national reimbursement system. The
health insurance organization intends to create a new national formulary and a reim-
bursement committee to manage it. Formularies can be used to specify the medicines
eligible for reimbursement and—alongside prescribing guidelines—encourage the
rational use of medicines. [446]
The health insurance organization and ministry of health are working independently
on criteria for the admission of new products to a future formulary. The ministry of
health suggested that, to guide the inclusion or non-inclusion of drugs in a national
formulary, the government should monitor, collect, and analyse all relevant clinical and
economic evidence from health technology assessment bodies in other countries. The
government could ask manufacturers to adapt foreign data on the cost-effectiveness of
drugs to local conditions.
The association for research-based manufacturers favoured the use of risk-sharing
schemes in the national health system. Such schemes could be applied to hedge against
uncertainties—at the time of a drug’s entry to the Cypriot market—regarding the
drug’s budget impact, clinical effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness. These schemes
grant manufacturers favourable reimbursement rates in return for achieving financial
or outcome targets. The health insurance organization is considering the use of risk-
sharing schemes. Although such schemes are widely used in Europe, they require
appropriate performance measurement and enforcement. [447, 448]
Finally, the health insurance organization noted that widespread tendering in a
unified national market could create supply disruptions, drive some generic drug
manufacturers out of business and lead to higher generic drug prices over time. The
organization proposed instead to use internal reference pricing and to tender selectively
if such pricing does not achieve adequate price reductions for some products. Internal
reference pricing sets a reimbursement ceiling based on the prices in a basket of drugs—
eg, the mean price of all drugs with the same active ingredient. If the price of a drug
exceeds the reference price, the patient usually has to pay the difference. Systematic
reviews have consistently found that such a policy can reduce drug prices and generate
savings. [116, 123, 125] The federation representing patients supported offering patients
the choice between a generic drug and an originator brand version at a higher price.
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6.2.2.3 Prescribing
Prescribing guidelines can have a beneficial impact on prescribing, when enforced ap-
propriately. [449–451] The Cypriot Ministry of Health plans to develop such guidelines
for conditions with a high budget impact. When appropriate, the ministry might adapt
guidelines published in other countries.
The interviewed representatives of the ministry of health, health insurance organiz-
ation and pharmacy association suggested the government enforce the prescribing of
generic drugs in the national health system. The health insurance organization aims
to introduce an electronic prescribing system to examine prescribing patterns and to
improve the quality of medicine use. The organization is reviewing other options to
encourage cost-effective prescribing, such as pay-for-performance schemes. It remains
unclear, from the evidence collected in other countries, whether pay-for-performance
schemes often achieve their intended goals. [452]
The Cypriot Ministry of Health believes there should be appropriate limits on drug
advertising and on the gifts and contributions given to physicians by drug manu-
facturers. One survey has found that, for Cypriot physicians, pharmaceutical sales
representatives are one of the most important sources of information on the safety and
efficacy of medicines. [453]
6.2.2.4 Dispensing
In some countries, if a physician prescribes an originator brand drug despite the
availability of a cheaper generic equivalent, pharmacists can override the physician’s
decision and dispense the generic drug instead. Depending on the country, such generic
substitution can be mandatory, [155] voluntary [115] or, as in Cyprus, forbidden. In
our interviews, both the ministry of health and health insurance organization favoured
mandatory generic substitution, which can speed up the market entry of generic drugs
and reduce pharmaceutical spending. [10] The federation representing patients opposed
such substitution, however, and stated that all treatment decisions should be made by
physicians.
Most sales (81.3%) in the Cypriot private sector in 2013 were for drug packs with
a wholesale price of no more than e 50 per pack. These packs were subject to one of
the highest pharmacy mark-ups in Europe, of 37%. [295] The ministry of health and
health insurance organization stressed that pharmacy mark-ups needed to be reduced
and revised in Cyprus to encourage the dispensing of generic drugs. However, the
interviewees from the association representing pharmacists expressed concern about
the poor macroeconomic conditions in Cyprus and, consequently, the financial viability
of pharmacies if the remuneration system were to change in any way that would reduce
the income of pharmacists.
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6.2.2.5 Cost sharing
The health insurance organization is exploring various cost-sharing options—ie, de-
ductibles, co-insurance or co-payments or any combination of these. The organization
is also considering whether to apply exemption criteria and cost-sharing caps to protect
patients financially. It may remove co-payments for conditions where compliance is an
issue, such as some psychiatric conditions. The interviewees from the federation repres-
enting patients stressed the importance of limits on cost sharing to protect vulnerable
groups like the chronically ill. The interviewees from the ministry of health stated that
the current out-of-pocket burden on private-sector patients was too high and that this
burden needed to be reduced in the national health system.
6.2.3 Barriers
We identified four key barriers to the successful implementation of a comprehensive
drug-benefit plan in the forthcoming national health system reforms.
First, it appeared difficult to obtain the buy-in of all stakeholders for the health
care reform. Notably, there was disagreement over whether the prices of prescription
medicines in the future system should be the current private-sector or public-sector
prices or lie somewhere between the two. Other disputes might arise, such as physicians
resisting the monitoring of prescribing habits. To resolve such disputes, it is important
to involve all stakeholders in the reform process.
Second, the governmental stakeholders—ie, the health insurance organization and
ministry of health—need to clarify their roles in the forthcoming system, particularly
regarding who will be in charge of reimbursement. Clear and transparent rules are
needed to allocate responsibilities. Since its inception, the Cypriot Ministry of Health
has been solely in charge of national pharmaceutical policies. Although the health
insurance organization was established in 2001, [438] it has only been actively engaged
in discussions with the ministry of health for the last few years.
Third, most of the proposed policy changes would need to be accompanied by
legislative changes, which may be time-consuming. Although the memorandum of
understanding provided a broad timeline for the implementation of a national health
system—including deadlines for key legislative changes—it allowed little time for
consensus-building and preparation.
Finally, the patient association stated that many patients—especially in the private
sector—do not perceive generic drugs to be as good as the originator drugs in terms of
safety and efficacy. It is possible that in Cyprus some physicians and pharmacists also
exhibit loyalty to brand name medicines. This may explain why generic substitution
has been forbidden in the Cypriot private sector. The government could launch a public
education campaign to promote the use of generic drugs. [150]
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6.3 Discussion and conclusions
Pharmaceutical policies should reflect national priorities for health and industrial policy,
including cost containment, employment, innovation, and trade promotion. [454] In
many countries, the main objectives of pharmaceutical policies are to ensure equitable
access to—and the good quality and rational use of—effective drugs. [23] The findings of
this study are meant to inform the ongoing policy deliberations in Cyprus. They can also
be used to inform discussions in other countries aiming to establish a comprehensive
drug-benefit plan under universal health coverage.
This study has some limitations. First, personal bias is unavoidable in interviews. To
minimize the risk of such bias, both interviewers closely followed an interview template.
Second, no representatives of the Cyprus Medical Association were available for an
interview during the study visit. Members of this association could have provided
valuable input on the prescribing environment. Finally, although this study looked at
reform in the pharmaceutical sector, a holistic analysis is needed to understand the full
impact of national health system reforms in Cyprus.
Over the next few years, there is a need to update the legislative and institutional
framework in Cyprus and to acquire data, through pilot studies and simulations, on
how health care might operate under the new system. There is a further need to build
capacity and to address issues before and after reforms are introduced. The government
should work to eliminate each of the four barriers identified. The Cypriot authorities
should also prepare for unforeseen problems that inevitably accompany large-scale
changes to health systems. Once new policies are implemented, the government should
continue to monitor the results.
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7Conclusion
“What are you after?” ... “Well,” said Zaphod airily, “It’s partly the curiosity, partly a
sense of adventure, but mostly I think it’s the fame and the money ...”
– Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy
Key messages
• It is important for policymakers and other health stakeholders to regularly mon-
itor the functioning of generic drug markets to quickly catch and address prob-
lems, such as shortages or large price hikes.
• Policymakers can calculate price indexes to get a sense of whether they are over-
paying for generic medicines or not, although it is important to recognize the
methodological pitfalls of such comparisons.
• Tendering is potentially one of the most efficient tools for governments or health
care bodies to procure medicines, but there is a lot of room for errors and uninten-
ded issues with a system as complex as tendering.
• Therapeutic tendering is a seemingly effective policy to cut spending on so-called
“me-too” medicines.
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Amix of factors, including aging populations, slowing economic growth, andrising costs of new drugs and medical technologies, have put pressure ongovernments to contain health care spending.1 Given these severe cost
pressures on health care budgets globally, some nations are reassessing, reforming, and
restructuring their models of health system financing. In this context, most health policy
analysts view generic medicines as a vital component of any strategy to improve access
to medicines and promote universal health care in both developed and developing
economies.
Substituting generic medicines for more expensive brand name versions is likely
among the most cost-effective interventions in health care systems. [14, 15, 71–73, 455,
456] Generic medicines are bioequivalent replicas of brand name drugs, containing
the same active ingredients and with identical quality, safety, and efficacy profiles. A
generic can be sold for a fraction of the price of the brand name drug as it is relatively
inexpensive to bring to market. Access to high-quality, low-cost generic medicines
is especially important at a time when many high-income countries have cut public
health care spending since the global economic downturn in 2008. [457, 458] In poorer
countries seeking to increase access to health care, the availability of generic medicines
can improve financial protection, reduce out-of-pocket spending, and enhance health
care quality and efficiency.
Yet there is wide disparity in access to generic drugs across high- and middle-income
countries, which has important economic and equity implications. The findings of this
thesis contribute to the evidence base on how to encourage generic drug use and to
stimulate price competition among generic drug companies, with a view to improve
access to medicines. The five Ph.D. studies present evidence which can be used to
inform generic drug policy reform in high- and middle-income countries aiming for
universal health coverage.
As discussed in Chapter 1, generic drug markets could, in theory, operate efficiently
under certain conditions. First, consumers must have access to information about
the price and quality of medicines to make informed decisions. It is often difficult
or impossible for patients to obtain these data. [459, 460]2 For a generic drug market
to operate efficiently, patients must be able to easily choose between interchangeable
products (ie, brand-name drugs and their generic counterparts) based on price3, which
1Some of the text in this chapter was published: Wouters OJ, Mckee M (2017). Private financing of health
care in times of economic crisis: A review of the evidence. Global Policy, 8(S2): 23-29.
2It could be argued that greater efforts should be made to systematically collect and disseminate easy-
to-understand data to patients, physicians, and pharmacists about the price and quality of medicines.
However, it would be important to determine the administrative costs this would entail, whether it
is even feasible given the complexities of health care decision-making, and whether all shortcomings
inherent to generic drug markets could be adequately addressed.
3This assumes all generic drugs are bioequivalent to their brand-name counterparts, which is not always
the case in low- and middle-income countries.
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should incentivise companies to compete on costs. However, consumers are often
insulated from the prices of medicines because of comprehensive drug insurance,
making them less cost-conscious. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that treatment
decisions are often taken by physicians, pharmacists, or insurers on behalf of patients.
As a result, traditional economic laws of supply and demand do not always hold.4
Second, patients, physicians, and pharmacists must hold evidence-based views and
perceptions about generic medicines, which, as explained in Chapter 2, is not always
the case. In reality, many patients and health care professionals view generics as being
less safe and effective than their brand-name counterparts.
In summary, although standard economic theory might predict that little or no
government regulation should be needed in generic drug markets to achieve low
generic drug prices and high usage rates, [116] empirical results from this thesis and
other studies reveal major failures in generic drug markets. Many commentators
therefore argue that these markets should be regulated to some extent—even if just
to prevent large price hikes for generic drugs—although the scale and nature of such
regulation are rarely specified. Indeed, generic drug markets in many countries are
heavily regulated. Yet governments in some countries, like the US, take a largely
laissez-faire approach to governing off-patent pharmaceutical markets.
These issues and contradictory approaches have fuelled debates about how to regu-
late generic drug markets to achieve low prices and high usage rates on a sustainable
basis. Although these debates are sometimes ideological, reflecting different views
about the relationship between the individual and the state with respect to government
intervention in free markets, they need to be evidence-based. The main aim of this
thesis was to examine issues relating to generic drug prices, usage rates, and policies.
This thesis focused on generic drug markets, given key differences between generic
and biosimilar products. As the US Food and Drug Administration explains [461]
A generic drug is the same as a brand name drug in dosage, safety, strength, how
it is taken, quality, performance, and intended use. Biological products include a
wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and blood components, allergenics,
somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins. Biologics
can be composed of sugars, proteins, or nucleic acids or complex combinations of
these substances, or may be living entities such as cells and tissues.
Generic and biosimilar drugs differ in terms of pricing, reimbursement, prescribing,
and dispensing, and cost sharing regulation. [462] There is ongoing debate over the
interchangeability and substitution of biological and biosimilar products, due to concern
that substitution may increase immunogenicity. [463] In the EU, substitution policies
for biological and biosimilar products are set at the national level. There is therefore a
4There have also been documented cases of generic drug firms colluding to fix the prices of generics, as
mentioned in Chapter 2. [220, 269]
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need to analyse generic and biosimilar markets separately.
7.1 Summary of key findings and contributions to the lit-
erature
The main research question posed in this thesis was: what are features of an efficient
generic drug market? This broad, overarching topic was broken down into five sub-
questions, each of which was addressed in one of the studies comprising this thesis.
1. How do generic drug prices, policies, and utilization rates compare across selected
high-income countries? (Article 1)
2. What are the methodological challenges to comparing generic drug prices across
countries? (Article 2)
3. What is the effect of pharmaceutical tendering on prices and competition over a
15-year period? (Article 3)
4. What is the price impact of tendering for medicines by therapeutic class? (Article
4)
5. What are features of a sustainable tendering system for generic drugs under
universal health coverage? (Article 5)
As a starting point for this thesis, I compared how generic drug prices, spending,
market shares, and policies compared across a wide range of high-income countries.
Chapters 2 and 3 (Articles 1 and 2) provide empirical evidence and methodological
guidance for generic drug price comparisons. These chapters also benchmark variation
in generic drug prices between countries against differences in pricing and reimburse-
ment policies for generics. A take-away message was that countries which relied on
tendering or tender-like systems in 2013 seemed to have among the lowest prices
among the countries included in the studies. This served as a starting point for more
in-depth analysis of tendering.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 (Articles 3, 4, and 5) provide data on the short- and long-term
effects of tendering. There are few published data on tendering, despite it potentially
being one of the most efficient policies for high- and middle-income countries to procure
medicines. Given that tenders are currently under consideration in many settings, it is
important to study existing systems to outline best practices.
Here I outline the key findings and empirical contributions to knowledge of each
study.5
5Parts of the text in the following subsections, like description of study objectives and results, appear in
the relevant sections of each chapter.
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7.1.1 Article 1
This study found that there are missed opportunities for significant savings from
generic drugs in Europe and the US.6
Shifting patients from branded to less expensive generic medicines is an important
way to contain health care costs. Yet the prices and prescription rates of generics
vary widely across Europe, resulting in missed opportunities for cash-strapped health
systems and patients. Policymakers in Europe and the U.S. should do more to break
down the barriers preventing timely access to affordable generic drugs for patients.
The study highlights the patchwork of policies in place in Europe and the US.
The study analysed 2013 data on the list prices7 and market shares of more than 3,000
generic drugs in 13 European countries and found the prices charged by manufacturers
in Switzerland are, on average, more than two and a half times those in Germany and
more than six times those in the United Kingdom, based on one commonly used price
index. The proportion of prescriptions filled with generics ranges from 17 per cent in
Switzerland to 83 per cent in the United Kingdom, among the countries included in
the study. By contrast, roughly 9 out of 10 prescriptions are filled generically in the
U.S. Having patients consume generic drugs instead of their more expensive brand
name counterparts is among the most cost-effective interventions in health care, with
potentially hundreds of millions of euros currently being wasted.
Based on a comprehensive literature review, this study identified numerous barriers
to the use generic drugs, including misperceptions among patients about the quality
of generic medicines and the lobbying powers of special interest groups. The article
analysed how regulators and policymakers in both Europe and the U.S. can (i) make
it easier for generic drugs to reach the market, (ii) stimulate price competition among
generic drug makers, and (iii) increase generic drug use.
These proposals come at a time when health systems worldwide are under financial
pressure. Notably, the U.S. has in recent years experienced a series of widely-criticized
price hikes for generic drugs. For example, the price of pyrimethamine (Daraprim), an
off-patent anti-infective medication used by HIV/AIDS patients, rose from $13.50 a
tablet to $750 overnight in 2015, despite having been around for decades at low cost in
the U.S.
6Some of the text in this subsection also appears in a summary of the paper I wrote for the London
School of Economics website (http://www.lse.ac.uk/News/Latest-news-from-LSE/2017/
09-September/Generic-medicine).
7List prices are official prices before discounts. The data does not reflect confidential rebates and
discounts.
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7.1.2 Article 2
In this study, I calculated all commonly used price indexes, using the same dataset as
in the first article, to highlight methodological challenges to comparing generic drug
prices across countries. I restricted the analysis to seven countries in order to increase
the sample size and to only include countries for which both ex-manufacturer and retail
data were available.
Consistent with the findings of Article 1, I observed large differences in generic
drug prices between these seven countries. However, the results varied, sometimes
dramatically, depending on the choice of index, base country, unit of volume, method
of currency conversion, price level (ie, ex-manufacturers vs. retail), and therapeutic
category.
Price indexes are one of the main statistical techniques that policymakers, regu-
lators, and other health stakeholders have at their disposal to gauge differences in
price levels between countries. In an era of ever-escalating drug prices, policymakers
should regularly benchmark prices in their own countries against those of neighboring
countries—or countries with similar income levels—to ensure they are not over-paying
for generic drugs. This is especially important in resource-constrained settings, where
generic medicines can generate savings and free up budget space.
However, health policy analysts applying these methods should be aware of the
many methodological pitfalls which can influence the results of such analyses. When
concerns about price levels in a country exist, drug price indexes should ideally be
supplemented by quantitative analyses of drug policies, price analyses of individual
products, and qualitative analyses to understand the nature and potential causes of
observed issues.
7.1.3 Article 3
This study found that tendering can be an effective policy to procure essential medicines
at low prices, based on analysis of data from South Africa.
The average prices of antiretroviral therapies, anti-infective medicines, small-volume
parenterals, drops and inhalers, solid-dose medicines, and family-planning agents
dropped by roughly 50% or more over this period in the country, based on price index
calculations. Moreover, many tender contracts in South Africa remained competitive
over time, based on Herfindahl-Hirschman results, with some notable exceptions. This
offers important counter-evidence against claims made by some commentators that
tendering systems are likely to lead to higher prices in the long-run, among other
disadvantages. There remains concern that tendering might drive companies out of
business, [325] so more work is needed to study the impact of centralised procurement
systems on market structures. Indeed, the number of firms winning contracts decreased
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steadily in most South African tender contracts between 2003 and 2016.
Tendering is potentially one of the most efficient platforms for setting medicine
prices and purchasing products in bulk. As a centralised procedure, tendering allows
national governments—or sub-national bodies, if tendering is done at a regional level—
to achieve economies of scale and scope, realize administrative savings, and improve
price transparency. Health policy analysts attribute the large savings observed in
existing analyses of tendering systems to the ability of a monopsony (eg, a single
purchaser of medicines on behalf of a large number of patients) to drive prices down
aggressively for the products and services it covers.
Yet there is a lot of room for errors and unintended issues with a system as complex
as tendering. Notably, there were large discrepancies between the drug quantities
the South African health ministry estimated it would need to meet patient demand
and the quantities the ministry went on to procure during tender period. The number
of different firms winning contracts decreased over time in most tender categories, a
situation which the health ministry should continue to monitor to prevent any future
price hikes or supply disruptions.
There is also growing anecdotal and empirical evidence indicating that product
shortages occur regularly in south Africa. The effects of stock-outs are significant:
apart from the cost implications for the government of buying off-contract—often at
a substantial premium—it may reduce patient trust in the system and can threaten
treatment adherence.
7.1.4 Article 4
This study found that the introduction of therapeutic tendering in South Africa in 2014
was associated with large drops in the prices of solid-dose medicines, which likely
saved the South African health ministry millions of rand in that year.
Given the rapidly increasing prices of many new medicines and the proliferation of
me-too medicines, it is important for payers and regulators to incentivise drug firms to
produce medicines which provide additional therapeutic benefit. One challenge is to
stimulate price competition when medicines are protected by patents or other forms
of market exclusivity, which grant firms monopoly pricing powers. In these cases, a
policy option is to tender for medicines by therapeutic class.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first quasi-experimental study of the impact
of therapeutic tendering on medicine prices and spending. The South African health
ministry introduced such a system for a solid-dose medicines in 2014, the largest tender
category in the country. I ran various difference-in-differences regression models, with
and without adjustments for covariates, to estimate the impact of the new policy on
drug prices and spending. I also ran robustness checks (ie, placebo tests and collapsed
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pre-intervention data) to examine the reliability of the results.
The findings consistently showed that the policy was associated with large declines
in the prices of medicines subjected to the policy, ranging from an average of 33% to
44%, depending on the model. The findings suggest that such a decline likely led to
savings of more than ZAR 1 billion for the health ministry in 2014 for these products.
Future studies should re-examine the South African therapeutic tendering system
once data from more post-intervention periods are available, possibly using other
research designs like interrupted time-series models (ie, segmented regression analysis).
It is important to determine whether the findings in this thesis can be replicated, and
whether they hold for other types of medicines (eg, injectables).
7.1.5 Article 5
This study outlined a blueprint for how Cyprus can move from a fragmented health care
system—one in which there are parallel public and private systems—to a single-payer
one, using tendering as the basis for a comprehensive drug-benefit plan.8
Cyprus is one of the few high-income countries in the world that has yet to establish
a national health system that covers a basic set of health care services for all legal
residents. At the time of the study, the government was aiming to introduce a national
health system by 2017, and needed to decide which drugs to cover in the forthcoming
health care system, which pricing and reimbursement policies to apply, and how much
patients would have to pay for medicines.
To collect primary data, we conducted a four-day study visit to Cyprus in April
2014. During the visit, we interviewed senior representatives from seven national
organizations involved in pharmaceutical care in the country. These organisations
represented various stakeholders, including research-based and generic drug manufac-
turers, pharmacists, patients, and relevant government agencies. The health ministry’s
department of pharmaceutical services also provided secondary data on the prices and
volumes of prescription medicines in 2013.
We identified several key issues, notably the underuse of generic medicines in
the private sector, high medicine prices in both sectors and high out-of-pocket drug
spending in the private sector. We also analyzed pharmaceutical policy options—based
on the feedback and suggestions from the interviewees—to inform the ongoing reform
process. The article also discussed likely barriers to the introduction of a comprehensive
drug-benefit plan in the forthcoming national health system. Barriers include how to
reconcile disagreements between stakeholders over which policies to adopt in the new
8Some of the text in this subsection also appears in a case study I wrote for the London School of
Economics website (http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/researchImpact/
caseStudies/kanavos-wouters-enabling-health-care-reform-in-the-Republic-
of-Cyprus.aspx).
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system, as well as how to raise awareness among patients, physicians and pharmacists
about the benefits of greater generic drug use.
7.2 Policy implications
7.2.1 Generic drug prices, usage, and policies
Following the worst global economic downturn since the Great Depression in the 1930s,
there is renewed pressure on governments and health stakeholders to control health
spending and to obtain good value for money in health care systems. Between 2008 and
2015, several European governments implemented generic drug policies to help control
costs. [149, 224, 464, 465] During this period, Slovakia introduced voluntary generic
prescribing, which was previously forbidden. Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Portugal,
and Spain made generic prescribing compulsory. Greece and Portugal made generic
substitution compulsory. And Finland introduced internal reference pricing.
Yet the results of the first and second articles suggest that many countries need to
do a better job of obtaining lower prices from generic drug firms and more effectively
control the distribution chain for pharmaceuticals. There remain large differences
between countries in generic drug prices and rates of generic drug usage. An immediate
priority is to persuade more physicians, pharmacists, and patients that generic drugs
are bioequivalent to branded products, although this may take time. In the meanwhile,
much could be achieved by requiring generic prescribing and substitution where such
policies are not yet in place.
The regulatory environment for generic medicines and the structure of health care
systems vary widely across countries. Therefore, it is unlikely that there is any one-
size-fits-all solution to regulate generic drug markets. Instead, it is possible that a
particular form of a policy might play a beneficial role in a specific setting but not
in another. Thus, given the current state of knowledge, any calls to implement a
particular pharmaceutical policy should, ideally, be accompanied by robust evidence,
such as real-world pilot studies. Moreover, as the designs of generic drug policies are
heterogeneous, it is necessary to assess the strengths and weaknesses of individual
systems. Also, because different interventions are often implemented at the same
time, it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the contribution of each policy change.
It is therefore important to pay attention to the context in which these reforms are
implemented before generalising findings from one setting to another.
Price indexes are one of the most useful statistical tools at the disposal of policy-
makers to gauge how price levels compare across countries. Yet medicines differ within
and between countries in strengths and formulations, as well as other factors (see
Chapter 3). There is a trade-off between matching all these variables and the sample
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size. The second study in this thesis illustrates how price-index calculations can differ
dramatically depending on the choice of method. This offers insights for policymakers
wishing to apply such methods. Another approach would be to compare the prices of
individual “reference” products for various active ingredients. However, there is no
obvious way to choose a strength-form combination to look at, and not all combinations
will be available internationally, so researchers might end up with a small sample size.
In short, while price indexes are a useful tool to assess how prices vary across countries,
it is important to interpret the results with caution given these limitations.
7.2.2 Tendering and joint procurement
The thesis gives some of the first evidence internationally on how a tendering system
influences medicines prices and competition over a period of ten years or longer.
This is timely given that a growing number of countries in Europe and elsewhere
are considering using such systems. [129, 140] Moreover, the research on the Cypriot
tendering system can inform the ongoing health care reforms in the country. [466]
The results of these studies show that while tendering can achieve low prices in both
the short- and long-term, it is important to recognize and proactively address issues
which may arise, such as supply disruptions and mis-estimates of required quantities.
It is important for policymakers aiming to introduce tendering to examine what role
strategic procurement can play in the drug sector, and how to best leverage purchasing
power to improve efficiency. As outlined in Chapter 4, policymakers should consider
trade-offs between obtaining the lowest possible prices for medicinal products and
other policy objectives (eg, industrial growth, split contracts to reduce the risk of supply
disruptions, etc.).
Therapeutic tendering is potentially a very effective tool to reduce spending on
patent-protected products which offer little additional therapeutic value (ie, “me-too”
drugs), as shown in Chapter 5. To increase the cost savings from tendering, policy-
makers should promote competition between companies by facilitating generic market
entry. It is important for government agencies or other bodies advertising tenders
to attract bids from as many local and international manufacturers with marketing
authorization as possible.
Moreover, there is growing interest in joint pharmaceutical procurement between
countries with similar income levels and disease profiles (eg, Nordic countries; Belgium,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). [33, 467] This is sometimes referred to as regional
group or pooled procurement of medicines. Tendering might be a suitable platform for
such procurement, which requires “shared political will, sharing of information and
experience, capacity-building, and harmonization”. [33] It is increasingly important for
national governments to cooperate to get the best possible deals for their patients given
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the spiraling costs of many medicines.
Group purchasing of medicines and other health technologies can create economies
of scale and reduce transaction costs. It can potentially take place in public or private
sectors, and at any level of health care systems. [468] Successful examples include
the Pan American Health Organization’s Revolving Fund, which purchases 46 vac-
cines (eg, polio, measles, yellow fever, rotavirus, and human papillomavirus vaccines)
on behalf of governments in 41 countries and territories in Latin America and the
Caribbean, [469–471] and the Gulf Cooperation Council Group Purchasing Program,
which purchases essential medicines and medical supplies for governments in six
Middle Eastern countries. [472] The EU has successfully issued tenders for some health
products, including gloves and Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) tuberculosis vaccines.
There is also interest in issuing tenders at EU level for new, expensive hepatitis C medi-
cines. [33] Yet in Europe, despite harmonization of rules for public procurement (eg,
EU Public Procurement Directive 2014), there is a need for more operational research
and transparency to implement joint procurement.
7.3 Key limitations
In each of the five articles presented in this thesis, I outlined specific limitations which
may have impacted the results of each paper. Here I elaborate on three cross-cutting
limitations which affected most of the studies in this thesis. These issues are important
for researchers on generic drug markets to consider in future studies.
7.3.1 List prices
The data in the first two articles did not reflect confidential discounts, which can be
sizable for generic drugs in some countries. [294]
The lack of reliable data on confidential discounts is an issue which plagues most
drug price comparisons and analyses, often leaving researchers with no choice but to
rely on list prices. Drug firms regularly use this caveat to argue in regulatory filings
that the findings of such analyses are flawed and do not reflect the actual prices they are
offering to payers. [473, 474] However, without better access to such data—which drug
firms usually keep confidential, stating they are commercially sensitive in nature—it
is difficult for health policy researchers to get a better idea of how medicine prices
compare across countries. With the prices of medicines in many therapeutic areas rising
rapidly, it is more important than ever for health policy analysts, governmental bodies,
and other stakeholders to promote price transparency in drug markets. Otherwise,
drug firms hold a strong advantage when negotiating prices in different countries.
235
7.3.2 Price indexes
All drug price indexes suffer from important limitations, which is why I explored the
methodological issues inherent to such analyses in the second article.
Laspeyres indexes answer the following question: if the base country paid the same
prices for a sample of drugs as a comparator country, what would happen to drug
spending? An index value of 120 for a foreign country, for example, indicates that
expenditure in the base country would rise by 20% if it paid the prices found in the
foreign country, assuming consumption remained constant. Another way to say this is
that prices are, on average, 20% higher in the foreign country for the sample of drugs.
Conversely, an index value of 80 suggests that the base country would reduce spending
by 20% if it paid the same prices as the foreign country. Paasche indexes are interpreted
similarly, but under the assumption that demand in the base country would look like
that of each comparator country given the same prices. In most cases, Laspeyres and
Paasche indexes can be thought of as lower- and upper-bound estimates, respectively,
of potential savings in the base country. [206] Fisher indexes is the geometric mean of
the Paasche and Laspeyres indexes, so Fisher results lie between the other two.
Uncertainty around the true underlying price elasticity—as well as the relative
impact of other factors which influence demand, such as standards of care, disease
prevalence rates, prescription drug coverage, and patient preferences—make it difficult
to determine which index is most appropriate. This issue is compounded by the fact
that there is no perfect measure of quantity for price indexes, there is uncertainty
around whether purchasing power parities or exchange rates are more appropriate for
currency conversions, and the choice of base country affects the results of Laspeyres
and Fisher indexes.9
7.3.3 External validity
There are important threats to the external validity (ie, generalizability) of the findings
in the last three articles on tendering systems.
It is important to examine the generalizability of the findings across countries:
while the tendering models in Cyprus and South Africa may be suitable for those
settings, they may be less effective—or even have adverse consequences—if used by
policymakers in other countries. The results of these studies cannot necessarily be
used to justify the use of tendering elsewhere. As a general rule, it is not advisable
to transplant pharmaceutical policies from one country to another without careful
consideration of the local regulatory and pharmaceutical environment.
9The latter issue is arguably less important for policymakers in individual countries, since the home
country is usually chosen as the base.
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Similarly, the results of the fourth article on therapeutic tendering should be inter-
preted with caution. The study only examined the impact of therapeutic tendering
on solid-dose medicines, so the results may not hold for other types of products (eg,
injectables and liquids). Also, because I only had data from one post-intervention
period, it was not possible to determine any changes in the underlying price trends.
The effect of therapeutic tendering is also dependent on when the policy is introduced
(ie, “status quo” prior to implementation). Point estimates are likely to differ if the
policy is introduced after tendering is used for years, as was the case in South Africa,
or immediately introduced without tendering having been used previously.
In summary, it is difficult to extrapolate the findings in the last three articles to other
tendering systems, given the unique features of the South African and Cypriot systems
(eg, broad-based black economic empowerment scheme). Data from more countries are
needed to validate these findings.
7.4 Ideas for future research
There are a number of possible extensions to the empirical evidence presented in this
thesis.
First, more research is needed to better understand the drivers of differences in
generic drug prices between countries. Future studies could conduct regression ana-
lyses to examine the association between generic drug policies (Table 1.2) and prices.
I chose not to do this in the first two articles of this thesis for several reasons. Most
importantly, I did not have information about some potential confounders, such as
the time since patent expiry or loss of data exclusivity (whichever happened last), the
drug indications, and the number of competitors on the market. I would not have been
able to control for these factors. Moreover, I only had data for a single year, and it
would be difficult to make causal inferences with a cross-sectional study design. Also, a
sample size of ten countries would have been too small to conduct meaningful analyses
with fixed effects. For example, the UK was the only country in 2013 that allowed
free pricing with no other supply-side measures besides regulation of the distribution
chain (Table 1.2). In such a case, it would be unclear whether a dummy variable for
free pricing would capture the effect of the policy on generic drug prices, or the effect
of unobserved country characteristics which are correlated with generic drug prices.
Future research could conduct these types of analyses using longitudinal data from a
larger sample of countries.
Second, additional work is needed to improve procurement procedures and supply
management in tendering countries. It is important to study the most appropriate
use of tendering in a particular setting. In some countries, national or regional bodies
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buy drugs centrally and then supply health care institutions; elsewhere procurement
is decentralised at the health institution or facility level. In some jurisdictions, it is
possible that tendering should serve a back-up role as a strategic measure when other
pharmaceutical policies do not deliver appropriate prices. In such cases, however, it
would be important to clearly define what threshold should trigger the use of tendering.
In summary, variation in reimbursement processes and administrative structures across
jurisdictions may mean that a particular form of tendering is most appropriate in a
given setting.
Third, it is important to study which factors and enablers are necessary for joint
pharmaceutical procurement models to succeed. There is growing interest in such
schemes, which require regional or sub-regional collaboration. For instance, national
governments in several countries might band together to facilitate access to costly new
medicines.
Fourth, data from more countries, especially low- and middle-income ones, are
needed to determine which features of tendering systems are associated with lower
prices. Additional research should examine the relationship between the quantities,
number of bidders, and prices achieved through tendering. Researchers should ana-
lyse whether it is the quantity being tendered for or the number of bidders which is
important for achieving large price reductions. It might be also be relevant to consider
the size of suppliers (eg, in terms of number of products or market value), since smaller
companies might be the first ones to disappear from the market if they are unable to
cope with high levels of competition.
Fifth, future studies should re-examine the South African therapeutic tendering sys-
tem once data from more post-intervention periods are available, possibly using other
research designs like interrupted time-series analyses (ie, segmented regression model).
A key limitation in the fourth article was that I only had access to one post-intervention
observation, meaning I was unable to determine any change in the underlying price
trends. Instead, I calculated a point estimate of the immediate impact of the policy
change on prices. Also, similar analyses should be conducted for other medicine cat-
egories to examine the generalizability of the findings to other medicine forms (ie,
non-solid dose drugs) and to specific therapeutic areas.
Finally, more research is needed to examine pricing and reimbursement issues in
biosimilar drug markets. Biosimilar products are a recent innovation: the European
Medicines Agency and US Food and Drug Administration approved their first biosim-
ilar products in 2006 and 2015, respectively. [463] Yet in recent years, a number of
insurers and health care systems have begun exploring whether biosimilars can be
considered perfect substitutes to the originator biological products. [87] As more data
become available, it is important to understand the impact of different supply- and
demand-side policies on biosimilar drug prices and usage rates.
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7.5 Final thoughts
Generics can generate large savings, especially for widely-consumed pharmaceuticals.
This is particularly important at a time when many governments worldwide are facing
budgetary pressures and are struggling to finance public health care. Under such
conditions, payers and other health stakeholders should aim to minimise the prices
and maximise the volume market shares of generic drugs.
It is widely acknowledged that market failures contribute, at least in part, to high
generic drug prices and low generic drug use in some countries. As shown in this
thesis, the prices and market shares vary dramatically across many countries. Given
market failures in generic drug sectors, policymakers should consider implementing
regulation to try to correct some of these failures.
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis points to tendering being an effective
measure to stimulate price competition on a sustainable basis and to increase generic
drug use—if coupled with mandatory generic substitution. Still, governments seeking
to implement new pharmaceutical policies, such as tendering, should ideally test their
proposals in real-world pilot studies.
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